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the army had established a great base of supplies. There was a small Confederate force on the west side of the river, and to relieve it, Pillow's brigade was crossed over to its support. These troops soon became engaged with the enemy, and as the battle continued to increase in importance, Gen. Polk also crossed with the greater portion of the remaining troops under his command. Arriving at the scene of action, the General at once ordered the whole command to press forward, and the line, advancing with a yell, drove the Yankees pell-mell before it. Soon the retreat became a rout-the enemy rushing in wild confusion toward their gunboats, abandoning artillery, wagons, baggage, knapsacks, and overcoats in their flight, and strowing the road with arms and cartridge boxes. On coming within sight of the transports and gunboats, Gen. Polk threw forward a cloud of sharpshooters, at a doublequick, across the fields. These at once proceeded to occupy the river bank for a long distance, both above and below the point where the gunboats were anchored, and their fire upon those densely crowded vessels was fearful. As it continued the dismay of that terror-stricken mass was terrific. Unable to escape, and seeing no hope of relief, the men would rush from side to side of the transports, many of them being shoved overboard and drowned in the confusion, while others had to be driven back at the point of the bayonet to prevent the boats from capsizing. Cutting their cables, they at length succeeded in steaming up the river, under fire of the riflemen, who lined the bank for more than a mile.

Thus ended the battle of Belmont. It was a brilliant victory to our arms. We had met an enemy in numbers vastly our superior, and had utterly routed him, after an obstinate engagement of four hours. Our loss in killed, wounded and missing was 632, while that of the enemy was reported to be at least three times that number.

The battle of Belmont was the first of that series of battles subsequently fought in the Western Department, and besides is remarkable as being the first appearance of Gen. U. S. Grant upon the field-at least so far as the writer of these notes has any knowledge of his movements. It was, indeed, the beginning of the western campaign, and the

first initiation of the Army of the Tennessee in the bloody work of war. In speaking of this engagement, in his address to the army, Gen. Johnson says: "The 7th of November will fill a bright page in our military annals, and be remembered with gratitude by the sons and daughters of the South."

Johnson had received instructions, upon assuming command, to hold Kentucky, if possible, not only on account of the great strategic importance of this line, but because it was hoped by so doing large accessions in the way of recruits from that State would be drawn to our ranks, and the country so occupied might be made to contribute to the support of the war, especially in the matter of horses and provisions. In this, however, the Government at Richmond was doomed to disappointment. The hostile attitude of Kentucky was soon placed beyond a doubt. In every portion of the State companies were being organized for the Federal service, while but few recruits came to our army. Nevertheless, it was necessary to hold Bowling Green for other reasons, and consequently Buckner's force was increased to twelve thousand men.

At this time the enemy's effective strength south of the Ohio, as reported to the War Department at Washington, was fifty thousand men. This put any advance on our part beyond the main line adopted out of the question, and at once forced Johnson to confine himself to the defensive. I think a very great misapprehension existed, and still exists, among our people as to the relative strength of the two armies. First, a desire to deceive the enemy as to our real strength, and in the second place a hope to encourage our own people by overestimating the Confederate arms, and underestimating those of the enemy.

I heard a distinguished Federal General say, just after the close of the war, that we had always underestimated their strength in numbers. The Federal armies were, at all times infinitely larger than represented by the Southern press. And everybody knows the great surprise of the world at the few who composed Lee's army when he surrendered. People could not believe that, with that mere handfull of starved men he could have held Grant's vast army at bay so long. In the west, too, at the very time our papers

were proclaiming brilliant prospective vic-as possible, in the face of a driving rain tories in Kentucky and Ohio, those who knew the real facts of the case were looking daily, with gloomy forebodings, for some sudden disaster to overtake our poor little half-organized army. The calls of General Johnson for troops were disregarded-his representation of the danger we incurred, and that uselessly, was unheeded. And the twelve months' men who had volunteered to drive the enemy across the Ohio were refused arms, because they had not enlisted for a longer period.

BATTLE OF MILL SPRING.

