LEASES (Continued).

credit of the account of the lessee, and further providing that the lessee mortgaged to the lessor the crops as security for the performance by the lessee of the conditions of the lease, the lessor is not invested with the ownership of the proceeds, but at the most is given the right to handle the money and place the amount received to the credit of the lessee, and is therefore not damaged by reason of the failure of the party which marketed the crops to pay over moneys to him, even though such party had knowledge of the terms of the lease. (Van Loben Sels v. Producers Fruit Co., 201.) 2. ERADICATION OF JOHNSON GRASS.-Under a covenant in a lease of farm land providing that the lessee would annually, and at the proper seasons, in a husbandlike manner, properly prepare and render fit for cultivation all of the land, tend and cultivate the same in a first-class manner, harvest the crops, and keep all the edges of the ditches, sloughs, roads, or any other lines of boundaries of the land clean of weeds and brush, it was not incumbent upon the lessee to eradicate certain Johnson grass standing and growing upon the premises, where such grass was growing upon the land when the lessee took possession and for several years prior thereto, and no express mention of such grass was made in the lease. (Id.) 3. LANDLORD AND TENANT-ACTION FOR RENT ASSIGNMENT OF LEASE -CONSIDERATION-STATUS OF ASSIGNEE-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. In this action for rent against the corporation assignee of a lease, which had made an assignment of the lease in turn to an individual who had defaulted in the payment of the rent, it is held that the defendant was an assignee of the lease for value, and not a mere reorganization of the original lessee corporation under a different name. (S. C. Smith Est. v. J. M. Dunn A. Co., 467.)

See Assignments, 1; Guaranty, 1; Unlawful Detainer, 1.

LICENSES.

1. EXECUTED PAROL LICENSE-CONSTRUCTION OF CANAL-FAILURE TO OBJECT EXPENDITURES IN CONSTRUCTION.-Where a land company was advised by a canal corporation that a right of way was desired over its land for canal purposes, without which privilege the project could not be effected, and made no objection to the surveying of the route for the canal, or of entering upon the work of construction, and with knowledge that the work had begun, commenced negotiations to fix the compensation for the privilege, and such negotiations were thereafter continued for nearly four years without result, the canal corporation in the meantime spending eighty thousand dollars, and the land owner at no time objecting to the prosecution of the work until such amount was expended, the conduct of the land owner amounts to an executed parol license, and it is estopped from enjoining the canal corporation from proceeding with the work, and

LICENSES (Continued).

is limited to an action at law for damages. (Gravelly Ford Co. v. Pope & Talbot Co., 717.)

2. IRREVOCABLE LICENSE.-A license by deed or parol is revocable at pleasure, except under certain circumstances, such as, where it is executed, or where by reason of expenditures made by the licensee on the strength of the license, it would be inequitable to permit a revocation.

(Id.)

3. PAROL LICENSE-CONSTRUCTION OF CANAL INJUNCTION.-Judgment reversed on the authority of Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co., ante, p. 717. (Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co., 817.)

See Ordinances, 1.

LIENS.

1. REPAIR WORK ON DREDGER RETENTION OF POSSESSION.-Under sections 3049 and 3051 of the Civil Code, a machine company doing repair work on a dredger and making certain new parts therefor is entitled, where part of the work under its contract has been performed, to retain possession of the undelivered part of the work until the purchase price of all the work has been paid. (Union M. Co. v. Chicago Bond etc. Co., 585.)

2. DELIVERY OF POSSESSION-GUARANTY OF PAYMENT SUFFICIENCY OF CONSIDERATION.-Where, under such a contract, the machine company refused to install the balance of the work until the full price was paid, and the dredging company being unable to make payment, prevailed upon the former to complete the work upon the execution by a bonding company of a guaranty of payment, the delivery of the articles without receiving payment was a good consideration for the guaranty. (Id.)

LOCAL OPTION. See Election Law, 4.

MALICE. See Innkeepers, 3, 4.

MALPRACTICE. See Negligence, 62-64.

MANDAMUS.

RIGHT TO MAINTAIN ACTION.-The purchaser at a commissioner's sale has the right to maintain a proceeding in mandamus to compel the commissioner to execute a deed conveying all the property purchased and an action quieting title thereto, and objections to the sufficiency of the complaint as against the commissioner cannot be raised by the former owners. (Morris v. Judkins, 413.)

See Criminal Law, 13; Joinder, 1; Torts, 2.

MEDICAL ACT.

1. REVOCATION OF LICENSE FOR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT-POWERS OF BOARD CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROVISION.-The provision of the

MEDICAL ACT (Continued).

State Medical Act (Stats. 1915, p. 184), that the board of medical examiners may revoke or suspend the license of a physician for unprofessional conduct, is not unconstitutional, as conferring powers which belong strictly, under the constitution, to the judicial department. (Lanterman v. Anderson, 472.)

2. PLEADING SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT.-A complaint filed before the state board of medical examiners charging a physician, in the language of the act, with committing a criminal abortion, is sufficient, without stating the acts defined in the Penal Code, as constituting such crime, since the language of the statute is sufficiently explicit to advise a person charged thereunder of the particular kind of unprofessional conduct which it is proposed to prove against him. (Id.)

3. EVIDENCE CONVICTION UPON UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICE.-A proceeding to revoke the license of a physician for unprofessional conduct is not criminal in its nature, and the rule that a person may not be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice has no application. (Id.)

MINES AND MINERALS.

1. LOCATION OF LODE CLAIM-POSTING OF NOTICE AT POINT OF DISCOVERY.-In the locating of a lode mining claim, the requirements of section 1426 of the Civil Code as to the posting of notice of location at the point of discovery must be complied with. (Batt v. Stedman, 608.)

