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8. The great demonstrated lesson of the World War was the fact that America relying solely on her own resources, could organize and train troops at a rate which far exceeded the capacity of the country to arm and equip them; further that the rate of manufacture of noncommercial articles of ordnance was the controlling factor of the entire war program.

9. Practically all the knowledge needed to organize and employ an expanded army is automatically maintained by the peace-time activities of the country with the all-important exceptions that (a) knowledge of the use of arms, and (b) knowledge of the manufacture of arms, must be stimulated in times of peace in order to be available adequately and promptly in event of emergency.

10. It is contrary to the traditional policy of America to maintain an extensive civilian industry devoted primarily to the manufacture of ordnance, and it is improbable that America will ever look with favor on measures intended to encourage the growth of a civilian industry dependent upon the manufacture of war material for its profits and existence.

11. Under existing conditions, the Ordnance Department of the Army, for example, while possibly adequate for such development work and such production in restricted quantities as may be necessary during peace times, is deficient in commissioned personnel when considered as the nucleous of knowledge around which must be built the tremendous industrial machine which, in the event of war, requires a preponderant proportion of the entire industrial war effort.

12. Commissionedl officers of the Army appear to be available to the number of 1,700 devoted exclusively to mobilizing man power or problems involved in the use of arms, whereas but 24 have to date been assigned to the far greater and more difficult task of educating industry in the manufacture of arms.

13. The present program for national defense is, therefore, out of balance to a critical degree, due to the wide disparity in the attention now being devoted to problems involving mobilization of man power, as contrasted with the attention being devoted to problems involving the mobilization of munition powerparticularly in the noncommercial classes such as ordnance and aviation material.

14. Due to the wise recommendations of the Morrow Board now being carried into effect by appropriate legislation, the problem of aviation material is proceed ng toward ultimate solution, while leaving the problem of securing ordnance material as the crucial question in considering national defense to-day. 15. What America needs most at present is a greater knowledge of ordnance manufacture and all artificial obstacles to the acquirement of this knowledge by American industry should be removed forthwith and every effort made through legislative enactment to stimulate the acquirement of this vital knowledge.

16. In this connection attention is invited to the fact that in order to build up the American aircraft industry for purposes of national defense, the Morrow Board states, on page 29 of their report, as follows:

"We recommended that:

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"(4) Government competition with the civil industry in production activity be eliminated except in those projects impractical of realization by the civil industry * *

This wise recommendation has been adopted as the permanent policy of the War Department. It will obviously tend to spread to the commercial world a knowledge on the design and manufacture of airplane material and render the solution of the aircraft problem immeasurably easier. The same reasoning should apply to the ordnance problem.

17. The present plans for the War Department for mobilizing industry for the production of ordnance in the event of emergency are excellent in every particular, and if carried through to conclusion in all particulars will not only shorten the duration, and therefore the cost of a possible future conflict, but by our defenses, will actually make the possibility of America being involved in war more and more remote in direct ratio with their degree of completeness.

18. Of the elements of industrial mobilization, the determination of requirements, both as to quantities and dates wanted, and the preliminary allocation of requirements to existing facilities, have been completed in a most effective manner. The actual completion of emergency production plans by ordnance reserve plants with the degree of accuracy and detail necessary to permit them to be used as the basis of determining probable schedule of output, as well as secondary requirements for buildings, equipment, raw material, etc., is a task of considerable magnitude for each factory involved.

19. Existing obstacles to the completion of emergency production plans are due largely to the scarcity of trained ordnance officers available for assignment

to specific plants, to supply necessary technical data and otherwise assist manufacturers in this exacting work which is expected to be done without direct remuneration from the Government.

20. The ordnance problem is the crux of national defense to-day, inasmuch as our citizens can be called to the colors ever so smoothly, can be housed and clothed and fed ever so completely, can be paid ever so generously, and furnished with all the care that surgical, medical, and dental science can afford, and yet will not become soldiers until they are furnished with the tools of their trade, viz, ordnance.

21. Ordnance is, of course, but one of several essentials of a modern army, but all the others are present in adequate supply or can be obtained in much less time than that required for the production of ordnance which, therefore, becomes the controlling factor of the entire program for national defense.


In order to provide a greater reservoir of knowledge for the solution of problems involved in the mobilization of munition power, particularly the noncommercial phase thereof such as the manufacture of ordnance, the committee on industrial preparedness of the National Association of Manufacturers recommends:

(1) That the National Association of Manufacturers indorse the organization of the proposed "Munitions Battalion " as described by the Hon. Hanford MacNider, the Assistant Secretary of War, at the annual meeting of the association held in New York City on October 7, 1926; that the necessary appropriation of Federal funds for the purpose of training annually 400 college students, who have satisfactorily completed at least three years of their courses, in the elements of military science and tactics, and in addition in the basic procurement problems of the Army, be urged upon the Congress now in session; that that, due to the need for immediate action in the premises, Hon. Frank A. Scott, during the war chairman of the War Industries Board, be requested, subject to the approval by your board of directors, to present to the President of the United States the recommendations of the association in this connection.

