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General RUGGLES. It is; but no amount of knowledge would enable you to go to a man who knows nothing about it-and we have to do it because 95 per cent of it has to come from private sourcesno amount of knowledge of what we want could possible cut that time short, the absolutely necessary time to produce, unless our manufacturers have some experience in the actual production of that material. We can't make those things in 2 or 3 months, or in 6 months, or in 9 months. Your factory isn't adapted to it at all. Your commercial methods are not refined enough in most cases to do those things. These weapons have got to be made in some cases almost like a watch, because upon them depends the lives of our men. If they don't function right, you have a premature, and the gun may blow up.

Mr. GARRETT. All of these things are supposed to be found out by the Ordnance Department first; aren't they?

General RUGGLES. They are; but they require a careful and complicated workmanship and a knowledge of the art which is beyond the ordinary commercial exactness, and it takes training, not only for the management to know what is wanted but it takes training for the individual workmen-at least the key men-to know how to produce these intricate things.

Mr. GARRETT. Are the manufacturers under this bill to be checked in the Ordnance Department, or are they going to be turned loose to develop something themselves?

General RUGGLES. They have sufficient engineering ability. They will get help from the Ordnance Department, of course. We will tell them how to overcome these difficulties; we will show them in our own arsenals what we do. We are a training center in that respect. It will shorten the time of manufacture because of the knowledge we have in the arsenal. But our own manufacturers are very skillful in these things, and if they once have a chance to solve a problem they will solve it for themselves, and even though we can give them a great deal of help it takes time to learn to make these things. They are absolutely different from the ordinary product in commercial life, and our experience was no different from that of the Allies. They waited two years before they could get quantity production. We can not hope in any other time, in any other war, to have the line held for us by the French and the English so as to give us time to get production, nor can we hope to buy munitions from somebody else. We have to depend on our own or, at least, are likely to. We have got to get munitions from our own people instead of buying them abroad.

Mr. GARRETT. It is not within the range of human knowledge to know how the next war will be brought about, or how it will be fought, or who it will be with, but I am wondering if you are going to establish a manufacturing educational school here for the production and development of munitions of war, what authority the Ordnance Department is going to have over that product.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, is it the intention of the committee to go on with the hearing? It will be necessary for me to leave in a minute or two.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; after we finish with Mr. Haynes.

Mr. GARRETT. Well, Mr. Chairman, if we can not interrogate witnesses here, and to our own satisfaction, I don't see any reason for

having witnesses here. That is what the witnesses are here for, to develop to our own satisfaction whether we are favorable or unfavorable to this legislation.

Mr. HOUSTON. Mr. Haynes, did this experience in handling this Government work with exacting requirements stand the commercial end of your company in good stead? Was it helpful to you in establishing and developing new processes in your own industry?

Mr. HAYNES. I think we got some benefit out of it. We got some benefit as regards materials out of it, and, of course, every problem that you solve in mechanics simply makes you more versatile for the solving of other problems.

Mr. HOUSTON. So that the educational program, in addition to being of benefit to the national defense, may also be of benefit to the industry itself?

Mr. HAYNES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Representative Rogers is here and would like to make a brief statement.

Mrs. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, as you may remember, I introduced the original bill (H. R. 14695) in the Sixty-ninth Congress in 1926. I filed a similar bill in the Seventieth Congress. I don't want to take up the time of the committee when you have so many valuable witnesses to be heard. If I may file the statement I made in 1927 on my similar bill, together with certain additional statements, and express my very great interest in the matter, that will answer.

The CHAIRMAN. We will probably include those hearings in this hearing.

(The statement referred to is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF MRS. EDITH NOURSE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mrs. ROGERS. I just want to say one thing, that this bill is not in any way a draft measure. I think one or two people have had an idea in some way we were drafting these companies to manufacture. It is not a draft measure in

any way.

I have always been very much interested, of course, since 1917, having seen so much suffering as a result of the lack of preparedness in France. I saw the Vaterland, an interned German ship, creeping out of New York Harbor on New Year's Day in 1918 and, later on, found the Vaterland had to make four starts before she got under way because the engines had been tampered with by the German crew. If we had had a good enough merchant marine of our own, we' would not have had to use German ships.

Also, I found out in France we did not have a single airplane in 1917 and we did not use one of our own airplanes during the war. I heard men say constantly, "We are not prepared to fight." We could not have been prepared to fight; we did not have enough of anything in the beginning. Now, what made me think of introducing this bill of mine in the beginning was the fact that the United States cartridge shop in Lowell was taken away from us and, in going over the facts concerning that, I found out that the War Department very much needs the United States cartridge shop, and we have over 700 splendidly trained workmen there, and, of course, no work for them. I am not speaking of that from the humane standpoint alone, although I bring that in; I am mentioning that simply to show that the plant in Lowell was an excellent plant; was well located; it was inland, and I understand some of the other munition plants are not inland. The Remington Arms and the Hayden plants are not inland plants, and when you ask whether it is not an effort on the part of some companies to get orders the answer is they do not want to give it to any one concern any way; they want their orders to be diversified and to be given to different plants.

