three months, and while he was engaged in work on the employer's house, an accident occurred whereby Hardwick received the injuries for which compensation has been awarded. It is admitted by respondent that the employment of Hardwick was not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer. Respondent contends, however, that the employment was not "casual" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that, therefore, the liability exists. This contention covers the only question for determination in this proceeding.

Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act, in its definition of the word "employee," as used in that act, excludes therefrom "any person whose employment is both casual and not in the usual course of the trade, . business, profession, or occupation of his employer." That clause was considered by this court in Blood v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 30 Cal. App. 274, [157 Pac. 1140], where we referred to decisions from other jurisdictions where the same subject was under consideration. In that case the claimant was employed at a daily wage to apply two coats of paint to a two-story frame building at that time occupied by the owner. The employment was not for any definite period of time, but the evidence showed that the work would reasonably have been done within two weeks. After entering upon his work the claimant was accidentally injured while engaged in the work. This court held that the employment was casual, and as it was also not in the usual course of any business of the employer, the award was annulled. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 748, [158 Pac. 1031], the claimant was employed by the day to repair a farm tractor. On his behalf argument was made that the employment was permanent as being "for an indefinite period which may be severed by either party." The court replied that this definition of permanent employment did not fit the hiring of the claimant Snow, who was employed by the day. "There was nothing indefinite about it, except the time which might be consumed in making the necessary repairs on the tractor, but, nevertheless, Snow was hired for the definite period reasonably necessary for the fixing of that particular machine.' Held, that the employment was "casual" in the sense of being "incidental" and "occasional"-that being undoubtedly the definition of the word as used in the statute. In Miller &

Lux, Inc., v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 32 Cal. App. 250, [162 Pac. 651], we have the opinion of the first district court of appeal upon the same question illustrated by somewhat different facts. There the claimant was employed as a carpenter and as the foreman in charge of the construction of a "fourteen-room cottage" located upon the land of the employer. After having continued in this employment for a period of fifty-seven days, and while so employed, the claimant suffered the accidental injury for which compensation was awarded to him by the commission. After a statement of the facts, the court held that the applicant's employment was neither casual nor out of the usual course of business of the employer, and the award was affirmed. The court said: "The cases collected with much industry and cited by counsel for the petitioner will, when analyzed, show that the rule depended in each case upon its particular state of facts; and that as to these facts they may each be easily differentiated from the case at bar. To hold that the applicant's employment to act as foreman over a number of other carpenters in the erection of a fourteen-room building, involving an engagement of several months of regular and daily recurring labor, to be 'casual' would, in our opinion, restrict the operation of the statute beyond its reasonable and liberal interpretation." In Michigan the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pub. Acts Mich. 1912 [Ex. Sess.], No. 10) does not include in its benefits any person whose employment is but casual. An instructive case under that statute is Dyer v. James Black Masonry & Contracting Co., 192 Mich. 400, [158 N. W. 959]. The employer was the principal contractor engaged in the construction of a building in the city of Detroit. Finding it necessary to have some person to look after the delivery of glass at the building and see to the unloading of the glass, the employer arranged with the claimant Dyer to do this work from time to time as the glass arrived. The claimant was injured while thus employed. In that case some of the principal decisions are referred to, including those relied upon by us in Blood v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 30 Cal. App. 274, [157 Pac. 1140]. It was held that the employment of the claimant was not casual.

With respect to this particular question, we think that the case of Miller & Lux, Inc., v. Industrial Acc. Comm., supra, is closely like the case at bar, and the language which we have

quoted from that decision is applicable here. Our own decision in Blood v. Industrial Acc. Comm., supra, does not necessarily conflict with this conclusion. The claimant there was employed to do work which was in the nature of repairs to an existing building. The claimant was employed at a fixed rate per day, but his contract was one of employment for the entire job, which was fixed and limited in its amount and in the description of the work which claimant was to do. It is not reasonably possible to set forth a hard-and-fast definition of casual employment whereby every case may be determined like a mathematical problem. It is our opinion that the award made by the commission is based upon a correct application of the statute to the facts of this case.

The award is affirmed.

James, J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on March 11, 1918.