(2) That the Ordnance Department of the United States Army be progressively increased over a period of years, in order to provide personnel of a proper degree of permanency equipped with the vitally important knowledge of the design and manufacture of ordnance necessary to permit present plans for industrial preparedness to be carried to a successful conclusion.

(3) That the provisions of section 5a of the national defense act approved June 3, 1916, as amended by the act of June 4, 1920, to the effect that "He (the Assistant Secretary of War) shall cause to be manufactured or produced at the Government arsenals or Government-owned factories of the United States, all such supplies or articles needed by the War Department as said arsenals or Government-owned factories are capable of manufacturing or producing upon an economical basis," be rescinded and that legislation be secured permitting the placing of "educational orders" with commercial manufacturers for the production of noncommercial articles of ordnance with due consideration for knowledge of the art acquired rather than as at present, upon a competitive basis as to price.

Memorandum for Mrs. Rogers:

GUY E. TRIPP, Chairman.

C. S. WALKER, Secretary.


Washington, January 24, 1927.

Subject: State of preparedness as to munitions at outbreak of the World War and, in brief, conditions to-day.

Rifles. In April 1917, we had on hand 600,000 Springfield rifles, sufficient to equip an army of approximately 1,000,000 men. The only places where these rifles were made were Springfield Armory, capacity 1,000 per day, and Rock Island Arsenal, capacity 500 per day. We needed approximately 3,000,000 rifles at once. Had it not been that six large manufacturing establishments were making rifles for foreign governments and that this same machinery could be used to make the same rifles converted to our own ammunition, we would have

been in a very bad condition as regards rifles at the outbreak of the World War. We now have on hand a sufficient reserve of rifles left over from the last war so that it is estimated that Springfield Armory can maintain these rifles in satisfactory condition for almost any future emergency that may arise.

Rifle ammunition.-At the outbreak of the war in 1917 we had on hand approximately 200,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. The requirements called for almost 3,000,000,000 rounds to July 1, 1918, and almost 3,000,000,000 rounds to December 31, 1918. Had it not been for the facts that, due to the Allies holding the lines, we did not have to get our troops into the line of battle very early, and that our small arms ammunition companies had already installed machinery and were making large quantities of rifle ammunition for the Allies, we would have been in very bad condition as to rifle ammunition during the early days of the World War. We fear that we may be in some such unsatisfactory condition for the next war, because our cartridge companies have largely scrapped their machinery for ammunition manufacture, except in small quantities which they need for making sporting ammunition, and we are now using a cartridge different from that which we used and which was manufactured during the World War. We therefore deem it highly desirable that we shall have a small quantity of the ammunition which we need in peace-time made by each of these cartridge companies in order to insure that they shall be in better condition, both as regards equipment and knowledge to take up quantity production on the outbreak of war. Artillery.-At the outbreak of the World War we had on hand some 500 American 3-inch field guns. We needed many thousands of these guns and the manufacturing capacity in this country was extremely limited. It was decided to adopt the French 75-millimeter gun because France had an excess of these guns and could supply us quickly, and because the ammunition problem would be simplified if all the Allies used the same type of shell. We would have been in very sore straits as regards artillery had not the French helped us out. We have now on hand about 5,000 75-millimeter guns, which will supply requirements for the first seven months of a major emergency. The total requirement for this gun is approximately 11,000 in two years. None of these guns has been manufactured since the war, except a few experimental designs and the art of manufacture is being largely lost. Our arsenals have not sufficient capacity to make the gun as fast as we will require it. It is highly desirable, therefore, that the commercial companies to which we have allocated war orders for these guns be given small educational orders from time to time in order that they can tool up for them and become experienced in this line of manufacture.

Artillery ammunition. At the outbreak of the World War there were very limited existing stocks of artillery ammunition. However, when we adopted the French 75-millimeter gun as a standard our own shortages in ammunition were made up by surplus which the Allies had on hand in France. At the present time we are favored by reserves of approximately 3,700,000 rounds of 75-millimeter high-explosive shell, which is only sufficient, however, to equip the overseas possessions and to meet the requirements of our armies for less than three months. No ammunition of this type has been manufactured in quantity since the war. The maximum requirements for a war of major effort would be about 3,800,000 rounds per month. Picatinny Arsenal and Frankford Arsenal are the only Government plants for making and loading artillery ammunition. They could be expanded to approximately 25,000 rounds per month within a few months after declaration of war. Commercial sources must therefore be relied upon for the great bulk of production, and in order that these commercial sources can get into production quickly it is highly desirable that all firms to which we have allocated orders for production in case of war be given educational orders so that they can install a small line of machinery and become skilled in the operations of making this ammunition.

The above are only a few examples, but they suffice to show, in brief, the condition of unpreparedness at the beginning of the war; the fact that this unpreparedness did not result most disastrously for us was only because our Allies were able to help us out, and because we did not have to enter the firing line at once, and because our own manufacturers at that time had much previous experience and had installed much machinery by reason of making munitions under contract for the Allies.


Lieutenant Colonel, Ordnance Department, U. S. Army. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn at this time until 9.30 to-morrow morning, but I would say for the benefit of those who

may have to leave town that if they have a statement which they wish included in these hearings, if they will hand it to the clerk that will be done.

