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engines of modern warfare, place them un- the protection of its Capital, and thus Washder the bravest, truest, and most skillful offington became the great center and base of cers, have every equipment perfect, and every all the Federal military operations in this department complete in all its details, and section. then leave them without rations, and in a very short time the organization goes to pieces and ceases to exist, without even the presence of a foe. Hence the importance of keeping open "lines of communication," as they are called. I speak for the unmilitary reader, and by these lines mean those great, channels of supply by which provisions, forage, ammunition and the thousand et ceteras needed by an army, are taken from the fac-seaport of the South, and that by a blockade tories and sections where they are produced to forces operating in the field.

Through the entire war the naval superiority of the United States gave them great advantage over us. In fact, we had no navy at all, while, on the other hand, the Federals set at once to work building up the most powerful navy in the world. While this was being done they bought up and fitted out, as cruisers, a vast number of steamboats, and with these succeeded in closing every

unprecedented in the annals of the world. The fact is, half a dozen well armed steam frigates could have, at any time, driven the whole of them off the ocean; yet these mis

war, completely to isolate us from the rest of the world, and inflicted an amount of damage that cannot be easily conceived.

The material of modern warfare has become so heavy that it is impossible to transport it in wagons, as was done of old. Nav-erable old concerns were suffered, during the igable rivers and railroads have become absolutely essential for this purpose, and experience teaches that it is neither safe nor practicable to conduct military operations on a large scale, or at any great distance from "the base of supply," without the aid of one or the other. This is the reason why all our great military operations were carried on upon the banks of rivers, or along those great lines of railroad which, beginning at the North, extended far down into the heart of the Confederacy.

Now, while these mere apologies for a naval force could shut up our seaports they were inadequate for the capture of any of them, and the water in most of our Southern harbors being shoal, vessels of a larger class could not enter, or operate effectively against them. It is true some places were captured by the co-operation of land forces, while others fell into the hands of the Yankees It was evident, at the breaking out of the through the incompetency of the officers in war, that Virginia would be the theater of command; but they were never made the the principal hostile operations east of the base of any important expedition into the mountains, and this for several reasons: interior, and the principal service rendered First, on account of its proximity to the was in affording shelter, during storms, to Federal seat of Government; secondly, its their rotten and unseaworthy blockaders. great importance to the Confederacy; and, So long as the Army of the Potomac was thirdly, because at its Capital centered those held at bay, and Washington, and through it great lines of railroad which, connecting the Pennsylvania and New Yerk, threatened by various sections of the south and west, served Lee and his gallant band, there was no danas the only door through which they could ger of any grand expedition being underbe surely entered. The Confederate Gov- taken further South, unless it had for its obernment early became aware of the impor- ject the opening of the Mississippi, to which tance of these points, and immediately after we will presently refer. Yet, these miserathe secession of Virginia removed their Cap-ble old gunboats, and the terror they inital from Montgomery to Richmond. This spired, induced the Government to maintain step not only obviated the necessity of keep-large garrisons in all the little unimportant ing an independent army for its protection, but transferred the seat of war close to the frontier, preserving thereby, as it was hoped, the interior of the Confederacy intact. It further made it necessary for the Federal Government to maintain a large force for

places along the coast, thereby greatly reducing the effective strength of our armies in the field and imposing an enormous burden on the people. It is poor consolation to know that all of this might have been avoided, our ports kept open, and our sea-coast

protected, had we possessed even a moderately effective navy; but it is nevertheless true, and the shame is the greater upon those who mismanaged that department.

All the railroads leading south and west centering in Richmond, and being commanded by the army covering that city, we can readily see why operations should have been confined to that section; while Western Virginia, being a mountainous and broken country, not penetrated by any important streams or intersected by railroads, could only become the theater of unimportant raids, undertaken solely for the purpose of breaking up salt works, burning bridges, and other kindred objects. It might, how ever, have proved another Switzerland, and have contributed greatly to the Confederate cause, but for the baseness and treachery of its people. They chose to become the slaves of the Yankee, and, as the war progressed, they and their operations sunk gradually into insignificance until near its close, when, being emboldened by the success of their allies, they crept forth from out of dens and rocks, destroying railroads, burning private houses and bridges, and committing other outrages, such as thieves manufactured from traitors can alone be guilty of. Still, it was necessary to keep a small Confederate force in this section for the purpose of protecting the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, which would otherwise have been exposed, at all times, to the combined raids of tories and Yankees. This great road, connecting, as it does, Richmond and Memphis, and passing through the most productive portions of Virginia and Tennessee, was of infinite importance to the Confederate Government. A glance at the map will show that it not only constituted the great channel through which the provisions of the west found their way to the army in the east, and the material of war, such as ammunition, arms, cannon, etc., manufactured in Richmond, was conveyed to the west; but in case it should be necessary, at any time, to reinforce either of these armies from the other without delay. For instance, suppose Island No. 10 in imminent danger. A whole corps of the eastern army might be dispatched, and would arrive there in a few days; while a body of troops from the Federal army, to reach the same point, would have to go to Baltimore, thence

