contractor in the principal contract, which was made between him and the state of California for the construction and completion of a portion of the state highway in Ventura County. The materials furnished by the plaintiff were used by the subcontractor upon a part of the work included in the principal contract. On obtaining his contract with the state, Garnsey, together with defendant Globe Indemnity Company, executed a bond for the purpose and in the terms required by an act of the legislature of the state of California, entitled "An act to secure the payment of claims of materialmen, mechanics, or laborers, employed by contractors upon state, municipal, or other public work," and an act amendatory thereof. (Stats. 1897, p. 202, and Stats. 1911, p. 1422.) If under the statute as in force during the year 1914, when the contract and undertaking were made, such an undertaking covered the matter of payment for materials furnished to a subcontractor to be used and which were used in the performance of the work described in the principal contract, then the complaint stated a cause of action against the defendants who executed that undertaking. In the case of Associated Oil Co. v. Commary-Peterson Co., 32 Cal. App. 582, [163 Pac. 702], the facts were similar to the case at bar and the same question was presented. It was there held that the statute in question is not confined to the engagements of the contractor. "It was manifestly intended to cover all labor and all material contributing to the improvement, whether furnished directly to the contractor or indirectly through a subcontractor." In the absence of any controlling decision in this state, the court discussed a number of decisions rendered in other jurisdictions. A petition for a rehearing of that cause in the supreme court was denied.

Notwithstanding the authority of the decision mentioned above, counsel for respondents insist that a different ruling should be made, their argument being based upon a point not suggested in the former case. They admit that the language of the statute, exclusive of its title, is broad enough to include the claim of the plaintiff; but they say that the title thereof (which we have quoted supra), is so limited that the statute does not cover the claims of any persons except those employed by the principal contractor. In support of this contention they rely upon article IV, section 24, of the constitution of this state.

...

"Recognizing the mandatory effect of the provision regarding the substance of the titles given legislative acts, the decisions have construed that provision in various cases. It has been said that the purpose of requiring the title to express the subject of the act was that legislators themselves, as well as the public might not be deceived by false, misleading, or deceitful titles, and so permit mischievous legislation to be unwittingly enacted. A liberal rule of construction has been adopted, however, in the interest of protecting meritorious legislation from being declared void through inartificially constructed titles. The main object of this provision. is to prevent legislators and the public from being entrapped by misleading titles to bills whereby legislation relating to one subject might be obtained under the title of another.. It seems to be well settled that it is not necessary that the title of an act should embrace an abstract or catalogue of its contents.' (Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, [24 Pac. 383].) Where the body of an act embraces provisions which are germane to the general subject stated in its title, the title will be held sufficient to comprehend all of the provisions of the act itself; and where the title suggests to the mind the field. of legislation which the text of the act includes, the title will not be held misleading or insufficient, or the act restricted in its operation." (People v. Jordan, 172 Cal. 391, 394, [156 Pac. 451, 453].) Applying the principles above stated, it appears clear to us that the provisions contained in the text of the statute here under consideration do not extend beyond the field of legislation naturally suggested to the mind by the words "materialmen . . . employed by contractors upon state, municipal, or other public work." It is our opinion that the complaint stated a cause of action.

The judgment is reversed.

James, J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred.

[Crim. No. 406. Third Appellate District.-February 18, 1918.] THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. G. PERA, Appellant. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SALE WITHIN NO-LICENSE TERRITORY-LOCATION OF PLACE-EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF COUNTY CLERK.-In a prosecution for the crime of keeping a place of public resort in no-license territory for the purpose of sale therein of alcoholic liquor, testimony of the county clerk that the town in which the defendant kept such resort was outside of the boundaries of any incorporated city or town, and within a certain supervisorial district which had voted no-license, is sufficient to show that such place was within no-license territory.

ID.-APPLICATION FOR FEDERAL LIQUOR LICENSE.-In such a prosecution, the admission in evidence of a purported written application of the defendant for a federal liquor license without proof that the same was signed by him was erroneous, but without prejudice, where the other evidence sufficiently supported the verdict.