(Whereupon at 12.10 o'clock p. m. the committee recessed until 9.30 o'clock a. m., Saturday, January 11, 1929.)


Saturday, January 12, 1929.

The committee met at 9.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. John M. Morin (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. We will continue the consideration of H. R. 450, a bill to amend section 5a of the national defense act, approved June 4, 1920, providing for placing educational orders for equipment, and so forth, and for other purposes.

Before we proceed to the hearing of the witnesses this morning, there is a letter from Mr. Thomas Elliott, president of the Continental Gin Co., addressed to the chairman, which will be inserted in the record. There is also a statement of Mr. Alfred Jones, director of research of the Armstrong Cork Co., of Lancaster, Pa.; a statement of Mr. Edwin B. Meissner, president and general manager of the St. Louis Car Co.; a statement of John S. Sewell, president of the Alabama Marble Co., Birmingham; and a statement of J. W. Glover, president of the Glover Machine Works, Marietta, Ga., which will be inserted in the record. These gentlemen were here yesterday, but were unable to remain, and they have submitted their statements for the record.

(The letter and statements above referred to are as follows:) WASHINGTON, D. C., January 11, 1929.


Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I regret my inability to appear before your committee to-morrow. What I wanted to say for the Continental Gin Co. was that we have plants in Dallas, Tex., Prattville, Ala., and a large new plant built three years ago in Birmingham, Ala. The planning committee allocated to us a study of the machining of the 75-millimeter high-explosive shells, which we have been doing during the past 18 months.

We have the organization and most of the machine tools necessary to do this work economically, but we have no gigs, fixtures, or gauges. We will be glad to use our organization and machine tools on educational orders, no matter how small, and expect to be reimbursed for the cost to us.

Yours very truly,

THOS. ELLIOTT, President.


Statement of evidence which would have been given if it had been possible to stay over for adjourned hearing before House Committee on Miltary Affairs.

The Armstrong Cork Co. engaged in the manufacture of 4.7-inch high-explosive shells during the late war and were awarded several contracts, the first one being for approximately 500,000 units.

The company is capitalized at $40,000,000 and has eight plants located at various points in the United States; it can therefore be considered as a

responsible corporation to engage in the manufacture of military or naval supplies in an emergency.

The company employs a large technical staff in addition to a mechanical force of trained men; we were also able to throw in a force of 500 men on munition work with very satisfactory results from a production standpoint.

Our experience in the late war certainly emphasized the need for educational orders. Had we produced 4.7-inch shells prior to our first order for war purposes we could have saved mon hs of time in getting into quantity production; our chief difficulty was the lack of an initial supply of gauges and jigs; after procuring the initial set we reproduced them in our tool room without any serious difficulty. An eductional order on these shells would have saved us at least three months of production time, and, since we tooled up for a production of 1,500 shells per day, this 3-month delay meant the loss of 100,000 shells at a very critical period of the war.

Our company appreciates the value of preparedness, this value was very forcibly impressed upon us in connection with our munition work in the late war; we believe that legislation which will permit of the placing of educational orders will be of enormous value to our country should we become involved in another major war and we are prepared to understake such orders on the basis of actual cost to us. Our experience in the late war further leads us to believe that the Ordnance Department will be greatly benefited by their contacts with the great body of technical men which would logically result from the carrying out of such eductional orders. We believe that the arsenals received at least as much benefit from the contacts formed as did the private contractors from the arsenals.

In conclusion I would like to say that the spirit of cooperation manifested by the officers of the Ordnance Department was much appreciated by all of our people with whom they came in contact. I can not remember any case of a serious difference of opinion between the department and ourselves. Respectfully presented.



Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, regret exceedingly that due to adjournment I could not remain over and appear before your committee in person. I appreciate, however, the privilege of submitting the following brief statement. The St. Louis Car Co. of St. Louis, Mo., which I represent, built the following war equipment for the United States Government during the late World War:

15,000 ordnance gun and ammunition carts.

10.000 ammunition crates.

125 completely equipped shop trucks for engineers' depot.

72 transports bodies for quartermaster.

1.000 American standard railroad box cars.

750 French standard military railways box cars.

600 French standard military railways gondola cars.

450 J. N. 4-D training airplanes.

Tools for making cartridges.

With the exception of the freight cars above enumerated, all other articles were foreign to our regular line of manufacture, and, therefore, necessitated much engineering work, planning, and the manufacture of special tools, jigs, dies, and templets before actual production could commence. Not only was considerable time consumed to provide suitable manufacturing tools, but much time had to be given to the training of men and women whom we were obliged to employ in our various departments for the new work allocated to us by the Government. My interest in the matter of establishing a policy of placing educational orders is provoked by the fact that many important months after war had been declared had to be used in preparing for the manufacture of necessary war equipment while Government departments were pressing us for deliveries due to urgent needs at the front. Had we been privileged to learn something of the manufacturing details of equipment required for warfare by becoming acquainted during peace time with what special processes and tools were necessary for their quantity production, several months, or, to be more spe

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