[Civ. No. 2512. Second Appellate District.-January 14, 1918.] THOMAS W. SPIER, Petitioner, v. H. E. PECK, as Treasurer, etc., Respondent.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-RULE.-Statutes are to be so construed as not to give rise to an absurdity in their attempted application and as not to destroy their efficacy as a whole or in substantial part. ID. INTENT-NATURE OF EVIL OBJECT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED.-Strong indices to the legislative intent will always be found upon an inquiry into the nature of the evil sought to be remedied by a statute or into the object to be accomplished by it. JUVENILE COURT ACT PROBATION OFFICERS SUPERINTENDENT OF DETENTION HOME-HOLDING OF Two POSITIONS PROHIBITED.-Section 18 of the Juvenile Court Act (Stats. 1915, p. 1225), providing, among other things, that all probation officers receiving a salary of seventy-five dollars or more per month shall devote their entire time and attention to the duties of their offices, and no such probation officer while holding such office and receiving salary there for shall be a candidate or seek the nomination for any other public office

or employment, disqualifies a probation officer from being superintendent of the detention home and drawing the salary annexed to that position.

APPLICATION for a Writ of Mandate originally made to the District Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District to compel a county treasurer to pay the warrant of a county probation officer for acting as superintendent of the detention home.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Robert M. Clarke, for Petitioner.

Don G. Bowker, District Attorney, for Respondent.

WORKS, J., pro tem.-Petitioner is probation officer of the county of Ventura and is also acting under appointment as superintendent of the detention home for the same county, both of the offices, or positions, having their existence under what is known as the Juvenile Court Act (Stats. 1915, p. 1225, Deering's Gen. Laws, Act No. 1770a). The law fixes petitioner's salary as probation officer at one hundred dollars per month and as superintendent of the detention home at fifty dollars per month. Section 18 of the Juvenile Court Act provides, among other things, "All probation officers . . . receiving a salary of seventy-five dollars or more per month shall devote their entire time and attention to the duties of their offices, and no such probation officer, . . . while holding such office and receiving salary therefor, shall be a candidate for or seek the nomination for any other public office or employ. ment." The petitioner presented to the board of supervisors of the county his claim for salary for June, 1917, as superintendent of the detention home and the claim was allowed. The county auditor approved the demand and issued his warrant for its payment, but the respondent, who is the county treasurer, refused to make payment of the warrant upon its presentation. Thereupon the petitioner instituted this proceeding to enforce the payment.

The respondent contends that section 18 of the Juvenile Court Act, in that part of it from which we have quoted, disqualifies the petitioner, while holding the post of probation officer, from being superintendent of the detention home and,

therefore, from drawing the salary annexed to that position. Can the language forbidding a probation officer to "be a candidate for or seek the nomination for any other public office or employment" receive that construction? Statutes are to be so construed as not to give rise to an absurdity in their attempted application and as not to destroy their efficacy as a whole or in substantial part (Murphy v. City of San Luis Obispo, 119 Cal. 624, 628, [39 L. R. A. 444, 51 Pac. 1085]; Hannon v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 12 Cal. App. 350, 355, [107 Pac. 335]; Madary v. City of Fresno, 20 Cal. App. 91, 96, 97, [128 Pac. 340]), all rules of construction having their existence, of course, for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the legislature, that being the prime object of the construction and interpretation of statutes. Strong indices to the legislative intent will always be found upon an inquiry into the nature of the evil sought to be remedied by a statute or into the object to be accomplished by it. (Bannerman v. Boyle, 160 Cal. 197, 200, [116 Pac. 732]; Patton v. Los Angeles Pacific Co., 18 Cal. App. 522, 525, [123 Pac. 613]; Odell v. Rihn, 19 Cal. App. 713, 719, [127 Pac. 802]; Gise v. Myers, 22 Cal. App. 127, [133 Pac. 500].)

In one of the cases above cited (Patton v. Los Angeles Pacific Co.), a statute was under review which provided: "An employer is not bound to indemnify his employee for losses suffered by the latter in consequence of the ordinary risks of the business in which he is employed, nor in consequence of the negligence of another person employed by the same employer in the same general business, unless the negligence causing the injury was committed in the performance of a duty the employer owes by law to the employee. . . . ; provided, nevertheless, that the employer shall be liable for such injury when the same results from the wrongful act, neglect or default of . . . a coemployee engaged in another department of labor from that of the employee injured, or employed upon a machine, railroad train, switch-signal point, locomotive engine, or other appliance than that upon which the employee is injured is employed. . . . The facts of the case were that the motorman of an electric interurban car was injured by the negligence of the conductor of another car. The motorman brought suit against the railroad company for damages. His complaint was assailed by general demurrer and in passing