Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European PerspectivesAn interdisciplinary perspective is adopted to examine international and European models of constitutionalism. In particular the book reflects critically on a number of constitutional themes, such as the nature of European and international constitutional models and their underlying principles; the telos behind international and European constitutionalism; the role of the state and of central courts; and the relationships between composite orders. Transnational Constitutionalism brings together a group of European and international law scholars, whose thought-provoking contributions provide the necessary intellectual insight that will assist the reader in understanding the political and legal phenomena that take place beyond the state. This edited collection represents an original and pioneering contribution to the international and European constitutional discourse. |
Lietotāju komentāri - Rakstīt atsauksmi
Ierastajās vietās neesam atraduši nevienu atsauksmi.
Saturs
| 17 | |
| 24 | |
| 26 | |
| 29 | |
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| 34 | |
For the Hobbesian this argument is certainly prima facie plausible | 39 |
2 | 44 |
subsidiarity practice has shown no references to the principle in | 186 |
The flexibility provisions thus reflect the complex constitutional | 201 |
the European Council Indeed a number of provisions indicate that | 204 |
7 | 207 |
Selfdetermination as a complex structure has over time integrated | 209 |
iv Conclusion | 220 |
democratic governance is to contribute to global societal pluralism and | 226 |
Verschraegen focuses on the human rights perspective of Niklas | 229 |
International decisionmaking | 50 |
the EU should not | 61 |
implement Community law The reasoning of the Court in this | 66 |
3 | 71 |
Typologies of general principles of law | 72 |
humanity27 whereas in the EU the principles are of ever | 77 |
General principles of law and the courts | 87 |
the authority of the Security Council SC82 This highlights the | 91 |
function entrusted to it alone by the Charter and its | 92 |
resolutions under Chapter VII are presumptively binding on all states106 | 96 |
may give rise to paradoxical results Judge Higgins reasoning in | 97 |
Constitutional rationale and general principles of law | 103 |
4 | 107 |
The nature and contexts of proportionality | 110 |
proportionality23 Structural discretion refers to the fact that | 114 |
NecessaryEfficient | 116 |
legally possible policies will be bigger as the court inclines | 118 |
C Evidential discretion | 120 |
to be able to test whether claims of expertise are | 122 |
By contrast evidential discretion is regularly appealed to by state | 124 |
fundamental rights cases and policy cases56 The debate about | 129 |
5 | 135 |
Nevertheless in two key constitutional provisions Articles 53 and 103 | 137 |
UN as well as the EU and the OSCE In | 140 |
Military measures | 150 |
from 200305 is evidence of the continued failure of the | 156 |
6 | 160 |
constitution made up of the constitutions of the member states | 166 |
constitutional notion was of course explicitly used in the Treaty | 167 |
the states according to a set of abstract principles Eventually | 170 |
B Consistency and delimitation between the constitutional levels | 178 |
needs to be established in conjunction with other provisions in | 182 |
democracies may introduce necessary or reasonable restrictions to | 235 |
and networks If democratic governance guarantees societal pluralism | 238 |
because of the fragmentation of international law and global law | 241 |
recourse to its own resources it is reasonable to conclude | 245 |
The increasing participation of NGOs in the WTO processes and | 257 |
The Report proceeded then to the interpretation of the clause | 266 |
8 | 269 |
ways Both institutions have recently confronted challenges to such modes | 270 |
there is greater commitment by industrial actors to the regulatory | 272 |
The potentialfor transformation ofglobal and regional | 277 |
Challenges to corporatism within the ILO | 281 |
simply reducible to duels between interest blocks to secure allies | 284 |
between processes of social dialogue pursued under the auspices of | 289 |
9 | 307 |
with Philip Allott a scholar who has profoundly reflected on | 309 |
international law30 and agrees with this writer that in that | 315 |
Almost all authors who use constitutional language refer in one | 324 |
10 | 329 |
are often invoked by advocates of a constitutionalist reading of | 334 |
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having | 335 |
and as the entity that recognises those values as the | 337 |
A Violations offundamental norms | 341 |
safeguard a general interest and not the interests of particular | 346 |
to all kinds of manipulation under whose cloak certain states | 347 |
Although one may question whether Schmitts reading of European | 348 |
A Limitation through law | 349 |
plurality of constitutional frameworks and the desire to establish a | 353 |
B The powers ofthe Security Council | 357 |
However since the late 1990s this hierarchy has been questioned | 359 |
C Working around the constitution | 362 |
to develop some sort of normative regime is understandable but | 364 |
5 Epilogue | 366 |
Citi izdevumi - Skatīt visu
Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives Nicholas Tsagourias Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 2007 |
Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives Nicholas Tsagourias Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 2010 |
Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives Nicholas Tsagourias Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 2007 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
action African Union agreement argued argument Cambridge University Press CFSP Charter Commission competences concept constitutional law constitutionalisation Convention cooperation corporatism corporatist Court of Justice decision-making decisions deliberative deliberative democracy democracy democratic discretion dispute economic effect enforcement established European Community European Court European Union example external Fassbender foreign and security function fundamental global governance Habermas human rights humanitarian intervention Ibid ICJ Rep institutions interests international community international constitutional international constitutionalism international law international organisations international relations interpretation Judgment judicial jus cogens Koskenniemi legal system legislative legitimacy limited Nicaragua obligations Opinion Oxford University Press participation parties peace peremptory norms political procedures proportionality provides question recognition regime regional organisations representative Review role rules Security Council security policy self-determination social dialogue social partners society sovereign sovereignty structure subsidiarity tion Tomuschat trade transnational Treaty UN Charter United Nations uti possidetis
Bibliogrāfiskā informācija
| Nosaukums | Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives |
| Redaktors | Nicholas Tsagourias |
| Izdevējs | Cambridge University Press, 2007 |
| ISBN | 113946468X, 9781139464680 |
| Eksportēt avotu | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |