this, where the result would be a clear evasion of the statutory prohibition against registration of mere names by the simple expedient of disclaiming all but the first letter of a notation otherwise objectionable." [1] We are of opinion the refusal of registration was proper. The rule as to registration of the name of an individual, firm, or corporation, where such name is claimed to be written, printed, impressed, or woven in some particular or distinctive manner, is well stated in In re Nisley Shoe Co., 19 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1211–1213, 58 F. (2d) 426: We are of the opinion that the proper construction of the words "particular or distinctive manner" in the proviso of section 5 referred to is that the word or words constituting the mark shall be written, printed, impressed, or woven in such a manner as to form a distinct impression upon the eye of the observer, to the extent that he will remember such particular or distinctive form and rely upon it, in part at least, in ascribing origin of the goods to which the mark is applied. This is the rule of the Patent Office: Ex parte A. Englehard & Sons Co., 1904 C. D. 122, 109 O. G. 1886; Ex parte Marsh, etc., 1929 C. D. 20, 382 O. G. 845; Flanders and Flanders Mfg. Co. v. The Studebaker Corp., 1913 C. D. 246, 197 O. G. 241; Ex parte Alden Co., 1907 C. D. 423, 131 O. G. 2419; Dunlap & Co. v. The Jackson & Gutman Co., 1924 C. D. 38, 326 O. G. 469; Ex parte C. S. Marshall Co., 1924 C. D. 88, 328 O. G. 528; Ex parte Dudley Lock Corp. 156 MS. Dec. 249; Ex parte The E. Kahn's Sons Co., 156 MS. Dec. 604. The rule has been approved by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (now the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), our predecessor in this jurisdiction. In re Artesian Mfg. Co., 37 App. D. C. 113; In re Landis, 54 App. D. C. 404. It is quite apparent here that there is nothing in the arrangement or appearance of the mark as originally presented which would make such an impression upon the eye of the ordinary observer as would outweigh the significance of the name "American Steel & Wire Company." [2] After the first disclaimer was filed, the word "American" remained. This word was, plainly, geographical, as held by the Patent Office. In its behalf, the appellant cites the case of Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U. S. 251, wherein the name, "The American Girl," was held to be a valid trade-mark, and not geographical. This, it is argued, is authority which supports the right of appellant to obtain registration of the trademark "American," for use with its sale of florist wire. The cases are not at all the same, and it is thought the differences will be obvious, without further discussion. Finally, as to the second attempted disclaimer, we agree with the Commissioner of Patents that we know of no authority, statutory or otherwise, which authorizes or approves the practice of disclaiming a part of the word or certain letters thereof. Although the practice of filing a disclaimer to part of a mark, while continuing to use the whole of the same, has been approved by the courts, it should not be further extended. Appellant seeks to justify the registration of its mark by referring to the action of the Patent Office in Ex parte The Atlantic Refining Co., 159 MS Dec. 87, wherein the mark "Safety-Kleen" was permitted to be registered as a trade-mark for liquid dry cleaner. What the office may have done in other cases cannot be held to be conclusive upon the court in the case now before us, and does not affect the principles of law involved. The decision of the Commissioner of Patents is affirmed. 466 O. G. 483; 23 C. C. P. A. 844; 81 F. (2d) 250 DAVIS v. CARRIER (No. 3557) 1. PATENTS-INTERFERENCE-ORIGINALITY. Appellant at most only suggested the desirability of having a car air conditioned by apparatus involving units all of which were to be installed on a single car. He was not skilled in this art and the testimony showed very clearly that he had no comprehension of the ultimate effect or practical commercial value of the proposed combination of the various units employed, or of certain dangers incident thereto. 2. PATENTS-INTERFERENCE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE. On the record of this case there was no relation of employer and employee, such as would entitle appellant to the benefit of the work of appellee. 3. PATENTS-APPEAL AND ERROR-DIMINUTION OF RECORD. In pursuance to a writ of certiorari issued by this court certain additions to the record were certified by the Commissioner of Patents and printed. The additional record was unnecessary to a proper determination of the issues in this case and the cost of printing is ordered to be taxed against the appellee. United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, February 3, 1936 APPEAL from Patent Office, Interference No. 62262 [Affirmed.] Robert T. Palmer (Edmond H. Parry, Jr., of counsel) for appellant. [Oral argument January 6, 1936, by Mr. Palmer and Mr. Seid] Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and BLAND, HATFIELD, GARRETT, and LENROOT, Associate Judges BLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: Appellant has here appealed from the decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office which affirmed the decision of the Examiner of Interferences in awarding priority of invention to the junior party, Carrier, in two counts of an interference, which counts were taken from the Davis application and are as follows: 1. The method of conditioning the air in a passenger vehicle, which consists in drawing the air into a unit, passing the air through a cold water spray in said unit to remove all foreign matter therefrom, and reducing the temperature of the air, regulating its moisture content, and eliminating the entrained water from the air, all of which is accomplished in said unit, and then distributing the conditioned air into the space occupied by passengers in said vehicle, removing the heat units from said spray water, and returning said cooled water to said spray, then dissipating these heat units in a cooling tower. 