After Schoepff's defeat, Zollicoffer advanced a portion of his troops to Mill Spring, which is situated on the south bank of the Cumberland river, and a short time after crossed the river and established a fortified camp on the north bank. He had taken up this position because the country was unable to supply him with provisions, and it was much easier to obtain them by way of the Cumberland than by any other route. But the enemy presently closed this line of communication, and consequently the troops were soon reduced to great want. About the first of January Gen. Crittenden arrived and assumed command, and shortly after learned that Gen. George H. Thomas was marching on him from Columbia, and a still larger body of troops under the redoubtable Schoepff was advancing from Somerset. The object of these movements was to dislodge Crittenden from his camp on the Cumberland, and as the position was unimportant, and the door of retreat open, it was clearly his policy to have fallen back to a stronger position in the mountains. But he judged differently, and at once determined to march out and attack Thomas before Schoepff could come up. The determination was rash in the extreme. His whole effective force did not exceed four thousand men, while the enemy had fully ten thousand. Nevertheless the resolution was taken, and at midnight he silently moved out of his camp, and begun the march. The gallant Zollicoffer commanded the van of this little column,

and about daylight on the morning of January 19th, 1862, ran upon the pickets of the enemy, who were well in advance of their main line. These were soon driven back, and again the column advanced as rapidly

storm, until they came upon the Yankees formed in line of battle, and prepared to receive them. Zollicoffer at once charged, driving them steadily back, until the crest of the last hill is reached, and the day seems won, when, unfortunately, he fell, pierced through the heart by a rifle ball. The news of his death soon spread among the men, who had great confidence in him as a leader, and they began gradually to fall back. At this moment Crittenden in person assumed command of the column, and leading the men again up the ascent, attempted once more to carry the disputed hill. But after several unsuccessful efforts, our troops were slowly driven back-nor could they again be rallied until within the shelter of their entrenched camp at Beech Grove, when it was found that their aggregate loss amounted to fully one-tenth of the whole number with which the fight was begun.

They had scarcely reached the camp before the advance of the enemy opened a heavy fire on them, which continued with unceasing fury until night put an end to the

contest.

It was very evident to Crittenden that he could not hold the position against the force attacking it. About midnight, therefore, the men were silently embarked on some flatboats and towed by a small steamer across the river. The means of transportation were so limited that everything except what the men could carry about their persons had to be abandoned, together with all the arcillery, horses, and wagons. These fell into before the last of the men crossed, and the the hands of the enemy. It was daylight column then began retreating in the direction of Monticello. So quietly was the move made that the enemy, who at nightfall considered the whole command their certain prey, had not suspected it in the least. Schoepff's brigade had crossed the river for the purpose of cutting off Crittenden's retreat, while Thomas had extended his lines so as to cover the entire front of the Confederate works. As soon as these dispositions could be made, the Yankee artillery opened a furious fire on the camp. The steamer which had conveyed the Confederates across the river during the night was also discovered, and to prevent her being

used by Gen. Crittenden as a means of escape, she too was fired upon by incendiary shells, and totally destroyed. But although the cannonade had been kept up for some time, not a shot had been fired from the works in reply, and the fact finally flashed upon Gen. Thomas that he had been wasting a vast amount of ammunition upon a deserted camp. Great was his chagrin at the escape of Crittenden's command, as, up to that moment, he had never entertained a doubt that the whole would fall into his hands. This was the first reverse sustained by our arms in this section, but as its result was of little importance, it did not serve to arrest the attention of the authorities at Richmond, who seemed entirely blind to the stupendous preparations being made by the Yankees to wrest this whole country from their hands. The vital importance of the western rivers to our cause had long ago attracted the attention of Congress, and large appropriations were made for the building of gunboats for their defense. These gunboats would not only have enabled us to hold the rivers themselves, but would have given us the means of taking the offensive, whenever occasion served-would have held the principal Yankee army to some line near the Ohio, and have compelled the North to keep a large force for the protection of their river towns; but this appropriation was suffered to remain in the treasury uncalled for. The gunboats were never built, and the holding of the rivers leff to the small land force, which was sparsely scattered along this great line.

Crittenden, after his repulse, fell slowly back to Monticello, and the whole country again went to sleep, congratulating itself apon the questionable fact that the matter was no worse. Their slumbers, however, were soon destined to be rudely broken.

During the early winter it was reported that the whole Federal army was in motion, and marching rapidly across the country in the direction of Bowling Green. Strenuous efforts were now made to reinforce Johnson, but these resulted in the sending of Floyd's brigade and some other troops to Kentucky, making the whole effective force in that section about twenty-four thousand men. The enemy had, in the meantime, organized another large army, under Major General Don

Carlos Buell, one of the most skillful and accomplished commanders in their army and possessing many of the essential qualities of a military leader. The advance of this army had already reached Mumfordsville, which is not more than thirty miles from Bowling Green, and was threatening that position. A portion of it had indeed crossed the river, and occupied Woodsonville, but were promptly attacked by General Hindman, and driven back, with considerable loss. Our success, however, was but temporary. The advance guard of the enemy was quickly reinforced, and Gen. Hindman found himself compelled to retreat some twenty miles in the direction of Bowling Green.

