made under Secretary of War Baker early in 1917, before we went into the war. That report, which I understand is now out of print, was Senate Document 664, of the Sixty-fourth Congress, second session. I made several extracts, because I understand that the complete report was out of print at this time and not available. The report emphasizes a great many of the things which have been said about this bill, and, in addition, it answers some of the objections which may be anticipated as to the attitude of the private manufacturer and his interest in this matter.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you.

(The extracts from the Kernan report above referred to are as follows:)

[From the Kernan report on "Government manufacture of arms, munitions, and equip99 ment (S. Doc. No. 664, 64th Cong., 2d sess.)]

THE ATTITUDE OF THE PRIVATE MANUFACTURER

No feature of the board's experience is more impressive than the attitude of private manufacturers to this whole question of preparedness. It is clear that the enormous difficulties they themselves have experienced in arriving at successful production, combined with the extraordinary size of the foreign demand, has sunk deep and made a lasting impression that the carrying on of modern war is a task of stupendous magnitude and of extreme difficulty from every angle. They are more than willing to cooperate; they are anxious to do so, fully realizing that in successful cooperation with the Government lies the best if not the only certain chance of success. Apprehension has been expressed that Government contracts and a potential capacity to turn out war material might foster the growth of a class whose profitable interests would lie in war, and who, in consequence, might in time become a danger to the State. It is not the belief of this board that any such danger exists in our country. The number of plants and of persons concerned, when considered in reference to the whole country, the total of industrial plants and of people, is relatively too insignificant. We know the function of the leaven in respect to the mass; but we know, too, that the mass must be adapted to the particular leaven if anticipated results are to follow, and it is impossible to believe that we constitute a mass responsive to a leaven of warlike provocation and ready to belie our strongest characteristics by taking on, under the workings of an insidious few, the nature of a war-seeking people.

But we find no ground for supposing private industry, cooperating with the Government in the manufacture of arms and ammunition, would constitute such a leaven. On the contrary, we found the feeling prevalent that the outbreak of any hostilities would be the signal for the Government to take practical possession of such private plants as were prepared to manufacture arms and "cut all of the profits out of war." Indeed, the board could see no way in which they could hope to derive any benefits from war in which this country is involved. On the contrary, they all realized that their industries, in such event, would have to cease and their plants would be turned over to the Government upon whatever terms the Government chose to fix. Domestic peace, not war, offers them the occasion for profit.

On the other hand, we can not fail to realize that the danger of a national catastrophe through a lost war is a real danger which we have to provide against, and only through such cooperation with private industry can it be practically done (pp. 15, 16).

If carried out as a policy this plan [exclusive dependence on Government manufacture] would work evil in two comprehensive ways. First, it makes no provision for supplying the necessarily increased demands when war comes, but leaves the very essence of genuine preparedness to be improvised when war is upon us. Second, it destroys the capacity of all private plants to give assistance to the Government; a capacity now large, organized, and efficient because of its development through the European war at no cost to our Government. It takes from 18 months to 3 years to re-create that capacity when once destroyed-to increase the Government plants and assemble the organizations to

operate them efficiently or to turn private industrial plants into munition factories. If our purpose be to prepare to protect and defend the country in time of need, then it is essential first and foremost to provide for an adequate reserve of arms and ammunition as soon as practicable and then to provide a capacity to produce a sufficient supply when and as needed under any reasonable conditions we may be called upon to face.

From the foregoing considerations it appears to the board impossible to escape the conclusion that it is not desirable for the Government to undertake, unaided by private plants, to provide for its needs in arms, munitions, and equipment. Nor is it feasible or practicable to do so in any sense except in the restricted sense of a mere physical possibility.

The board, in considering the question of the desirability of depending largely upon private plants for war material in case of hostilities, inevitably had its attention drawn to the ways and means by which that object could be best effected; and here a rich fund of experience has been acquired by the numerous plants undertaking war orders for the European combatants. It may be well to point out that practically every variety of carriage, of gun, of projectile, of powder, and of partially-prepared material has been made and shipped, so that the American manufacturers' experience is varied as well as large, and marked by costly mistakes as well as successful achievement (page 12).

These considerations make impossible exclusive Government manufacture, not only because of the enormous capital locked up and wasted through the nonuse and deterioration of a large portion of the plants in which it is invested in peace years, but more strongly still because such a plan spells delayand long delay-which in turn may spell disaster.