to Pittsburg, and from there down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, more than a thousand miles-consuming at least double the time it would take the Confederates to accomplish the same object. This ability to concentrate rapidly afforded so evident an advantage to the army possessing it, that it needs no very extensive military knowledge fully to appreciate it. It is self-evident, and hence the strenuous efforts made to keep open this line of communication,

I have been thus particular in describing this mountain region, which may be termed the second section in our "line of defence," and in pointing out its important features, that the reader may fully understand the nature of the western campaign-of which we design more particularly to write-and may comprehend the causes of its failures, and the disastrous result of those failures upon the Confederacy.

Having taken a rapid glance at the geographical situation in the east and along the sea-coast, we will now turn for a moment to the third and last great section of our line. This, we find, extends from the mountains of West Virginia to the Mississippi river; and it was very evident that, so soon as the war begun, it would become the great theater of active operations on this side of the Alleghanies.

Looking at the map, we see, not only that the Mississippi separates the States of Missouri, West Louisiana and Texas from the rest of the Confederacy, but that west of that river there are no great lines of railroads intersecting those States from north to south, nor are there any rivers which would aid an army marching through Missouri for the invasion of that country. All rivers penetrating those States empty into the Mississippi below the mouth of the Ohio; and consequently, so long as we held that, they were effectually closed against the enemy.

Now, such being the condition of affairs, we can readily see that no great army could operate west of the Mississippi, except upon its immediate banks, and then only so far as their gunboats and transports were able to penetrate. Consequently, by closing the river, all that portion of the Confederacy on the west bank would be free from invasion, and that without the presence of any con

nessee, again enters Kentucky near Tompkins' mill, and is navigable for many miles above that point. The other river, the Tennessee, after passing across the State of Tennessee, penetrates into Alabama, and then returning into the former State by Chattanooga and Knoxville, finally loses itself in the mountains of Southwestern Virginia. From Tuscumbia to Knoxville, the Virginia and Tennessee railroad passes within a short distance of this stream, and for a great portion of the distance, follows directly along its course. The river being navigable, whoever held it would necessarily control the railroad--an important consideration, as will

siderable army for its protection. This near Paducah, pass entirely across this State. would enable the South to concentrate their One, the Cumberland, after running for a whole available force in Kentucky, and pre-long distance through the very heart of Tenserve, for the maintenance of those troops, the finest provision producing country in the world. Look again at the man, and you will see great rivers running across Arkansas in every direction, and extending far into the "Indian country." The same is the case with Louisiana, the rivers of that State penetrating into Arkansas and Texas. Now, these rivers serve as the natural highways down which float the products of those vast rich vallies through which they flow, bearing them safely to the great storehouses of the South, New Orleans and Memphis; and in this point of view alone they were of infinite value. But this is not all. So long as the Yankees were kept out of the Missis-presently be seen. Both of these rivers flow sippi, all that portion of territory east of the river, comprising in part the State of Mississippi and West Tennessee, was also safe from invasion; and this would compel the Federal army to operate in front of the lines we might adopt, instead of having it in their power, at any time, by means of the river, to strike us in the rear.

I think I have shown two points conclusively: First, that no hostile army could operate successfully against the Confederacy west of the Mississippi, so long as we held that river, except in Missouri, where the Yankee gunboats had undisputed possession of all the rivers; and, secondly, that these States would not only be safe from invasion, but that the Yankees would be forced to confine their operations to Kentucky, or that portion of country designated as the third section of our great line.