The reader should carefully bear in mind the explanations regarding this campaign, which precede this period. He will then be able rightly to estimate the importance of holding Kentucky, and the fearful effect of its loss upon the fortunes of the Confederacy.

I have shown why the principal operations east of the mountains were confined to the vicinity of Richmond and Washington. The protection of her railroad communications compelled the Confederacy to maintain a large army in Northern Virginia, aud in front of Richmond, where her principal railroads centered. The presence of this army so near their seat of government compelled the Federals also to keep a large force at all times confronting it. And these two armies necessarily held a continual check upon each other. Never allowing either for a moment to uncover their respective Capitals, because that would have exposed them to instant capture, and perhaps destruction. Thus, we see that so long as Johnston was able to hold Manassas with a force adequate to cope with the Yankees, he compelled McClellan to remain between that point and Washington. But when McClellan had been reinforced with men sufficient to leave a garrison for the protection of Washington, at least temporarily, and began moving to the Peninsula, this at once placed Johnston again on the defensive, and compelled him to throw his army in between Richmond and the position taken by the enemy. So, after the battles before Richmond, so soon as Lee began his movements with a victorious army towards

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Kentucky and take a rapid view of the condition of our line of defense here, at the time Buell's advance reached Mumfordsville.

Manassas and the Potomac, it immediately tions of the country, we will now return to became necessary, for the protection of Washington, to withdraw McClellan from before Richmond, and at once transterred operations from that city to the neighborhood of the Federal Capital-and so to the end of the war.

My military readers will, I know, excuse these long explanations, for the sake of those not conversant with army matters-and more particularly as they are necessary for a proper understanding of events which will be treated hereafter.

Some time during the winter Gen. Beauregard had been assigned to the command of the defenses of the Upper Mississippi. That skillful engineer saw that Island No. 10, situated in a bend of the river at New Madrid, possessed decided advantages over Columbus as the point at which to hold the river, and immense works were, by his order, erected there. These works commanded the river for several miles, and perfectly encircled the island, leaving no spot upon which the enemy could plant his foot. The island could not be attacked from the Missouri side of the river by land forces, be

It has been clearly shown why no military operations could be conducted by way of Western Virginia, nor through the TransMississippi, without the possession of the great Mississippi river-thus confining them to Middle and Western Kentucky, and East-cause an immense swamp covered the whole ern Virginia, which may be termed the great front doors of the Confederacy. We have seen how one of these doors was closed, by that immortal hero Robert E. Lee, and the world renowned army of Northern Virginia, until there was scarcely a foot of land left the Confederacy that she could call her

own.

We will now turn to the west, and see if the facts do not enable us to discover why our gallant army in that section was not equally successful.

shore for miles in that direction. The same was partially the case on the Kentucky side, and a strong covering force, it was believed, would make it impregnable. But should the enemy possess himself of the Tennesseee and Cumberland rivers, this would compel our lines to fall back, uncovering the position, and compelling either the evacuation or surrender of the island. To prevent this an earth-work, called Fort Henry, had been erected on the Tennessee, near the Kentucky line, and a work-Fort Donelson-somewhat similar, and equally insignificant, on the Cumberland.

It was believed that the mouth of the Mississippi river, guarded by two powerful forts, could be held against any force the enemy The two rivers at this point are but twelve might operate against it; and for the reason miles apart, and this offered the advantage that their operations must necessarily be con- | of having but one covering force for these fined to the navy, the whole country sur- two positions. As we have seen before, the rounding the forts, and from thence to the main portion of our forces were at Bowling sea being one vast and impenetrable morass, Green, on the Louisville railroad, while there and precluding the possibility of co-opera- was still a small force in the neighborhood tion by a land force. Therefore, no appre-of Cumberland Gap. This was the situation hension was felt in that quarter. This confidence would have been well grounded, as will presently be seen, had there been a fleet of Confederate gunboats in the river capable of coping with the enemy. These boats would not only have prevented them from passing the forts, as they did, but would have forced their fleet outside the mouth of the river; and any of their vessels that might have accidently run past would certainly have been captured or destroyed. Having glanced hastily at the situation in other por

of affairs on the 1st of February, 1862. The entire force under Albert S. Johnson did not exceed twenty-four thousand, while that of the enemy exceeded one hundred thousandforty thousand of whom were confronting the small force at Bowling Green-and these the very best troops in the Yankee army. There was not a gunboat on either the Tennessee or Cumberland rivers, and no means of holding them, provided the two little insignificant works above mentioned should fall.