If we are preparing for offensive war, we can, of course, take our time, but if our preparation be solely for defense, for insurance against the aggression or attack of other nations, we can not know when such insurance may be needed. Indeed, we can not fail to recognize the period succeeding the present European war as one fraught with much difficulty and danger. And we can not insure against contingencies which may then arise, except by taking advantage of our present opportunity promptly and vigorously (p. 11).

STATEMENT OF EDWARD G. CURTIS, OF NEW YORK, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, VARIOUS OTHER ENGINEERING SOCIETIES, AND THE NEW YORK ORDNANCE PROCUREMENT DISTRICT

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state for the record what concern you represent?

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here representing the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American Society of Electrical Engineers, the American Society of Chemical Engineers, the Society of Industrial Engineers, four State engineering societies, nine city engineering societies, and the New York Ordnance Procurement District. I am a reserve officer of the United States Army, having also served my time in France and in this country during the last war.

The engineering societies, of course, require no introduction to you; but the New York ordnance district possiby may.

The country is divided into 14 procurement districts for the purpose of getting ordnance matériel in time of war. The personnel of these districts has been recruited from civil life. All of us who are members of these district organizations are serving without pay. We are endeavoring, under the direction of the War Department, and have been so endeavoring for the last several years, to procure information looking to preparedness, to find plants that are capable of manufacturing ordnance matériel, what plants are capable of manufacturing what, and making actual arrangements with those plants

in anticipation of defensive war. Now we have reached the point, after these many years of work, where there is practically nothing more for us to do unless, by educational orders coming through, we can carry the work on to actual practical demonstration of accomplishment.

So much has been well said, that it would be, I think, entirely out of place for me to undertake to make a summary of the arguments in favor of this bill. I will simply say that all these engineering societies and the ordnance procurement districts, after long and careful study of the procurement problem, are wholly and without reservation in favor of the passage of this bill as it stands.

I had intended to make a general summary of all that had been said, but it seems to me that the questions I have heard asked to-day and the answering statements I have heard General Ruggles make with his great clearness and precision, have made any such summary unnecessary. Instead of being illuminating I should only be boring if I undertook to summarize arguments that have quite evidently been well grasped by the committee.

But I do wish to give one graphic demonstration of the difficulties involved in manufacturing ordnance materiél, pointing to the necessity of giving manufacturers advance practice in producing such materiel if we expect them to function well and promptly in an emergency. Yesterday one of the gentlemen of the committee made a very good point: That while the discussion of the difficulties of manufacturing the French 75 recuperator was highly interesting, it would have been more persuasive if they had taken something less special-something with which at least some of our manufacturers had some familiarity already. Consequently, I will now do so. I will take something quite ordinary and relatively simple, as ordnance materiel goes.

Here is the hammer of an automatic pistol such as we use in the Army [producing sample]. It is one of 54 parts that make up that pistol and is by no means the most difficult part to make. Here producing a large number of papers] are the charts and graphs for the machine tools, and the directions for making, not the pistol but merely this piece-this little hammer. I put them on the table so that the committee can get by this one fair sample a visualization of the actually studendous difficulty of making ordnance matériel.

Why should it be so difficult? Because each portion of ordnance matériel must be absolutely accurate, for reasons already stated. Interchangeability of parts is a necessity that has been touched upon; but there is another point that I want to illustrate by a story.

In France in 1918-I think General Ruggles will remember the incident-some pistols got over there that had a little bit of a defect. I think it was in the sere. The sere is one of the parts of the pistol that controls the action of the hammer and some other inter-related parts. The result was that when a man fired the pistol, instead of firing one shot the pistol behaved more or less like a machine gun, and carried on, firing several shots in succession. That is a pistol practically out of control. What that would mean in actual service, if such errors crept in in any great numbers, is obvious enough.

I will give one or two more illustrations, for while much has been said about this point of accuracy and consequent difficulties of

manufacture, too little has been said about why this accuracy has to be.

Perhaps the committee is not familiar with the shape of a shell. Shells nowadays are formed with what is known as a boat-tail. A peculiar shaping of the rear end of the shell has been found so to reduce air-resistance factors that the shell will carry a very great distance farther than when made in the old shape; but if that portion of the shell by error in manufacture, is incorrect so that it is out of shape, that shell may fall 300 yards short of where it is intended to fall.

