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sea-letters and certificates establishing identity of ship and cargo in case of war in which one party should be neutral, the other belligerent. Article XIII taken from the treaty of 1785 between the United States and Prussia, stipulated that in case of war between the two parties, merchants of one residing within the jurisdiction of the other should be allowed one year in which to collect and transport, inviolate, their merchandise. Article XIV, modelled on all the earlier American treaties, forbade subjects or citizens of the one party to take out privateering commissions from any prince or state with which the other party should be at war.

One of the most interesting portions of the treaty was that containing the articles on neutral rightsArticles XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII. They adopted the principles of the Armed Neutrality, which were mainly also those of the previous treaties of the United States, excepting that just signed with Great Britain which while not relinquishing the principles in theory nevertheless acquiesced for the duration of the war in the British contrary practice. Pinckney, fully cognizant of the articles of Jay's Treaty and their heavy concessions on these points, now put into the Spanish treaty articles conformable to the old creed: free ships make free goods; neutral ships may trade freely from port to port of the enemy, except in contraband of war or to a really blockaded or beseiged enemy port-a repudiation of the British Rule of 1756; and a carefully stipulated list of contraband strictly limited to enumerated warlike implements. The contraband article studiously

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and elaborately listed non-contraband, including as such especially naval stores and provisions, and all else not mentioned in the enumerated list of contraband. Article XVIII restricted the right of search of neutral ships by belligerent cruisers to small boarding parties and provided that the neutral ship should be equipped with sea-letters and certificates, a form for which was declared to be annexed to the treaty."

These were traditionally American articles going back to the model treaty plan of the Continental Congress, the "plan of 1776" and the elaborations on it in the treaties with France (1778), the Netherlands (1782), Sweden (1783) and Prussia (1785), and so inconsistently and purposefully omitted from Jay's Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain.

"Consuls shall be reciprocally established with the privileges and powers which those of the most favored Nation enjoy in the Ports where their consuls reside, or are permitted to be." So said Article XIX in toto. This shut out American consuls from Spain's colonial dominions. As to commerce, it was left out except for the provision in the first paragraph of Article XXII which provided that the two parties "will in future give to their mutual commerce all the extension and favor which the advantage of both Countries may require." This not only excluded citizens of the United States along with the subjects of all other countries

The form was not so annexed to the treaty in the archives of the Department of State. Its absence is not explainable. The form may however be found on p. 415 of the second volume of the English translation of Godoy's Memoirs.

from Spain's American colonies, but did not even provide for the most-favored-nation commercial privileges which were a feature of all other American treaties. American commerce thus remained at the mercy of any sudden change in Spanish municipal law; so reciprocally did Spanish commerce with the United States. Because of the one-sidedness of the trade this article was of greater advantage to Spain than to the United States. This was one of the reasons why William Short did not approve of the treaty. Another was because no entrance for American trade into any of the Spanish colonies was granted - which Short believed could have been secured; and still another objection which he had was that no specific rules for adjudication were laid down to govern the mixed commission for judgment on spoliations by Spanish ships of war on American neutral shipping. By Article XXI this mixed commission, set up according to the machinery for such established by Jay's Treaty, was to decide "according to the merits of the several cases, and to justice, equity and the law of Nations." Unlike the rule of the British-American treaty spoliation mixed commission, cases brought before this tribunal did not require to have exhausted the resources of Spanish courts of justice. This was a distinct advantage for the United States. If Godoy was negligent in overlooking this point, he was even more careless in not detecting a perfectly good opportunity to place before the same mixed commission the spoliations on

See appendix no. IV to this volume.

Spanish vessels in 1793 by French privateers illegally fitted out in American harbors. Pinckney could hardly have refused to make such an article reciprocal."

The second paragraph of Article XXII covered the entrepot provision. When the compromise concerning this was reached at the eleventh hour of the final negotiation Pinckney wrote Short that "we have agreed upon N. Orleans for 3 years paying only storage, but this permission to be continued unless an equal establishment is assigned elsewhere on the Mississippi." As actually worded the article read:

"His Catholic Majesty will permit the Citizens of the United States for the space of three years from this time to deposit their merchandize and effects in the Port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores, and his Majesty promises either to continue this permission if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them an another part of the banks of the Mississippi an equivalent establishment."

Did the terms of this sentence reserve the right to the King of Spain to revoke the entrepot altogether at the expiration of three years, if he found during those three years it had been prejudicial to the interests of Spain? The reader may see for himself, by consulting the original English and Spanish texts of the treaty,

'That Godoy permitted these points to escape him is another very strong argument to show that he could not have known the text of Jay's Treaty.

in appendix V of this volume, that it was somewhat ambiguous on this point.

Finally, the last article (XXIII) concerning ratifications, should be noticed. Pinckney's powers authorized him to sign and to send the treaty to the United States for ratification by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This article textually ignored the Senate:

"The present treaty shall not be in force until ratified by the contracting parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within six months, or sooner if possible."

A treaty like this one encountered no opposition in the Senate! It was immeditely and unanimously ratified, as soon as submitted, and returned forthwith to Spain, where ratifications were exchanged, April 25, 1796, barely within the allowed six months.

The treaty was not so promptly executed. The history of the long, unpleasant and highly involved chapter of bickerings over its execution must be told very briefly. The delay was due principally to two things: Governor Carondelet's prosecution of the Wilkinson intrigue; and the incompatibility of the terms of Jay's British treaty with those of Pinckney's Spanish one, together with the discovery in Spain that after all the terms of Jay's Treaty were on the whole comparatively innocuous, so far as that monarchy was concerned.

When it became known in Louisiana that direct negotiations on the Mississippi and boundary questions had been resumed at Madrid, Carondelet was influenced, largely by Gayoso de Lemos, to take up again

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