on the demurrer the court said: "The objection urged is that single cars, like those upon which the plaintiff and the negligent conductor were employed, are not to be considered as machines or railroad trains, or to be comprehended within the term 'other appliances' as used in the statute. To our minds, influenced by the consideration that the statute must be given a fair and reasonable meaning and be liberally construed to effect the purposes of its enactment (Judd v. Letts, 158 Cal. 359, [41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 156, 111 Pac. 12]), this contention of appellant is without merit. From the phraseology of the provision quoted it is evident that the legislature intended to make the law broad in its scope and to preserve the liability of the employer for the employee's benefit in all cases generally where the mechanical device upon which the injured servant is employed is separate and different from that being operated by the negligent employee. By way of closer definition of the department of labor classification, the legislators undertook to and have said in effect that a person is not employed in the same department with another servant where he is at work with or upon a different machine, railroad train, etc.; and in consonance with a rule of fair construction it would be proper to say, if the words 'railroad train' were the only descriptive ones contained in that portion of the statute quoted, that that term as applied to an interurban railway is sufficient to include a single trolley car. Such cars combine in their construction both motors for propulsion and seats for the accommodation of passengers. Used in interurban traffic they perform the same work over long distances as does the steam-propelled train. While a train usually consists of a motor vehicle and cars attached thereto, where these djuncts are combined in one carriage and serve the same uses, there is no good reason why the one should be said to be a train, within the meaning of the statute, and the other not be so classed. In construing statutes courts are not bound to an interpretation which shall give the words or phrases a literal, close dictionary definition."

In Odell v. Rihn, 19 Cal. App. 713, [127 Pac. 802], another of the cases we have cited, the litigation was instituted under the following circumstances: At the time the controversy arose section 4014 of the Political Code provided: "The officers of a township are, two justices of the peace. . . . In townships containing cities in which city justices or recorders are elected

..

there shall be but one justice of the peace, and in townships having a population of less than five thousand there shall be but one justice of the peace. It was contended that the city of Richmond was entitled to two justices of the peace under this section. In disposing of the question the court said: "We are satisfied that the fifteenth judicial township of Contra Costa County was not at the time of the election in 1910 entitled, under the provisions of section 4014 of the Political Code, to more than one justice of the peace. . . . It is conceded that the judicial township in question consists entirely of the city of Richmond, which, although it has a population of more than five thousand, is provided by charter with a city justice of the peace, who is appointed by the city council. His jurisdiction and duties are concurrent and coordinate with those conferred generally upon justices of the peace throughout the state. It is petitioner's contention that the term 'elected' as employed in section 4014 of the Political Code, should be construed to mean elected by the popular vote of the people. In this contention we cannot concur. Statutes must be read and considered in conjunction with the legislative intent, and then be liberally construed with the object in view of effecting such intent. In restricting the number of justices of the peace to one in townships which include. cities in which city justices or recorders are elected, it was evidently the legislative intent not to burden the people of the state with the expense of maintaining more judicial officers than were actually necessary to the needs of the people. The arrow construction of the statute here contended for by petitioner obviously would result in defeating the legislative purpose and intent in that behalf, and is therefore to be avoided, if possible. The words 'elected' and 'appointed' ordinarily are not synonymous. In its limited sense the word 'elected' is usually employed to denote the selection of a public officer by the qualified voters of a community. On the other hand, the word 'appointed' is generally understood to mean the selection of a public officer by one person who is empowered by law to make the appointment. In its broadest sense, however, the word 'elected' means merely selected. When used in that sense the word 'elected' is synonymous with the word 'appointed'; and where, as in the case at bar, a public officer has been selected by the votes of several members of a city council, it may be truly said in the broadest

sense of the term that he was elected. . . . Having in mind the spirit and purpose of the code section under discussion, it seems to us that the word 'elected,' as used therein, was not intended to apply solely to the election of a city justice by the votes of the people at large; but included as well the selection of a city justice of the peace by the city council or other legislative body in whom the power of election is conferred by law. In other words, it is our opinion that the appointment of a city justice of the peace by the votes of the city council of the city of Richmond was tantamount to the election of such justice of the peace in the sense contemplated by the legislature, and that therefore the fifteenth judicial township of Contra Costa County was entitled to have but one justice of the peace at the time of the election in 1910."

