Was two months an unreasonable time to wait for the delivery of the stock? In Pinkiert v. Kornblum, supra, this court declined to assume, in the absence of evidence upon the question, that twenty days was a reasonable time to be allowed for the issuance of stock in a corporation to one who had purchased it. (See, also, Roughton v. Brookings Lum. & Box Co., supra.) In the present case, evidently with the intention of bringing it within the rule stated in Vickrey v. Maier, supra, the trial court found that certain "peculiar circumstances" existed, and they are stated specifically in the findings of fact. Although respondent looks to them as a justification for a delay of two years and two months in demanding a return of his purchase money, they are established as facts in the case, and we may look to them for aid in determining whether two months was an unreasonably long time to await the delivery of the stock. Among the "peculiar circumstances" found were these: That a dispute arose between appellant and its officers who received respondent's money, and that those officers were friends of respondent, and that he was lulled into a sense of security by assurance from them that he would in due time receive his stock. The circumstance involved in the dispute mentioned is very generally stated, as we are not told what was the subject of the dispute, but taking all the circumstances together, taking the rule expressed in Pinkiert v. Kornblum, supra, and in Roughton v. Brookings Lum. & Box Co., supra, we are of the opinion that two months was not an unreasonably long time to await the delivery of the stock, and that, therefore, the demand for the money was made within two years after respondent reasonably first could have made it. There is an angle of the above discussion which we have not yet followed to its conclusion. If we overlook the necessity for a disposition of the rights of the parties under the express contract for the delivery of the stock, as a prerequisite to the arising of the implied agreement for the return of the purchase money, and regard the case as one in which the money became returnable at once after it was paid over to the agent of appellant, we may yet dispose of the question of the statute of limitations satisfactorily to the contention of the respondent, and along the lines evidently followed in the settlement of that point by the trial court. The question then is, under all the circumstances of the case -and giving due regard to the rule of Bills v. Silver King Min. Co., 106 Cal. 9, [39 Pac. 43], and cases like it-was two years and two months an unreasonably long time to elapse before the making of demand for the return of the purchase money? In addition to the "peculiar circumstances" stated above, the trial court also found that "plaintiff made repeated demands for the aforesaid stock; that said. defendant did not finally refuse to deliver said stock until September 16, 1914, and plaintiff did not treat said refusal as final until said time, but until said time expected that said. defendant would deliver said stock." It is shown by the evidence upon which these facts are found that there was continual argument among the officers of appellant-and that argument was continued as late as at a session of the directors of the appellant held on September 16, 1914-upon the question whether the stock contracted to be delivered to the respondent should be delivered by the agent who had received and used respondent's money, from his own holdings, or whether it should come out of the treasury of the appellant. The evidence shows that the respondent was justified in believing, until the date last mentioned, that his stock would be forthcoming from either the one source or the other, and the directors of the appellant never at any time formally refused to make delivery from the corporate treasury. These facts bring the case within the rule as to "peculiar circumstances," stated in Vickrey v. Maier, 164 Cal. 384, [129 Pac. 273], and a delay of two years and two months in making demand for the money was justified. There are certain other contentions made by appellant but they do not merit a discussion. The judgment is affirmed. Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred. [Civ. No. 2101. Second Appellate District.-March 2, 1918.] A. D. ANDERSON, Appellant, v. H. W. WILCOX et al., Respondents. APPEAL JUDGMENT-RECORD-PRINTING IN BRIEFS.-Where on an appeal from a judgment the only record consists of a typewritten transcript, and no part of the record is printed in the briefs, except the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the brief of respondents, and the facts found are sufficient to support the judgment, the judgment must be affirmed, since it will be presumed that counsel have presented in their briefs all portions of the record which they desired to call to the attention of the appellate court. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. T. L. Lewis, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. H. W. Scheld, and W. J. Carr, for Appellant. Shreve & Shreve, for Respondents. CONREY, P. J.