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through the richest portions of these States, and their possession would give the enemy, with his vast naval superiority, undisputed possession of the whole of Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Mississippi river as low down as Memphis; and at the same time would leave the Gulf States open to invasion from more than one point. Two railroads also cross the State of Kentucky--one from Louisville, and other from Henderson, on the Ohio-both uniting at Nashville, Tennessee. That the enemy would make these railroads their principal line of operations was very evident, because of the possession of Nashville, in case the naval expeditions were unsuccessful, would enable them to turn the defences on the Cumberland, place them in position to strike the Tennessee, and, if victorious in one great battle, enable them to destroy the communication between Richmond and Memphis, seize the latter city, and compel the forts on the river above to surrender.

It was very evident to the enemy that the only way to gain or hold possession of this country was to open the river; and to this end, solely, for a time, their whole ener- Along the eastern boundary of Kentucky, gies were devoted. Their plan was com- and running across the State of Tennessee, prehensive-first, operate a combined mili- in a southwest direction, is a lofty and rugtary and naval force directly against the Con-ged range called the Cumberland Mountain. federate blockade, and at the same time This ridge separates Eastern and Western march an army across the country, occupy Tennessee, and is inaccessible to an army, a position on the river below the forts, and with its trains of wagons and artillery, exthus force either their evacuation or surren- cept, perhaps, at Cumberland Gap. This render. To prevent this, it would be neces-gap was considered, by engineers, a strong sary to occupy Kentucky. The reader will see, by again looking at the map, that two large rivers, beth emptying into the Ohio

position, easily defended, and of great importance, as it not only covered the direct railroad route to Richmond, but protected

also a rich grain growing country from the in the State, found it no longer necessary to chance of hostile incursions.

It is clear that the holding of the Mississippi river was the great point at issue in the western campaign, and it is equally clear and a fact that cannot be controverted that its loss was not only fatal to the campaign itself, but the very death-blow to the Confederacy.

Whether this disaster was the result of the incompetency of one, or of all the commanding Generals of this most unfortunate department, or of neglect on the part of the Government in providing adequate means of defense, or whether it arose from causes over which neither Government nor General had control, history, perhaps, will tell to some future generation. In the meantime we will take a glance at facts, and let the reader judge for himself.

Thus having taken this cursory view of the geography of the country, to enable us to comprehend fully the nature of the campaigns we are about to describe, we will now turn, without further delay, to active operations transpiring in the field.

continue this disguise, and, without hesitation, began to inaugurate a system of persecution against those of the people who sympathized with the South. To escape this, numbers of young men fled into Tennessee and Virginia, and cast their lot with the South, and among these General Buckner, the late commander of the home-guard. Buckner was at once appointed a Brigadier in the Confederate army, and assigned to the command of those Kentuckians who, like himself, had fled from their native State.

About this time Rousseau, a citizen of Louisville, was commissioned by the Federal Government to raise a brigade for the Union service, as it was called. It still served the purposes of the Yankees to blind the people of Kentucky to their real designs, and a promise was therefore made the State Government that their declared neutrality should be respected. Consequently, Rousseau was kept on the Indiana side of the river, as Lincoln was not yet prepared to throw off the mask. As soon, however, as he became satisfied of the temper of the State, the Federal troops were ordered to cross the Ohio, and march at once into the interior of the State. Anticipating this movement, Buckner had occupied Bowling Green, on the Louisville and Nashville railroad, distant about thirty miles from the Tennessee line. This was considered a strong point, and directly on that great line of defense inaugurated in this department a little later in the campaign. The step, however, served the Federal Government as a pretext for raising a great outcry against what they were pleased to term "a flagrant violation of the neutrality of that State;" while, in fact, it was but anticipating the Yankees themselves in the occupation of a position which, at this early stage, they considered highly important to their future operations.