A fighting army expends ammunition each day of warfare. The supply must come from factories or reserve stocks. This ammunition is not commercial and the factories are not regular peace-time producers. During the time their production is being built up, reserve stocks must be available to be drawn upon. The longer it takes to build up the necessary production the greater the initial reserve must be. The alternative of a slackened rate of fire means a greatly increased death rate and possible defeat. The British Army experienced the former in averting defeat in Flanders while waiting for high explosive shell production, and barely avoided defeat even with the enormous loss of men accepted.

I have a statement here from the War Department which shows that the British Army experienced reverses because they did not have reserve stocks. Of course, they had been manufacturing for a long time before the war. This bill has the indorsement, you know, of the Secretary of War and the approval of the Director of the Budget, and it is certainly in keeping with the economy program, as it requires no added appropriation. I think it will take no work away from the arsenals and I know the people who have arsenals in their districts are particularly anxious to have the arsenals kept up and, after discussing the matter with the War Department, I realize they are equally anxious to have the arsenals kept going.

I do not want to take up any more of your time, but I would like very much to file some papers and would like very much to file a preliminary report which was written by Gen. Guy E. Tripp, the chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers Committee on Industrial Preparedness, who is the president of the Western Electric Co., and, if I may, to file another statement and some more papers with your committee.

Mr. RANSLEY. Yes.

Mrs. ROGERS. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, for your kindness in hearing me.

Mr. RANSLEY. Not at all; it is a pleasure, I assure you.

Mrs. ROGERS. I know you have enjoyed the statements of the Secretary of War, General Ruggles, Colonel Wainwright, and Colonel Whelen.

Mr. RANSLEY. Very much.

(The reports filed by Mrs. Rogers are as follows:)

Hon. JOHN M. MORIN,

Chairman Committee on Military Affairs,

NOVEMBER 24, 1926.

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. MORIN: I submit herewith draft of an amendment to the national defense act approved June 3, 1916, which I request be introduced in the House of Representatives and enacted into law.

The second paragraph of section 5a of the national defense act now reads as follows:

*** "He shall cause to be manufactured or produced at the Government arsenals or Government-owned factories of the United States all such supplies or articles needed by the War Department as said arsenals or Governmentowned factories are capable of manufacturing or producing upon an economical basis." The amendment I suggest is to change the period in the above sentence to a comma and add the following:

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Provided, however, That the Secretary of War may authorize the placing of educational orders for equipments, munitions, and accessories needed in the military service with commercial concerns to the degree that is considered by him as being necessary to familiarize commercial factories with munitions manufacture and to advance the industrial war plans of the War Department, and in placing these educational orders the competitive bids which in his opinion best secure these results may be accepted; and he shall make statement of his action under this provision in his annual report."

The change in legislation is desired to further industrial preparedness for war. In the consideration of industrial preparedness the following points are emphasized:

1. Modern war is a war of machines.

2. Modern war requires these machines in numbers heretofore undreamed of. 3. The capacity of Government arsenals for the manufacture of these macines is small compared with the volume required.

4. The industry of the country must make up the deficiency.

5. Modern industry is not familiar in time of peace with munitions manufacture.

6. Without this familiarity valuable time is lost when an emergency arises. 7. Much of this valuable time can be saved by placing educational orders for munitions with commercial concerns.

8. The placing of these educational orders will unquestionably add to national preparedness.

9. The slight increased cost is cheap national insurance.

10. The placing of these educational orders is not possible under existing law. The applicable provisions of existing law on this subject are as follows: "SEC. 3709, R. S. All purchases and contracts for supplies or services, in any of the departments of the Government, except for personal services, shall be made by advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals respecting the same, when the public exigencies do not require the immediate delivery of the articles, or performance of the service

** *

In connection with this statute the Secretary of War has prescribed:

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'Except in rare cases, when the United States elects to exercise the right to reject proposals, awards will be made to the lowest responsible bidder, provided that his bid is reasonable and that it is in the interest of the Government to accept it."

* **

* * *

Section 5a of the national defense act prescribes : "the Assistant Secretary of War shall cause to be manufactured or produced at the Government arsenals or Government owned factories of the United States all such supplies or articles needed by the War Department as said arsenals or Government-owned factories are capable of manufacturing or producing upon an economical basis."