-Plaintiff appeals from the judgment. In the briefs the action is described by counsel for appellant as one in replevin to recover the possession of certain personal property, and by counsel for the respondents as an action to recover damages for alleged wrongful conversion of personal property. No part of the record has been printed. in the briefs, except that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are printed in the brief of respondents. The facts found are sufficient to sustain the judgment. Counsel for appellant say that the findings of fact are contrary to the evidence, but do not point out any particulars in which the evidence is not sufficient to support those findings. They further say in their brief that "the evidence in this case shows" certain facts stated by them, without setting forth any part of the record of such evidence. The only record on appeal consists of a typewritten transcript. It is presumed that by their briefs counsel have presented to us all portions of the record to which they desire to call our attention. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 953c.) Many decisions concerning such defective presentations of the record are col lected in Barker Brothers v. Joos, ante, p. 311, [171 Pac. 1085]. The judgment is affirmed. James, J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred. [Civ. No. 2103. Second Appellate District.—March 2, 1918.] HAMMOND LUMBER COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v. FRANCIS T. KEARSLEY et al., Defendants; FRED L. STOCKS et al., Respondents. PROMISSORY NOTE-ASSIGNMENT OF ALL INTEREST-QUALIFIED INDORSEMENT. In view of section 3118 of the Civil Code, providing an indorser of a promissory note may qualify his indorsement with the words, "without recourse," or equivalent words, and upon such indorsement be responsible only to the same extent as in the case of a transfer without indorsement, the assignment by the payees of a promissory note of "all of our interest in this promissory note" is a qualified indorsement, and upon the maker's default, such payees are not liable as indorsers. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. E. T. Zook, Judge Presiding. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. R. L. Horton, for Appellant. Harry M. Irwin, for Respondents. WORKS, J., pro tem.-The defendants Stocks, who are also the respondents, delivered to the appellant a certain promissory note secured by trust deed, after writing on the back thereof, over their signatures, the following: "For value received we hereby assign all of our interest in this promissory note of $757.66, dated April 23, 1913, signed by Francis T. Kearsley and C. B. Kearsley, to Hammond Lumber Company, a corporation." Two of the respondents were payees of the note and the third was the wife of one of the others. This action was commenced against the makers of the note and against the respondents upon their assumed liability as ( indorsers under the terms of the instrument above quoted. The makers defaulted and judgment was entered against them; but judgment was rendered in favor of the respondents. The plaintiff appeals. The appellant contends that a liability as indorsers rests upon the respondents and cases are cited, in support of the position, to the effect that an assignment written on the back of a note by the payees named in it is not different from an indorsement by them in blank, and that they are liable as indorsers in the one instance as in the other. There are many cases which so decide, but they are cases in which the assignments were transfers, without words of qualification, of the instruments upon the backs of which they were written. The assignment in question here conveys "all of our interest in this promissory note," which is quite different from such an indorsement as, for instance, "we hereby assign the within note." The respondents cite many cases which point out the difference, in legal effect, between two such indorsements. We do not present a citation of those cases, but content ourselves with quoting from one of them, Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. C. 61, 66, [54 S. E. 847, 849], in which the court, speaking of a section of the negotiable instruments law of the state, said: "A qualified indorsement may, by the express terms of that section, be made by adding to the indorser's signature the words 'without recourse, or any words of similar import.' It has been settled in commercial law that a transfer by indorsement of the 'right and title' of the payee or an indorser to a negotiable note is equivalent to an indorsement 'without recourse,' and words such as were used in this case are therefore in their meaning or 'import' similar to such an indorsement, and this is their reasonable interpretation. (1 Daniel, secs. 700 and 700a; Norton on Bills and Notes, 3d ed., p. 120; Hailey v. Falconer, 32 Ala. 536; Rice v. Stearns, 3 Mass. 225, [3 Am. Dec. 129]; Randolph on Commercial Paper, 2d ed., secs. 721, 722, 1008; Goddard v. Lyman, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 268; Borden v. Clark, 26 Mich. 410; Eaton & Gilbert on Commercial Paper, sec. 61.” This decision, and the others cited by respondents, bring the present case within the terms of section 3118 of the California Civil Code, which, with our own italics, is as follows: "An indorser may qualify his indorsement with the words, 'without recourse,' or equivalent words; and upon |