Mr. WURZBACH. Three hundred yards out of what total distance? Mr. CURTIS. Three hundred yards short of the target or point aimed at under average battle conditions.

General RUGGLES. It is liable to fall much farther short than that. Mr. CURTIS. General Ruggles helps me by his knowledge that it will fall even much farther short than that.

Now, let us carry this supposition further. Suppose all of us here in this room are with the troops advancing behind a barrage. We are going forward with a barrage being dropped ahead of us, the artillery to our rear progressively elevating its barrels to keep the curtain of falling and bursting shells moving along just ahead of us; and then as we go on the shells from our own artillery begin to fall a thousand feet short! That means that our troops are being shelled by our own artillery! Merely because the shell makers had blundered.

Suppose that in firing a piece of artillery at a certain target 10 miles away there is a defect ever, ever so slight in the sighting and fire-control mechanism—a resultant error that would make a difference in the pointing of the gun, we will say, of a fraction of a degree in terms of angularity. Multiply that error by 10 miles, and we find our shells falling nowhere near what we are shooting for, and the gun is thus out of commission for all practical purposes.

Consequently, I make the point that all these difficulties of manufacturing ordnance matériel are not difficulties set up arbitrarily or because the Government is more fussy than it needs to be, but they are difficulties involved in making instruments of precision, and that is what good ordnance matériel is.

I ask permission to file for Col. James L. Walsh, chief of the New York ordnance district, this printed circular, which outlines the organization of our district there, and in so doing gives you a certain idea of the organization of the 13 other similar districts.

(The circular referred to is filed with the clerk of the committee.) Mr. CURTIS. I also ask permission to have filed such further representations as Colonel Walsh may wish to make, because he is unble to be here, and may want to add somethink to the record. The CHAIRMAN. That may be done.

Mr. WURZBACH. Those 14 districts cover the United States?
Mr. CURTIS. Yes; they do.

Mr. WURZBACH. They do not correspond, do they, with the corps areas?

Mr. CURTIS. Not necessarily; no, sir. I should like to have you take away a clear mental picture as to the activities of these districts. We are volunteers. We work without advertisement, without parades or public functions. Our aim is to get commerce and industry

actually and genuinely prepared without ostentation, jingoism, or pretense of any kind, so as to be ready to act promptly and efficiently under the Army's direction when and if action becomes necessary.

The ideal preparedness, toward which we are quietly working, is this: That if a war were declared it would only be necessary for the Secretary of War, through the General Staff, or whatever the channel may be, to send out identical telegrams to all the factories, reading something like this:

War declared to-day. Proceed in accordance with your instructions.

That is all; whereupon each factory would promptly start, knowing what it was to do; what it had to make, how much, how soon, and by virtue of experience with educational orders, able to make it right, and promptly. And we of the engineering societies and the ordnance procurement districts, speaking without bias or personal advantage to be gained, speaking after years of study of the preparedness problem, support this bill as the necessary remaining step to assure us all that when our millions of men spring to defensive arms they will have good arms to spring to, and have them promptly enough to achieve military success.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Curtis, I wish you would also put in the record the number of charts and blue prints required to make that part-the hammer of the automatic pistol. We can not put in the charts and blue prints themselves, of course.

Mr. CURTIS. Yes, sir; I will count the papers, and report the number.

(Mr. Curtis afterwards stated that there were approximately 200 papers.)

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions? Does any other member of the committee desire to ask questions of Mr. Curtis? If not, is there any one else here who desires to be heard?

I think that concludes the hearing.

General Ruggles, do you wish to make any general statement at all?

General RUGGLES. I do not think so, Mr. Chairman.

Mrs. ROGERS. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mrs. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I think I have in my office data that show what some of the other countries are doing along this same line, if you would like to have that go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. If you desire it to go in, we should be glad to have it.

Mrs. ROGERS. In 1918 I saw a practical illustration of what defective munitions can do to an officer or a soldier. There was a British soldier there who was blinded by the explosion of a machine gun.

General RUGGLES. I might say-I do not know whether I mentioned it, Mr. Chairman-that we have, as you know, a general mobilization program prepared by the General Staff. That plan is rather indefinite as to the particular enemy, but it contemplates what might ordinarily be considered a mobilization for our maximum defensive effort. It contemplates a number of troops to be mobilized, about the same number that we mobilized in the World War.

We have been accustomed to say that we have a large amount of munitions in store. It is large compared with what we had before