that it was not fully supported by competent evidence. In other words, any substantial error would make it appear more readily that there had been a miscarriage of justice. However, we have searched with great diligence through the record and have examined with much care all of the assignments of error made by counsel in their brief. We find nothing which would justify the conclusion that defendant was not given a fair trial, or that he was denied any right which the law guarantees to a person accused of crime. The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed. Conrey, P. J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred. A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the district court of appeal on April 25, 1918. [Civ. No. 2341. Second Appellate District.-March 26, 1918.] CONSTANTINO V. BORBA et al., Respondents, v. JOSE DE MELLO, Appellant. APPEAL ALTERNATIVE METHOD PRINTING OF RECORD IN BRIEFS.Where an appeal is taken under the alternative method, the parties must print in their briefs such portions of the record as they desire to call to the attention of the appellate court, and references to the transcript are not sufficient. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. J. A. Allen, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Bradley & Bradley, for Appellant. G. W. Zartman, for Respondents. THE COURT.-Defendant in this case appeals from an adverse judgment and presents his appeal by the alternative method. In the briefs filed by counsel no attempt is made to comply with the provisions of section 953c of the Code of Civil Procedure, which require that the parties in presenting an appeal by the method mentioned shall print in their brief such portions of the record as they desire to call to the court's attention. Numerous references are made to the pages of the transcript filed, but it has been repeatedly held that the appellate courts will not examine the transcript documents in order to determine whether there is merit in the contentions made by the appellant. Many opinions of this court and the supreme court reiterate the rule. A collection of the cases so holding will be found grouped in the case of Barker Bros. v. Joos et al., ante, p. 311, [171 Pac. 1085]. Not having properly before us sufficient of the record to illustrate the various contentions made on behalf of the appellant, we are compelled to hold that no error is shown as against the judgment. The judgment appealed from is affirmed. [Civ. No. 2539. Second Appellate District.-March 28, 1918.] ROBERT MCNEELY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. ACTION AGAINST JOINT TORT-FEASORS SEPARATE JUDGMENT.-Where two joint tort-feasors are sued and one of them suffers default, a judgment may be taken against him and the action proceeded with against the other and a separate judgment rendered against him. ID. DEFAULT OF ONE DEFENDANT RIGHT OF TRIAL BY APPEARING DEFENDANT-MANDAMUS.-Where in an action against two joint tortfeasors one of them suffers default, the court has a discretion under section 579 of the Code of Civil Procedure to determine whether a judgment should be rendered against such defendant in advance of a trial against the other defendant, but it has no discretion to refuse to proceed with the trial, as to the appearing defendant, and a writ of mandate will lie to compel the court to proceed with the trial. APPLICATION for a Writ of Mandamus originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District to compel the Superior Court to proceed with the trial of an action. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. W. A. Alderson, for Petitioner. G. F. McCulloch, for Respondent. WORKS, J., pro tem.-This proceeding concerns a certain. action in which the petitioner, as plaintiff, sued one Connell and one Hill for damages as joint tort-feasors. Hill appeared in the action and made answer to the complaint, but the default of Connell was taken; whereupon the petitioner elected to proceed against the latter under the default and judgment in the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars was entered against him. Connell then came forward and presented a motion to set aside the default and the motion. was granted. The petitioner appealed from the order thus made and the appeal is now pending. The action was set down for trial against Hill, but, at the time set, the respondent refused to proceed with the hearing. The petitioner then filed in this court his application for a writ of mandate requiring the respondent to try the action as to Hill and an alternative writ was issued. It is contended that the petitioner is entitled to the writ under the terms of section 579 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads: "In an action against several defendants, the court may, in its discretion, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others, whenever a several judgment is proper." The respondent contends, however, that, in an action against several joint tort-feasors, a several judgment is