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together and should not be taken as implying that all of the individual schools had enrollments meeting the 20 percent guidelines. Some of the schools were virtually all black, some virtually all-white and others well integrated. The objection made, however, was to the overall participation of black students in private schools, and the analysis addresses that issue only. Fourth, to the extent certain written comments are correct that the "relevant community" for church-affiliated schools has a much lower black percentage composition, one would expect a lower involvement of black students in the schools analyzed than in schools which cater to the community at-large. Finally, the analysis is based on 1972-73 data rather than current data and subject to the other caveats noted in paragraph la, above.

b. Overview of data analysis. Given the limitations on the available data noted above, particularly the fourth point, the level of participation of black students shown by the analysis is remarkably high. A review of the data analyses in section c, below, reveals that during the 1972-73 school year, there were 425 private schools in Louisiana; 289 (68 percent) were religious affiliated. Enrollment data is available for 251 (86.8 percent) of such schools. Black enrollment in parochial schools ranged from a low of 0.26 percent in Evangeline Parish where data was available for all schools to a high of 48.8 percent in Plaquemines Parish where data was also available for all schools. On a state-wide basis, black students, on the average, constituted approximately 14.7 percent of the total enrollment of each parish. The percentage of black enrollment a private school would have to meet in order to comply with the twenty percent (20 percent) guideline ranged from a low of 1.2 percent in St. Bernard Parish to a high of 14.9 percent in Orleans Parish. During the 1972-73 school year, on a parish-wide basis, the total black enrollment in private schools in 19 (52.7 percent) of the 36 parishes substantially met or exceeded the twenty percent (20 percent) guideline. c. Analyses of data by Parish.

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Civil Action No. 71-1316, Section B

Oless Brumfield, et al. versus WILLIAM J. DOdd, et al.

On December 13, 1976, this Court found the Plaquemines Parish Independent Schools to be racially discriminatory private schools and, therefore, ineligible to receive state assistance under the law enunciated in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 544 (1973). The four schools which make up the Plaquemines Parish Independent Schools are: River Oaks Academy; McBride Academy; Delta Heritage Academy; Promised Land Academy. On January 12, 1977, this Court directed the defendants to collect all state textbooks from these schools and to cease providing the Plaquemine Parish Independent Schools with funds to operate a bus system.

Approximately two months later, on March 24, 1977, the Independent Schools were recertified by the defendant State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education as having, at that time, satisfied the Board that they were entitled to state assistance. The recertification of the schools by the Board was based on affirmative action taken by the Independent Schools in: 1. placing advertisements in local newspapers declaring the schools to be open to applicants without regard to race or color and stating that tuition scholarship aid would be available to blacks and other minorities; 2. alleged hiring of four black teachers; 3. alleged "preregistration" of sixteen black students for the 1977-78 school year under a recruitment effort by independent School employees with the help of parish officials. The United States and plaintiffs filed a Joint Objection to the giving of state aid to the Independent Schools in March, 1977. On April 20, 1977, the United States moved to add the Plaquemines Parish Commission Council as a party defendant to this action for the alleged purpose of enjoining any and all publicly provided transportation assistance to the private schools. It is the position of the plaintiffs and the Government that the Commission Council picked up the amount of state funds attributable to the transportation of private school students after this Court prohibited the State from providing them. They, therefore, contend that unless the Commission Council is joined in this case and ordered to cease paying transportation costs of the Independent School students, these students will continue to ride to school at public expense.

Thereafter, the Independent Schools requested and were granted an evidentiary hearing on the question of their present eligibility for state textbooks and transportation funds and the Commission Council participated in order to oppose their being made a party to the suit.

Having heard the testimony of witnesses and received into evidence pertinent documents, the question now before this Court is whether the Plaquemines Parish Independent Schools have proved that they are no longer racially discriminatory. We think that in order to prove this, the schools must have demonstrated to the Court that there is, in fact, a genuine non-discriminatory policy. The Court, however, feels constrained to find that they have not. Additionally, the Court is of the opinion that the Plaquemine Parish Commission Council should be joined as a party in this suit in order that the Court can give complete relief to the plaintiffs and the government.

