decision is that the reissue is applied for under a different statute. It is thought, however, that the full meaning of this has not been understood by the applicant, and is perhaps not generally understood. An original application is filed to secure a monopoly for a seventeen year period on an alleged new and useful improvement and any patent granted thereon is for the invention defined by its claims and is for such period. The provision for the reissue of a patent is solely for the purpose of correcting an error which arose by "inadvertence, accident or mistake, It has no other purpose and the patent granted thereon is a re-grant or correction of the original patent, which is surrendered. This reissue expires at the end of the term of the original, surrendered patent. It may be said that the entire transaction is for an entirely different purpose than that of the proceedings leading up to the grant of an original patent. A reissue patent application may be filed at any time during the life of the original patent, whereas an original application must be filed within two years after the first public use or sale, and within two years after the first printed publication thereof. The essential differences between a reissue and an original application have been recognized in framing the Rules of Practice. For example, there are special requirements as to the nature of the oath, as to why inadvertence, accident or mistake arose, and the original patent is required to be surrendered. The reissue application receives special treatment within the Patent Office. The special requirements as to the oath provided for in Rule 87 have been upheld by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (C. D. 1913, page 444). While it may be that, as stated in the former opinion, there is no precedent for refusing to convert an application for reissue into a regular application, the different nature of the two forms of applic tion has long been recognized. On June 6, 1916, Assistant Commissioner Whitehead rendered a decision in Ex parte Holt, Ms. D. 1916, pages 448-451, which is parallel in some respects to the circumstances of the present case. There, as here, the applicant filed still another application purporting to be a continuation of an attempted reissue. That decision recognized that an original application is not the same. in theory or substance as an application for the reissue of a patent. That case also holds that the two applications were filed under different sections of the statutes and seek protection for different periods. The decision further holds that a so called continuing application cannot be valid unless it is based upon an application upon which a valid patent could have issued. It follows that the petition must be again denied. DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS IN PATENT CASES FOR THE YEAR 1936 [U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia] BISSELL CARPET SWEEPER Co., A CORPORATION, v. COE, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS No. 6,446. Decided January 27, 1936 466 O. G. 243; 82 F. (2d.) 821 1. PATENTABILITY-CARPET SWEEPER-PATENTABLE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS. Certain claims of an application, No. 282,582, for a carpet sweeper Held properly rejected as reciting no novelty beyond that disclosed in other claims allowed. A claim of application No. 266,268 for carpet sweeper, including the clause, "the wheels at each side being supported and connected by axles," required to be omitted by court below, Held allowable over a patent to appellant. APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Mr. Fred L. Chappell and Mr. William S. Hodges for Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. Mr. R. F. Whitehead for the Commissioner of Patents. Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, GRONER, and STEPHENS. Associate Justices ROBB, A. J.: APPEAL from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District in a patent suit filed under section 4915, Revised Statutes, as amended (35) U. S. C. sec. 63). 115363-37 -2 15 The alleged invention relates to carpet sweepers. Appellant, the Bissell Company, is an extensive manufacturer of such sweepers, and it is apparent from the record that the art was so well developed that there was little room for further improvement. On March 25, 1927, the company, in the name of its assignor Pullen, filed application No. 178,283 relating to "improved carpet sweeper brush drive mechanism in which stub axles are used for the floor wheels and rods are avoided." This application resulted in Patent No. 1,800,958, dated April 14, 1931. On March 31, 1928, the Bissell Company, in Pullen's name, filed application No. 266,268. The Patent Office ruled that the difference between the structure shown in the drawing of that application and that of the co-pending application No. 178,283 (patent granted) is that in the former the wheels on each side are connected by axles, whereas in the patented structure the floor wheels are carried on stub axles. On June 4, 1928, there was filed by the company, in Pullen's name, application No. 282,581. This application differed from application No. 266,268 in the substitution of a spring axle for the stiff axle and hub-acting spring of the earlier application. On June 4, 1928, appellant, in Pullen's name, also filed application No. 282,582, which the Patent Office ruled differed from application No. 266,268 "only in the substitution of a different means for operatively connecting the spring arms to the wheel hubs." The Patent Office further ruled that the applications disclosed "only one specific novel structure, that is, the construction of the equalizer between the wheels of the carpet sweeper;" that it was old in such sweepers to employ an equalizer of the same general type as that disclosed by appellant, and as shown in the Drew Patent No. 391,129. "Apparently”, said the Board of Appeals, "the patentable novelty in the equalizer over that shown in Drew above mentioned is in the slideways and slides opposite the ends of the brush roll.” The Board directed attention to the fact that the claims in applicant's patent are restricted to the use of stub axles, and that claim 11 of application No. 266,268 "specifies wheels connected by axles." The Board suggested amending claim 11 by the omission of the connection between the wheels. The Board concluded: "It is our opinion, therefore, that there is only room for one patent and that the only proper way to obtain protection is by a reissue of patent 1,800,958. Certainly we do not consider that there is any patentable distinction between stub axles and axles extending entirely through the sweeper." Following the rejection of claims of applications No. 266,268, No. 282,581, and No. 282,582, the present suit was instituted. The court below, after hearing, ruled that a patent issue on application No. 266,268 containing claim 11 as modified by the Board of Appeals; that is, by the omission of the clause, "the wheels at each side being supported and connected by axles." The court further ruled that on application No. 282,581 there should issue a patent containing claims 2 and 3 of that application, which the court found "are for respectively different inventions from that covered in Letters Patent 1,800,958." Finally, the court ruled that as to all other claims involved in the suit (including those of application No. 282,582) the complaint should be dismissed. The Patent Office did not appeal. [1] In our view the court properly rejected the claims (2 and 3) of application No. 282,582. There is no novelty in these claims beyond that disclosed in other allowed claims. Through axles and tensioning springs were old. [2] But claim 11 of application No. 266,268 should be allowed without modification; that is to say, the claim should be allowed as presented in the application and containing the limitation, "the wheels at each side being supported and connected by axles." As already observed, claims 2 and 3 of application No. 282,581 were allowed by the court below as "different inventions from that covered in Letters Patent 1,800,958." Claim 11 of No. 266,268 as allowed by the court below is a subcombination claim. The decree is affirmed in part, and reversed in part. Affirmed in part, Reversed in part. [U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia] DAVIES v. COE, COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS No. 6,592. Decided March 30, 1936 466 O. G. 741; 83 F (2d) 602 PATENTABILITY-HAIR REMOVER AND METHOD. Claims for a hair remover and claims for method of removing superfluous hair, Held patentable over the prior art. APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Reversed. Mr. Joseph H. Milans and Mr. Needham C. Turnage for Davies. Mr. R. F. Whitehead for the Commissioner of Patents. |