2. The method of conditioning the air in a passenger vehicle, which consists in drawing the air into a unit, passing the air through a cold water spray in said unit to remove all foreign matter therefrom, and reducing the temperature of the air, regulating its moisture content, all of which is accomplished in said unit, and then distributing the conditioned air at a plurality of points into the space occupied by passengers in the said vehicle, and then cooling the said water for reuse and returning it to the spray. As will be observed from the counts, the issue relates to a method of conditioning the air in passenger vehicles by passing the air through a cooled water spray in a unit to remove foreign matter therefrom, lower the temperature of the air, regulate its moisture content and eliminate the entrained water from the air. After the air is conditioned, it is distributed through ducts into the spaces occupied by the passengers in the vehicle. Refrigerating apparatus removes the heat from the spray water which is returned to the spray unit. Count 1 calls for a cooling tower for cooling the spray water, and count 2 omits reference to any specific means for cooling the water. Since appellant stresses the importance of his being the first to suggest the installation of all the apparatus here involved in one passenger vehicle in which the air is to be conditioned, it is important to note that neither of the counts calls for any definite location of the apparatus involved in the method. The party Davis is "Chief Engineer, Electric Traction, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad", and the party Carrier is chairman of the board of the Carrier Engineering Corporation, which with its subsidiary and connected companies is engaged in manufacturing, installing and designing air conditioning equipment and systems. There is much testimony in the record concerning early conversations between the parties in which apparatus for use in conditioning air in passenger vehicles was discussed. In view of our conclusion, it will not be necessary to consider all the testimony of the voluminous record. The facts which we regard as pertinent to our decision of the issues involved follow: Prior to any contract being made between Davis and Carrier, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company assigned to their chief engineer of electric traction, Davis, the duty of selecting air conditioning equipment and installing the same on its cars. Davis knew of certain refrigerating and air conditioning machinery which the Carrier Corporation manufactured, and also had in mind certain apparatus manufactured by the Frigidaire Corporation and others. From the beginning of the transactions between Davis and Carrier, it seemed to be the purpose of Davis to put the Carrier spray dehumidifier unit, together with some kind of refrigerating unit, on each individual car which was to be air conditioned. In view of the fact that there was danger of the ammonia from the compressors escaping into the passenger vehicle if so installed, Carrier at first did not readily agree to this system of installation and advocated putting the refrigerating machine in the baggage car or at least outside of the air conditioned car. Davis, however, was insistent that some kind of satisfactory air conditioning system involving the water spray method be installed on the car which was to be used for experimentation. The record is full of correspondence and conversations between Carrier and Davis relating to the installation of an air conditioning system. "B. and O. car No. 5275" had been chosen as the vehicle upon which experiments were to be made. Carrier, after some correspondence, succeeded in getting Davis to send him blue prints showing the available spaces in said car in which the apparatus might be installed. Carrier then drew or caused to be drawn complete plans for the installation of the units in the car, and with Davis' permission, and at the request of the railroad officials, proceeded to install the units in the car in accordance with said plans. In this task he was aided by H. Richard Arf, his assistant, a graduate engineer. Arf worked under Carrier's directions, and stayed on the job until it was finished. He then tested it on the standing car, as well as on the car while running, and found that it performed its intended functions satisfactorily. John D. Winters did some work in connection with the installation of the system. He was general foreman, electrical department, of the Mt. Clare shops of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. At the hearing here it was stated that this invention had not gone into commercial practice. It was suggested that the use of the water spray method had not met with the commercial success which had been anticipated for it, and that possibly there were other objections to the system which rendered it commercially impracticable at this time. It is clearly shown in the record, however, that the system installed performed satisfactorily the function of cooling, dehumidifying, purifying, and distributing the air. While there is certain documentary evidence in the record, introduced by Davis, which is, to some extent, relied upon by Davis as having a bearing upon the question of priority herein being considered, none of the same, we think, supports appellant's contentions or in any way affects our conclusion. It is Davis' chief contention here that since he was the first to insist upon the particular kind of construction which is involved in the conditioning of the air of said car No. 5275, and that it was by virtue of his insistence that Carrier finally consented to the installation, he should be regarded as the first inventor, having first conceived the invention, and that Carrier's and Arf's work was merely that of skilled mechanics carrying out the details of the plan which he, Davis, had devised. This contention, he maintains, rests upon the familiar principle announced in numerous decisions, not necessary to discuss here, to the effect that where an inventor conceives an invention and lays out and describes to another the plan of the same and directs how it shall be constructed, he is entitled to the benefit of the work of the one who carries out and puts into operation such a plan. This principle is involved in the following authorities: Fritz v. Hawn, 17 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 796, 37 F. (2d) 430; Braunstein v. Holmes, 30 App. D. C. 328; Novelty Glass Mfg. Co. v. Brookfield et al., 170 Fed. 946. The second contention of the appellant is that the record shows that the relation of employer and employee existed; that Carrier and Arf were his employees, or possibly his contention may amount to a claim that Carrier and Arf were the employees of Davis' employer, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. It is stated by appellee and not disputed by appellant that the B. F. Sturtevant Company, an active competitor of the Carrier Engineering Corporation, in manufacturing air conditioning devices, is the owner of the Davis application and the real party in interest. Just what relations exist between said Sturtevant Company and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company is not disclosed. [1] The Examiner of Interferences held that the facts of record did not show that Davis was the inventor; that certain evidence |