At the beginning of the war, in 1861, Kentucky, through her Governor, (Magoffin) promptly refused to respond to the call made by the Federal Government for troops for the purpose of crushing the rebellion, as they were pleased to term it. Being a slave State, it was believed that her sympathies were with her sisters of the South, but in this the Confederacy was wofully mistaken. It is true that after the election of Lincoln her Legislature had adopted a resolution declaring that in the coming contest Kentucky would observe a state of strict neutrality between the hostile sections; and, for the purpose of enforcing this resolution, a home guard, as it was called, was organized and placed under command of a gallant exUnited States army officer, General Buckner. But this resolution of neutrality was coupled On the 4th of September, 1861, General with another reiterating the devotion of the Polk, with two divisions, took possession of people to the Union; and in a very short Columbus, Kentucky. This is a small place time, under the pretence that neither Buck- on the Mississippi, but a short distance bener or his men were true to the State, the low the mouth of the river, and was believed organization was disbanded, and active steps to possess the requisite advantages for maktaken to disarm its individual members. Ating it the point at which to begin the blockthe election next following the secession of ade of the river. General Polk found the the Gulf States, the Black Republicans, hav-| Yankees already occupying the opposite ing obtained possession of most of the offices bank, with their guns trained upon the vil

lage, from which many of the inhabitants had fled in terror. The Yankees were also occupying Paducah, Cairo and New Madrid, and, from the preparations making, their designs were very evident. From Haskins' Cross Roads they were also threatening East Tennessee, by way of Cumberland Gap, and this, no doubt, for the purpose of destroying the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad, and thus breaking the connection between Memphis and the East. For the purpose of repelling this and similar raids, Brig. Gen. Zollicoffer was sent, with a small force, to occupy the passes through the mountain, and to fortify Cumberland Gap, which, as we have seen, is the door from that direction into East Tennessee.

this was so, and the fact that he did not discover his error, is evidence that his investigations were not very thorough

I have spoken more particularly of this first effort to penetrate into Tennessee, as it was the beginning of that great invasion which ended in the march of Sherman to the sea. Schoepff's invasion terminated most ingloriously, and Sherman would probably have rivaled him in that respect had the proper steps been taken.

Toward the end of August, 1861, Colonel Albert Sidney Johnson, of the United States army, having resigned his commission in the Federal service, tendered his services to the Confederacy, was appointed General in the regular army, and assigned to the command of the Department of the Mississippi. Gen. Johnson was a soldier of high reputation, a distinguished graduate of West Point, and had recently commanded the far-famed Utah expedition, in which, by a combined exercise of skill and discretion, he had obtained a bloodless victory over the followers of the

Zollicoffer, on entering Kentucky, telegraphed Gov. Magoffin offering to withdraw from the State if the Federal troops would do the same. Instead, however, of acceding to this request, and evincing thereby at least a show of respect for the neutrality about which they had said so much, the Federals set about making preparations for at-many-wived Brigham. As a Colonel of Texas tack-assembling for this purpose a camp volunteers he had also served with distincat Barboursville, a small place on the Cum- tion during the Mexican war, and brought to berland. But before their preparations were his new command a robust constitution, an completed, Zollicoffer made a dash upon energetic spirit, and an amount of actual exthem, breaking up their camp, and driving | perience in the field possessed by few of our them back in utter confusion. Soon, how-commanding officers. ever, a much larger force was assembled for Upon assuming command, he found the the purpose of driving him from the posi- Confederate troops in Kentucky disposed as tion he had taken. This force consisted of follows: Zollicoffer holding the pass at CumYankees, Western men, and renegade Ken- | berland Gap-this was the extreme right tuckians, and was placed under command of wing of the army; the center, under Buckone Schoepff, who had, by some means, ob-ner, occupied Bowling Green, and was holdtained the rank of Brigadier in the Yankee army. Schoepff marched boldly in the direction of the "rebel invaders," but before getting within either sight or hearing of them, concluded that "discretion was the better part of valor," and commenced beating a hasty retreat. So hasty, indeed, was his retrograde movement, that it soon degenerated into a regular rout, in which he lost guns, arms, ammunition wagons, and supplies-in fact, everything but honor, and might have lost that, had such a thing been in the keeping of any one among that motley crew. In extenuation of this most disgrace- Before General Polk had completed his ful flight, Schoepff urged his belief that Har- works, General U. S. Grant occupied Bel dee was flanking him. But it does not ap-mont, on the Missouri side of the river, and pear that he took any pains to ascertain if begun rapidly reinforcing from Cairo, where

ing the Louisville and Nashville railroad; while the left, under Polk, rested upon the Mississippi at Columbus. Gen. Polk had,. immediately upon occupying this place, set about fortifying his position, and had erected a number of works for the purpose of holding the river. In the meantime every shipyard and workshop along the upper Mississippi and the Ohio resounded with those stupendous preparations, both military and naval, which finally resulted in placing the whole of the Western waters under Federal control.

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