ID. OTHER SALES.-In a prosecution for the crime of keeping a place of public resort in no-license territory for the purpose of sale in such territory of alcoholic liquor, testimony as to a sale of liquor made by defendant fourteen days prior to the commission of the date charged is admissible to show the character of the place and the purpose of the defendant.

ID. INTENT TO COMMIT ACT-EXISTENCE IMMATERIAL. In a prosecu tion for the crime of keeping a place of public resort in no-license territory for the purpose of sale in such territory of alcoholic liquor, it is not necessary to the consummation of the crime that an intent to commit the act be shown, since the mere commission of such act is sufficient to constitute the crime.

ID. POSSESSION OF FEDERAL LIQUOR LICENSE-EFFECT OF INSTRUCTION.-An instruction that the possession by defendant of a federal liquor license could not legally operate as a shield to any person shown to have committed the crime of keeping a public resort for the sale of alcoholic liquors in no-license territory, against the penal consequences thereof, is abstractly correct in the statement of the principle declared therein.

ID. PUNISHMENT FOR OFFENSE SENTENCE OF FINE AND IMPRISONMENT-INVALIDITY AS TO IMPRISONMENT.-Under section 19 of the local option law, limiting imprisonment upon conviction of any of the provisions of the law to seven months, a sentence to imprisonment for one month and to a fine of six hundred dollars, and in default of payment, imprisonment not exceeding one day for each two dollars thereof, is void as to imprisonment for nonpayment of fine.

APPEAL-MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENTS JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL.-The district court of appeal, before its judg ments become final or before the causes in which such judgments are rendered are transferred to the supreme court upon petition, has the right or jurisdiction to modify its judgments, or set them aside if for good reasons such a course is required.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial and from an order denying a motion in arrest of judgment. E. N. Rector, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

L. J. Schino, and Terry W. Ward, for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and J. Chas. Jones, Deputy Attorney-General, for Respondent.

HART, J.-Defendant was informed against by the district attorney of the county of Merced for the crime of keeping a place of public resort in no-license territory for the purpose of sale in no-license territory of alcoholic liquor. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged in the information. Defendant made a motion in arrest of judgment and a motion for new trial, both of which motions were denied. Judgment was pronounced and, as entered in the minutes of the court, read as follows:

"It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that said defendant, G. Pera, be, and he is fined in the sum of $600, said sum to be paid to the clerk of this court, immediately, and in default of said payment of fine, said defendant to be imprisoned in the Merced County jail for a term not exceeding one day for each $2, of such fine so remaining unpaid. It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that said defendant be, and he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of one month in the Merced County jail."

The appeal is from the judgment, the order denying the motion in arrest of judgment, and the order denying the motion for a new trial.

Appellant contends that the "judgment is excessive, void, and unintelligible."

It appears from the record that, at the time of pronouncing judgment, the court imposed the fine of six hundred dollars, with the alternative of imprisonment, and then the following colloquy ensued:

"The Court: Now, Mr. District Attorney, of course I don't think there is any question but what the court has the right to go ahead, after this kind of a judgment, and impose a sentence of imprisonment.

"Mr. McCray: I will just read the section.

"The Court: This imprisonment, of course, is only in default of the payment of the fine, that's all, and there is no imprisonment at all except for a default in the payment of the fine, that is only to compel the payment of the fine, that is all. It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that you be imprisoned in the county jail of the county of Merced for the term of one month."

It is the contention of appellant that, under the first part of the judgment, imposing a fine of six hundred dollars, or imprisonment for one day for each two dollars of the fine, he may be compelled to serve three hundred days, while, in addition, under the second part of the judgment, he must serve one month without the alternative of a fine, a total of 330 days.

Section 19 of the Local Option Act (Stats. 1911, p. 604), under the provisions of which the defendant was tried and convicted, provides: "Any person violating any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding six hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding seven months, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

Section 1205 of the Penal Code reads as follows: "A judgment that the defendant pay a fine may also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine be satisfied. But the judgment must specify the extent of the imprisonment, which must not exceed one day for every two dollars of the fine, nor extend in any case beyond the term for which the defendant might be sentenced to imprisonment for the offense of which he has been convicted."

It is manifest that the penal clause of the local option statute limits the power of the court to impose punishment by imprisonment to a term of seven months, and that, therefore,