FALL OF FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.* About the first of February, Grant began moving up the Tennessee river, and on the 4th arrived at Fort Henry. Having made his dispositions, on the morning of the 6th the attack began. The Confederate force, under Gen. Tighlman, consisted of about two thousand men and nine guns. The river had risen so as completely to surround the Fort, which was garrisoned by sixty men, under Capt. Taylor. Tighlman's force was distant half a mile, and completely cut off from the Fort by-high water. Grant, with ten thousand men, was between Tighlman and Fort Donelson, while a large fleet of gunboats threatened Fort Henry. Tighlman's position was critical in the extreme. He however ordered the retreat of his little band, having determined himself to remain in the Fort and share its fate.

fend the works with great gallantry, keeping the a'tention of the gunboats away from the force on shore until they finally succeeded in making their escape. By this time tents, cabins, and other buildings inside the Fort were on fire, the flames curling high above the works, and nearly stifling the garrison with smoke. The gunboats had ranged close along beside, and were pouring a storm of shot and shell into the devoted little band defending it. One-third of the number had already fallen, and a further defence being hopeless, Tighlman, with his forty men, surrendered, after having himself worked personally at one of the guns for more than an hour.

The fall of Fort Henry opened the Tennessee through its entire length to the enemy-a gain of vast importance, as, of itself, it almost insured the very first object of the

With but sixty men he continued to de-campaign-the possession of the Mississippi.

*NOTE.-Letter of Gen. A. S. Johnson to President

Davis:

(Unofficial.)

DECATUR, ALA., March 18, 1862. My dear General: I received the dispatch from Richmond, with your private letter, by Captain Wickliffe. three days since; but the pressure of affairs and the necessity of getting my command across the Tennessee prevented me from sending you an earlier reply.

I anticipated all you have told me as to the censure which the fall of Fort Donelson drew upon me, and the attacks to which you might be subjected, but it is impossible for me to gather the facts for a detailed report, or to spare time which was required to extricate the remainder of my troops, and save the large accumulation of stores and provisions after that disheartening disaster.

I transmitted the reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow without examining or analyzing the facts, and scarcely with time to read them.

When about to assume command of this department, the Government charged me with deciding the question of occupying Bowling Green, Ky., which involved not only military but political considerations. At the time of my arrival at Nashville the action of the Legislature of Kentucky had put an end to the latter, by sanctioning the formation of companies menacing Tennessee, by assuming the cause of the Government at Washington, and by abandoning the neutrality it professed; and, in consequence of their action, the occupation of Bowling Green became necessary as an act of defense, at least in the first step.

War Department, was 50,000, and an advance was impossible.

Believing it to be of the greatest moment to protract the campaign, as the dearth of cotton might bring strength from abroad, and discourage the North, and to gain time to strengthen myself by new troops from Tennessee and other States. I magnified my forces to the enemy, but made known my true strength to the Department and the Governor of the States. The aid given was small. At length, when Gen. Beauregard came out, in February, he expressed his surprise at the smallness of my force, and was impressed with the danger of my position. I admitted what was so manifest, and laid before him my views for the future, in which he entirely concurred, and sent me a memorandum of our conference-a copy of which I sent to you. I determined to fight for Nashville at Donelson, and gave the best of my army to do it, retaining only 14,000 men to cover my front, and giving 16,000 to defend Donelson.

The force at Donelson is stated in Gen. Pillow's report as much less, and I do not doubt the correctness of his statement, for the force at Bowling Green, which I supposed to be 14,000 effective men (the medical report showing only a little over 500 sick in the hospitals), was diminished more than 5,000 by those who were unable to stand the fatigue of a march, and made my force, on reaching Nashville, less than 10,000 men. I enclose Medical Director's report.

Had I wholly uncovered my front to defend Donelson, Buell would have known it, and marched directly into Nashville. There were only ten small steamers in the Cumberland, in imperfect condition-only three of which were available at Nashville, while the transportation of the enemy was great.

About the middle of September Buckner advanced, with a small force of about 4,000 men, which was increased by the 15th of October to 12,000, and though The evacuation of Bowling Green was imperativeaccessions of force were reeeived, it continued about ly necessary, and was ordered before, and was exethe same strength until the end of November-meas-cuted while the battle was being fought at Donelson. les and other diseases keeping down the effective I had made every disposition for the defense of the force. The enemy's force then, as reported to the Fort my means allowed; and the troops were among

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