not proper, and cites McCool v. Mahoney, 54 Cal. 491, and Marriott v. Williams, 152 Cal. 705, 711, [93 Pac. 875]. These cases decide that where an action is tried against joint tortfeasors, only one judgment may be pronounced against them. all; but a later case has announced the rule that where, as in the action now in question, two joint tort-feasors are sued and one of them suffers default, then a judgment may be taken against him and the action be proceeded with against the other and a separate judgment be rendered against him. (Cole v. Roebling Construction Co., 156 Cal. 443, [105 Pac. 255].) It is insisted that, after judgment had been rendered against Connell, it was left to the discretion of the respondent to determine whether a trial should proceed as to Hill, and the well-known rule is invoked that the writ of mandate will not run to control judicial discretion. Under section 579 the court did have a discretion to determine whether a judgment should be rendered against Connell in advance of a trial against Hill. Further than that there was no discretion reposed in the court. Under the latter part of the section the petitioner has the right to press the action for trial and it is the duty of the respondent to try it. A peremptory writ of mandate will issue as prayed for. Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred. [Civ. No. 2323. First Appellate District.-March 28, 1918.] SAMUEL KALISH, Appellant, v. D. A. WHITE et al., Respondents. PEACE OFFICERS-EXECUTION OF WARRANT.-When a warrant, valid in form and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, is placed in the hands of an officer for execution, it is his duty without delay to carry out its commands, and for the proper execution of such process the officer incurs no liability, however disastrous may be the effect of its execution upon the person against whom it is issued. ID.-LIABILITY OF ARRESTING OFFICER.-The authority derived from the warrant justifies the officer in arresting no one but the person named therein against whom it is issued; and any interference with the liberty of the person other than the one named in the writ renders the officer liable in trespass, unless such interference is caused by the act of the person himself. FALSE IMPRISONMENT--ACTION FOR DAMAGES-WARRANT OF ARREST AS DEFENSE. In an action against an officer for damages for false imprisonment, the warrant of arrest was a complete defense where it appeared that the process, which was regular in form and legally issued, described the plaintiff by his name, which was the usual way, and that he was in fact the person for whom it was intended. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. George A. Sturtevant, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Devoto, Richardson & Devoto, for Appellant. C. M. Fickert, District Attorney, and Aylett R. Cotton, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondents. KERRIGAN, J.-This is an action for damages for false imprisonment, brought by the plaintiff against D. A. White, chief of the police department of San Francisco, and William Minehan, a detective sergeant in the department. Upon plaintiff resting his case a motion for a nonsuit as to defendant White was granted, and at the conclusion of the testimony of both sides the court of its own motion instructed the jury to return a verdict for defendant Minehan, which the jury did. This is an appeal by plaintiff from the judgment entered on the instructed verdict. The circumstances of the plaintiff's arrest and imprisonment were as follows: One Samuel Kalish, a person other than plaintiff, had embezzled the sum of eight hundred dollars belonging to one Mrs. Lydia McCarthy, and shortly thereafter disappeared, whereupon Mrs. McCarthy reported the matter to the police department of San Francisco, with the result that a warrant was issued for the arrest of the offender. About ten months prior to the embezzlement Minehan had known the plaintiff in San Francisco, and the execution of the process was placed in his hands. He made a diligent search for the plaintiff, and learned that he had recently vacated his room, leaving some of his clothes behind, and that prior to leaving it had been his custom to get his mail at the postoffice. The search in San Francisco proving fruitless, and it having been learned from the complaining witness that the accused had brothers in New York and Chicago, Minehan advised her to write decoy letters addressed to Samuel Kalish at both those cities. This she did, and received a reply from the plaintiff signed "Sam Kalish." Thereupon the case was presented to the grand jury and an indictment was returned against the plaintiff charging him with embezzlement; extradition proceedings were inaugurated, and Minehan proceeded to New York, where he found the plaintiff in the custody of the police department awaiting process for his removal to California. Plaintiff protested his innocence, but Minehan proceeded to execute his process. It is also to be noted that the record |