reference to the charges made, dismissed MacPhee from the force. He appealed from the conviction in the criminal case, and this court reversed the judgment and granted him a new trial. Proceedings in the lower court were thereupon dismissed, and MacPhee subsequently demanded that the police commission proceed to set aside his dismissal on the accusation before that body and hear the charges against him. This the commission refused to do, and he then applied to the superior court for a writ of mandate to compel them to act in accordance with his demand. That court denied the application, and MacPhee now appeals. The appellant relies upon a section of the charter of the city and county of San Francisco which provides, generally speaking, that no member of the police department shall be subject to dismissal for any cause except after trial before the commission had upon notice to him of the time and place of hearing (Charter, art. VIII, c. 7, sec. 3). But there is another provision of this charter which must be construed with the section above referred to so as to reconcile them, if possible, with each other, namely, section 10 of article XVI, which provides that an office becomes vacant when the incumbent thereof dies, resigns, is adjudged insane, convicted of a felony or of an offense in violation of his official duty, or is removed from office, ceases to be a resident of the city and county of San Francisco, or absents himself from the state without leave for more than sixty consecutive days. Upon first reading, these two sections of the charter appear, as contended by the appellant, to be irreconcilable, but a closer reading shows that section 3 of chapter 7 of article VIII refers to trials generally for breach of duty or misconduct and other cases before the commission; while section 10 of article XVI specifically makes a rule by which offices of the city and county become vacant under certain specified and carefully defined conditions. Viewing the first section above cited as providing a rule governing the dismissal of a member of the police department, and the latter section as designating a condition under which an office, either in the police or any other department of the city government, shall become vacant, there is no irreconcilable conflict between these two sections of the char ter; and it therefore becomes unnecessary to apply the rule invoked by the appellant that particular provisions prevail over more general provisions of a statute. This being so, the case of McKannay v. Horton, 151 Cal. 711, [121 Am. St. Rep. 146, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661, 91 Pac. 598], covers this case, where it is held that by section 10 of article XVI of the charter of San Francisco an office ipso facto becomes vacant on the conviction of the incumbent of a felony. Here the conviction was of a misdemeanor, but it was a misdemeanor of such character as involved a violation of official duty, and therefore comes within the section of the charter upon which the case of McKannay v. Horton rests. The judgment is affirmed. Lennon, P. J., and Kerrigan, J., concurred. [Civ. No. 2054. Second Appellate District.-February 19, 1918.] BARKER BROTHERS (a Corporation), Appellant, v. J. JOE JOOS et al., Respondents. APPEAL-ALTERNATIVE METHOD REVIEW OF TYPEWRITTEN TRANSCRIPTS. In view of section 953c of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires that the parties who present a cause on appeal by the alternative method shall print in their briefs such portions of the record as they desire to call to the attention of the court, where no portions of the record are printed in appellant's brief, and references are made to the pages of the typewritten transcripts only, appellate courts will not look to the typewritten transcripts for the purpose of determining whether ground exists for reversal of the judgment appealed from. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Leslie R. Hewitt, Judge. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. A. P. Michael Narlian, and N. B. Nelson, for Appellant. Geo. S. Hupp, and Lynden Bowring, for Respondents. THE COURT.-It is stated in the brief of plaintiff in this case that the appeal is from a judgment for the return of certain personal property to the intervener-respondent, or for the value thereof. The appeal is taken under the alternative method. No portions of the record are printed in appellant's brief. References are made to the pages of the typewritten transcripts only. Section 953c of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that the parties who present a cause on appeal by the alternative method print in their briefs such portions of the record as they desire to call to the attention of the court. It has been repeatedly held that appellate courts will not look to the typewritten transcripts filed under the alternative method of appeal for the purpose of determining whether ground exists for the reversal of the judgment appealed from. (Jones v. American Potash Co., 35 Cal. App. 128, [169 Pac. 397]; Marcucci v. Vowinckel, 164 Cal. 693, [130 Pac. 430]; Wills v. Woolner, 21 Cal. App. 528, [132 Pac. 283]; Miller v. Oliver, 174 Cal. 407, [163 Pac. 357]; Pasadena Realty Co. v. Clune, 34 Cal. App. 33, [166 Pac. 1025]; McKinnell v. Hansen, 34 Cal. App. 76, [167 Pac. 887]; California Sav. & Commercial Bank v. Canne, 34 Cal. App. 768, [169 Pac. 395]; Stewart v. Andrews, 35 Cal. App. 230, [169 Pac. 397]; Huffaker v. McVey, 35 Cal. App. 302, [169 Pac. 704]; Hepler v. Wright, 35 Cal. App. 567, [170 Pac. 667]; Anderson v. Recorder's Court, ante, p. 123, [171 Pac. 812]; Blochman Commercial & Sav. Bank v. Ketcham, ante, p. 284, [171 Pac. 1084].) The judgment appealed from is affirmed. [Civ. No. 2102. Second Appellate District.