In the present case we have a potent index to the legislative intent in using the words "be a candidate" and "seek the nomination," in the very language of section 18 of the Juvenile Court Act. In the same sentence in which these words are found, and preceding them, it is declared that probation officers "shall devote their entire time and attention to the duties of their offices." It is, therefore, manifestly in aid of this provision that probation officers shall not be candidates nor seek nominations for other offices or employments. But this plain legislative intent will be frustrated and the provision be reduced to an absurdity if the language employed is to receive a literal construction. The time to be expended by a probation officer in seeking or being a candidate for another office or employment would ordinarily be inconsiderable when contrasted with the time expended by him in occupying and discharging the duties of the new office or employment, if his seeking, or his candidacy, were successful. Moreover, a literal construction would serve to disqualify a probation officer who sought another office or employment successfully, but would not disqualify one who proenred and occupied another post without actually or technically seeking it. We are convinced that the legislature did not intend such an anomaly to arise through the application of the provision now under examination. When probation officers were commanded not to seek other places, they were disqualified from occupying such places.

The application for a peremptory writ of mandate is denied.

Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 2454. Second Appellate District.-January 16, 1918.] JOHN A. ROEBLING'S SONS COMPANY (a Corporation), et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INJURY IN EMPLOYMENT-BURDEN OF PROOF. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the burden of proof that the injury for which compensation is asked was suffered in the course of the employment is on the claimant.

ID. THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS.-Where various theoretical conclusions may be drawn from the state of facts established, each being equally plausible, some indicating that the injury may have arisen out of the employment, and others that the misconduct of the person injured was the producing cause, then it may not be said that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the case of him upon whom the burden of proof rests.

ID. DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS FROM EVIDENCE-RIGHT OF COMMISSION.If different conclusions may rationally and fairly be drawn from the evidence, one sustaining the right to compensation and the other being opposed thereto, the Industrial Accident Commission is at liberty to adopt the conclusion favorable to the claim, and its conclusion is beyond the scope of review by the supreme court. Where, however, there is no substantial evidence reasonably warranting an inference favorable to the claim for compensation, and any finding to the contrary is necessarily based on mere surprise, speculation, or conjecture, an award of compensation will be annulled. ID.-EVIDENCE- INFERENCE FAVORABLE ΤΟ COMPENSATION UNWARRANTED. An award of compensation made to the widow of a night watchman, who met his death from inhaling gas, is unwarranted, where the uncontradicted evidence indicates, if choice is to be made between conflicting speculative deductions, that the deceased willfully stepped aside from the performance of his duties which his employment laid upon him and invited by direct action on his part the occurrence of the detrimental cause which produced his death.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Review originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District to annul an award of the Industrial Accident Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Redman & Alexander, for Petitioners.

Christopher M. Bradley, for Respondents.

JAMES, J.-Petitioners herein seek to have annulled an award made in favor of Ellen J. Bundshu by the Industrial Accident Commission. Said Bundshu is the alleged widow of Joseph G. Bundshu. The commission determined that Bundshu, who died on or about the tenth day of December, 1916, came to his death through accidental means while he was in the employ of petitioners Roebling's Sons Company. It is the contention of petitioners that the award cannot be sustained; that, first, it was not shown that the death of Bundshu was produced by causes arising out of his employment; second, that it was not shown that Ellen J. Bundshu was the widow of the decedent.

At the time of his death Bundshu was employed as night watchman and janitor in the Roebling's Sons Company's plant in the city of Los Angeles. His duties were to keep watch over the plant during the night-time and to do necessary janitor work about the offices of the company. The local manager of the company testified that he had made up the compensation of Bundshu, which was $85 per month, by calculating about $60 as proper compensation for the watchman service and $25 for the janitor work. This witness testified: "I figured twenty to $25 a month extra to have the same man do the janitor work of the office, and make a better job for somebody. In addition to that they would have plenty of time to do the work and make it more economical for us than hiring two men, and would serve to give the fellow something to do and keep him awake and keep busy during the night." The main business of the watchman, as is common in employment of that character, was to guard the plant against intruders. In order to insure the performance of such duties the watchman was required to "ring in" hourly upon instruments placed in the building which were connected with a concern known as the District Telegraph. It was the duty of the latter concern, whenever there was a failure of the watchman to so report, to send a roundsman to find out the reason for the neglect, if it so should happen to be. Bundshu was at work on the night of the 10th of December, 1916, in the Roebling plant. At about 9:30 o'clock a roundsman of the telegraph company visiting the Roebling plant saw Bundshu apparently asleep at a desk in the office. This roundsman rapped loudly upon the door, whereupon Bundshu aroused himself and started to come to the door. On the way