2. QUIETING TITLE-OWNERSHIP OF CLAIMS-FINDING.—In an action to quiet title to mining claims, where plaintiff's right of ownership and possession was in no way dependent upon a prescriptive title, it was sufficient to find that, at the commencement of the action, plaintiff was the owner and entitled to the possession of the claims, and the portion of a finding declaring that plaintiff for more than five years prior to the commencement of the action had been the owner in fee and entitled to the possession, may be disregarded as surplusage. (Id.)

3. CONSTRUCTION OF LOCATION NOTICES.-Location notices should be liberally construed, having reference to the circumstances under which, and the character of the parties by which, they are generally made; and in determining the sufficiency of a location notice, the most important guide is the purpose of the notice, which is to identify the land claimed with reasonable certainty. (Id.)

4. IDENTIFICATION OF CLAIM-EVIDENCE-MONUMENTS.-Under section 1426 of the Civil Code, which requires a description of the claim by reference to some natural object or permanent monument as will identify the claim located, testimony of a deputy United States mineral surveyor as to his finding stone monuments

MINES AND MINERALS (Continued).

on the exterior boundaries of the claim, and the reference in the amended location certificate thereto, sufficiently satisfies the requirements of the code provision. (Id.)

MISCONDUCT. See Criminal Law, 9, 10, 28, 40; New Trial, 90; Workmen's Compensation Act, 9.

MISREPRESENTATIONS. See Sales, 2, 3; Vendor and Vendee, 4.

MORTGAGES.

1. SALE OF

PROPERTY UNDER FORECLOSURE-EFFECT OF STIPULATION. In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage, where the defendants, after judgment of foreclosure had been entered, wrote to the attorney for the plaintiff advising him of their intention to take an appeal from the judgment and of filing a stay bond, and in the meantime to bring on a hearing to fix the amount of such bond, and the attorney replied thereto that it would be useless for him to advertise the sale while the necessary steps to perfect the appeal were pending, and that he would not do so, all that such attorney agreed to do at the most was to refrain from proceeding with a sale pending such proceeding, and where twenty-eight days after the amount of the stay bond had been fixed no such bond had been filed, plaintiff was entirely within his rights in proceeding with the sale of the property. (Harding v. Dam, 748.)

2. ADEQUACY OF SALE PRICE-FINDING APPEAL.-Where, on an application to set aside a sale of mortgaged premises, the trial court, upon ample evidence, reached the conclusion that the price for which the property was sold was fair and adequate, its conclusion will not be disturbed on appeal. (Id.)

3. RENEWAL THROUGH ATTORNEY FOR MORTGAGEE-AGENCY-BREACH BY ATTORNEY AS DEFENSE TO FORECLOSURE.-Where a mortgagor, upon threatened foreclosure proceedings, sent a new note and mortgage to the mortgagee's attorney with instructions to deliver them to the mortgagee upon receipt of the outstanding note and a duly acknowledged satisfaction of the mortgage, the attorney became the mortgagor's agent for their delivery, and the mortgagor cannot, in a foreclosure action upon the new mortgage, set up as a defense the failure of the attorney to obtain the old note and satisfaction of the old mortgage. (Harding v. Dam, 751.)

4. CONSIDERATION FOR NEW OBLIGATION.-Where the new note and mortgage were delivered without surrender of the old note and acknowledged satisfaction of the outstanding mortgage, the mortgagee's acceptance of the new note and mortgage amounted to an extinguishment of the old obligation, and constituted a valuable consideration for the new obligation. (Id.)

See Promissory Notes, 10; Vendor and Vendee, 4.

NOTICE. See Criminal Law, 1, 2.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

1. PAYMENT OF BONDS-CONSTRUCTION OF ACT OF 1901.-The act relating to the incurring of indebtedness by municipal corporations (Stats. 1901, p. 28) does not require payments to be made at annual consecutive periods in equal amounts, but only that payments shall not be less than one-fortieth part of the whole amount of the indebtedness. (Town of Calistoga v. Adams, 486.)

2. IMPROVEMENT OF STREET-DRAIN FOR SURFACE WATERS-DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY-LIABILITY OF CITY.-A municipal corporation may be enjoined by a property owner from maintaining a paved street in a condition which will make the same a watercourse for surface waters in time of storm and rainfall, instead of a street for traffic, whereby the owner's land will be gullied and have deposited thereon large quantities of silt, sand, and various kinds of debris, even though the paving of the street was completed before the action for the injunction was commenced. (Farrell v. City of Ontario, 754.)

See Charters, 2-4, 7; Ordinances, 1; Police Officers, 1; Streets,
Roads, and Highways, 1.

NAMES. See Pleading, 3.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. COLLISION BETWEEN AUTOMOBILE AND BUGGY-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE QUESTION OF FACT.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the collision of an automobile owned by the defendant with the buggy in which plaintiff was riding, which collision was caused by the sudden swerving of the automobile obliquely from the right to the left-hand side of the road to avoid a collision with another horse-drawn vehicle, the question whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to look to see if any vehicle was approaching on that side of the street was one of fact for the jury. (Oberholzer v. Hubbell, 16.) 2. DISPOSITION OF HORSE-EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE NOT ERRONEOUS.The refusal to permit evidence of the nature and disposition of the horse was not error, in the absence of any showing that the horse had become frightened at the approach of the automobile or was in any way unmanageable until after the collision had occurred. (Id.) 3. TRIAL VIEW OF AUTOMOBILE-REFUSAL NOT ERRONEOUS.-The refusal to permit the jury to inspect the automobile for the purpose of ascertaining the extent and character of the damage done by the collision was not error where fifteen months had intervened, during which time the machine had been in use and made several long trips. (Id.)