—February 19, 1918.] CHARLOTTE P. MUNN, Respondent, v. EARLE C. ANTHONY, INC. (a Corporation), Appellant. SALES-FRAUD-MISREPRESENTATIONS AS TO YEAR OF MANUFACTURE OF AUTOMOBILE EVIDENCE.-In an action by the buyer of an automobile for damages for alleged misrepresentations made by the seller's agent regarding the year of manufacture, the fact that the plaintiff had an independent examination of the car made before buying does not deprive her of the right to prove reliance upon such representations, where such examination looked only into the general condition of the car and its batteries, and not as to the year of its manufacture. ID. ORAL REPRESENTATIONS-WRITTEN CONTRACT-WAIVER.-Where a written contract for the sale of an automobile contains a description of the car with its model number, which number is descriptive to show the year of manufacture, and also contains a clause that all promises, verbal understandings, or agreements of any kind pertaining to the purchase not specified are expressly waived, the claim that false representations had been made as to the year of manufacture furnishes no ground for a cause of action for damages. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Stanley A. Smith, Judge Presiding. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. E. W. Freeman, and Paul Nourse, for Appellant. Olin Wellborn, Jr., and Stephen Monteleone, for Respondent. JAMES, J.-Appeal from a judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff and from an order denying to the defendant Earle C. Anthony, Inc. (a corporation), a new trial. The action was based upon alleged misrepresentations made by an agent of appellant regarding the year of manufacture of a certain electric automobile. Plaintiff negotiated with English, the agent of appellant, for the purchase of a secondhand electric automobile. She alleged and the court found that English represented that the automobile had been manufactured in the year 1913, when in fact it was a 1912 model. The car was offered to the plaintiff, with electric rectifier, for the sum of one thousand eight hundred dollars. Plaintiff informed appellant's agent that she would not purchase it without the privilege of having an examination made by persons of her own selection. Agreeable to this suggestion, the machine was left with the mechanics designated by the plaintiff, where it remained for a day or so. These mechanics being experienced in the handling of electric machines, examined the car and its batteries and reported to the plaintiff that everything was in good condition and that the car "looked to be a good buy." Plaintiff thereupon offered appellant the sum of one thousand seven hundred dollars for the car and rectifier, that being one hundred dollars less than the proposed price. This offer was accepted, and thereupon a written contract was entered into and signed by both parties. The contract appears to have been made upon the blank form used for the purchase of new cars, except that the descriptive matter was written in before it was signed. The contract in its main parts was in the following form: "November 24th, 1913. "In consideration of the placing at once of an order with the manufacturer, I hereby agree to purchase of the California Motor Company of Los Angeles. One R & L Electric Model No. 28475..... Sold for the account of Mrs. K. A. Kelley (AS IS) ... Including one second hand Westinghouse Price Price $1700.00 Price and to pay for the same the sum of $1700.00, said payment to be made at the garage of the California Motor Company, of Los Angeles, as soon as shipment from factory is received. "All cars are sold under the Standard Warranty of the National Association of Automobile Manufacturers. "All promises, verbal understandings or agreements of any kind pertaining to this purchase not specified herein, are hereby expressly waived. "Subject to conditions on back. "Signed CHARLOTTE P. MUNN. "Received of Charlotte P. Munn-Hotel Maryland, Pasadena, Cal., the sum of $200, as deposit upon and to apply upon the purchase price of the above contract. "All agreements contingent upon fires, strikes, delays in shipment, accidents or other reasons beyond our control. "CALIFORNIA MOTOR COMPANY, "By E. ANTHONY." There was a conflict in the evidence upon the question as to whether the false representations had been made and this |