The proposed legislation should be enacted into law for the following reasons: When the two above quoted laws are considered in connection with our plans for industrial mobilization and procurement in time of war, including our desire to build up munitions production capacity in our private plants, it will be seen that, if strictly construed, as they must be, they are very detrimental. Our industrial mobilization plans contemplate the placing of our war requirements not only with our arsenals but also with the various commercial plants. The arsenals will be given schedules which will utilize their maximum capacity in war, but these will by no means meet our requirements, and the majority of these requirements have been allocated to commercial plants which have accepted schedules of production. It is the desire of the War Department to further in every way the war plans and preparations of these commercial plants so as to facilitate their rapid conversion from peace to war production. This, of course, involves giving the plants specifications, drawings and manufacturing information, but these alone are not sufficient. In addition, each plant should receive as far as possible a small order for the manufacture of the articles which they will be called upon to manufacture in time of war. Only by obtaining experience in such a way can it develop and keep alive the art of manufacture, including the design for the necessary machine tools, gauges, dies, jigs, fixtures, etc.

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However, the present legal requirements concerning competitive bidding make it impracticable to place such educational orders with the particular plants to which we have allocated our war schedules; for, should it be necessary to conform to competitive bids on the manufacture of groups of material, low bids for such manufacture might frequently be received from concerns which would actually have no interest in the industrial program and would merely utilize such work to fill in during periods of depression. Again, other concerns which have the experience necessary would compete and it would be necessary to place manufacture with them without advantage to the United States.

The above quoted section 5a of the national defense act also makes it impracticable to place such educational orders, because, in many cases, our existing arsenals are capable of manufacturing the article desired at a price which can not be met by the commercial plants. The arsenals probably are continually manufacturing the particular article and commercial plants are obligated to accept this educational order in a form which is to them more or less experimental and hence their bids are higher than the production cost at the arsenal. It is desired to submit briefly several examples of this, one of which is that of our new type of artillery guns and carriages. These have been developed as a result of the lessons learned in the World War and these are the types which we would like to manufacture in another emergency. Pilot models of these guns have already been made and it is planned under the 10-year program to manu

facture enough of them to equip a regiment or other tactical command with each type. These can be manufactured more economically at an arsenal than elsewhere, but we think it highly desirable to manufacture at least a portion of them in the plants which we have selected for their manufacture in war. This is not possible with existing laws.

Another example is that relative to the procurement of rifle ammunition. The present type of rifle ammunition differs considerably from that used in the last war, being a very much improved type which none of the commercial companies has heretofore made. We desire very much to have these commercial companies learn to make this ammunition. Under existing laws, however, we can not place orders with them unless their bid compares favorably with that of Frankford Arsenal. Moreover, under section 3709, Revised Statutes, above quoted, we would be obliged to award the contract to the lowest bidder, and there being five of these cartridge plants it is obvious that four of them would not receive orders. We are now manufacturing much more of this ammunition annually than is necessary to keep the art of manufacture alive at Frankford Arsenal, and to maintain a nucleus of skilled employees at that arsenal, and we believe it would be to the best interests of the United States to place annually an order of a small number of rounds with each one of these five cartridge companies. This can not be done in conformity with the present laws, because of competitive bidding, and also because the prices at which these commercial plants can make ammunition are higher than the cost of manufacture at Frankford Arsenal.

If any additional information from the War Department is desired, I shall be pleased to furnish it.

If the Committee on Military Affairs wishes to have hearings upon the proposed legislation, the following-named officers are designated to appear before your committee: Maj. Gen. C. C. Williams and Brig. Gen. C. L'H. Ruggles.

This legislation has been discussed with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and its submission is with his favorable knowledge.

A similar letter has been addressed to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

DWIGHT F. DAVIS,

Secretary of War.

PRELIMINARY REPORT NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL PREPARDNESS

FINDINGS

1. Continued prosperity in America is dependent upon assurance of enduring peace.

2. America's most recent experience indicates that the surest guaranty of peace is a readiness to defend the national sovereignty, i. e., preparedness. 3. The foreign policy of America involves no dreams of conquest nor any aggressive action toward any foreign power whatsoever, and therefore preparedness in America connotes only defensive measures.

4. America maintains, in proportion to national wealth guarded, the smallest standing army of any of the 50 principal countries of the world. In proportion to population, whose peace and prosperity are at stake, America likewise maintains the smallest Regular Army, even smaller than that allowed Germany by the treaty of Versailles, which was specifically intended to render her impotent as a military power.

5. Preparedness, on an efficient and economical basis, requires years for complete achievement and unremitting attention for its proper maintenance. Hastily improvised preparedness is needlessly wasteful to human life, and unnecessarily expensive.

6. Unpreparedness has failed dismally in ever keeping America out of war. Proper preparedness, however, according to the best military opinion, might conceivably have precluded the necessity for American participation in the World War, and, in any event, would have shortened the duration of the conflict which cost a million dollars an hour for over two years.

7. Prior to the World War, preparedness was taken to mean only plans for the mobilization of man power, failing to take into consideration the fact that mobilized man power unless adequately supported by munition power was entirely ineffective.

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