Although the private schools claimed to have preregistered 16 black students for the 1977-78 school year, only five children have in fact been enrolled: four at Promised Land Academy and one at River Oaks Academy. McBride Academy has not preregistered any black students nor has it employed any black teachers. Delta Heritage Academy has not preregistered any black students but has employed one black teacher. River Oaks Academy has employed two black teachers and Promised Land Academy has employed one. However, it is significant to note that all of the black students preregistered to attend the private schools reside outside of Plaquemines Parish and all of these students are related to two of the black teachers recently employed by the private schools. It must be further noted that the evidence showed that in trying to recruit black children from Plaquemines Parish, all those who were contacted were contacted at least by one member of the Commission Council. In addition, of the parents contacted, in most of the cases, the father was employed by the Plaquemines Parish Commission Council and felt somewhat pressured to preregister their child. Forms were signed to preregister children. However, most of the parents signing believed that they were signing to indicate that they did not want their child in private school. Moreover, there was a strong emphasis on the fact that the private schools desired to enroll exceptional black children who would be starting fourth, fifth and sixth grades. It does not appear that only exceptional white children are enrolled or permitted to enroll at the private schools. The evidence also shows the Plaquemines Parish Commission has been giving substantial public support to private schools. Part of this support consists of a program which has existed for a number of years whereby private school students and parents are employed on a part-time basis to earn money in order to cover tuition payments at the private schools. Commission checks are sent directly to the private schools, many not endorsed by the individual payees and in some cases the students earn just enough to annually cover their tuition expenses. The evidence is also clear that the Commission Council is using public funds to continue to operate buses which transport private school children. The Commission Council relies on the 1967 decision of the late Judge Christenberry, in U.S.A. v Plaquemines Parish School Board (no. 66-71A), permitting the School Board to expend money for the transportation of private school children as long as it did not interfere with transportation of public school children. However, this overlooks the fact that in 1973 the Supreme Court, in Norwood banned all state aid to schools found to be racially discriminatory, a decision Judge Christenberry could not have anticipated in 1967. The Court was convinced by the testimony of numbers of black residents from Plaquemines Parish that the black community does not believe that the private schools have changed their attitude toward integration and the black community genuinely does not want to enroll their children in the private schools. This Court cannot enunciate, with exactitude, a formula which, if automatically followed, would ensure a finding that a once racially discriminatory school is no longer discriminatory. But the Court can listen to evidence and determine that a school has not convinced black residents in its community of its sincerety. The black residents of Plaquemines Parish believe that there is only an attempt being made to "use" a token number of black children in order to regain state aid. Surely, a token number cannot be sufficient to justify a finding of nondiscrimination. Apparently, too little has been done in too short a period of time and the Court feels that it would be an injustice to these people if it made a finding of nondiscrimination on the part of these private schools at this time. Accordingly,

It is the order of the court that defendant, State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education be, and it is hereby, directed not to certify the schools of the Plaquemines Parish Independent School System at this time.

It is the further order of the court that the Plaquemines Parish Commission Council be, and the same is hereby, made a party defendant to this suit and, as such, is ordered to cease transportation of students who attend schools which belong to the Plaquemines Parish Independent School System.


(Full statement was made a part of the committee record)


Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am E. Stanley Rittenhouse, legislative aide of Liberty Lobby. I appreciate this opportunity to appear today and present the views of Liberty Lobby's 25,000-member Board of Policy, as well as the approximately half a million readers of our weekly newspaper, the Spotlight.

Presumption of guilt and thus the presumption of intention are illegal. Well settled for eight centuries of Anglo-Saxon common law, plus being the thrust of our Constitution, it is still the law of the land and will remain so if this proposed revenue procedure on private tax-exempt schools is defeated.

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has become a dictatorial power all its own, holding in its hands the power of life and death over every tax-exempt private and church-related school in this country. With such awesome power which they have declared unto themselves, they in turn have become a separate government.

Their most recent decree as entered in the Federal Register demands that all taxexempt schools bow the knee to the new Baal, IRS and its unelected bureaucrats. The children of Israel, Daniel, Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego never had it so rough with Nebuchadnezzar and his decrees. This time instead of being thrown into the lions' den, many of these private and church-related schools will be thrown into the fiery furance of bankruptcy.

Representative George Hansen (R-Idaho), protesting such action, declared: "All schools formed or expanded at or about or after the implementation of desegregation plans in the respective communities will be presumed guilty of systematic racial discrimination and their tax-exempt status revoked retroactively. It proposes to make a blanket finding of racial discrimination and automatically harass all private schools, putting on its victims the onerous burden of proving their innocence. At the same time, it says that it will be practically impossible to refute the charge unless there is an affirmative action program operating.

“It obviously has the gravest conceivable implications for the survival of private schools and certainly gives the IRS wide scope for abuse and harassment . . . What is involved here is not actually a matter of racial discrimination, nor is it really a tax matter. Since the regulation explicitly includes church-related schools, and since there is nothing in the regulation that could not later be applied to churches themselves, what is involved is a very deep first amendment question."

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof In other words, there should be no hostility toward religion; the state cannot inhibit religion in any way. Not only should the government prevent a decreed state religion; it should also be neutral toward all religions by prohibiting inhibition and hostility of any and all religions.

Neutrality does not mean to prohibit but to allow the people to be free to do as they wish. The main thrust of the First Amendment is to maintain neutrality and prevent hostility. To prohibit is to be hostile.

If a school could not maintain its tax-exempt status, it would be forced to raise tuition, forcing many parents to send their children to public schools where the gods of secular humanism, evolution and the like are worshipped.

Karl Marx said, "Humanism is the denial of God, and the total affirmation of man . . . Humanism is really nothing else but Marxism." In the foreword to Witness, Whittaker Chambers called communism "man's second oldest faith. Its promise was whispered in the first days of the Creation . . : 'Ye shall be as gods .' The communist vision is the vision of man without God."

It is apparent that the government desires to stop this growing trend of Americans educating their children apart from the socialism, the secular humanism of the internationalists. With Americans producing an ever-increasing segment of young patriotic, God-fearing leaders through these private and church-related schools, the liberal element in education and politics realize they will be met with greater resistance in the years ahead. From their point of view, this trend must stop. Thus the real issue is the preservation of their monopolistic power over the education of our young people. As the left-wing mass media seeks to control the minds of the adults, these regulations seek to control the education of the young.

These IRS rulings attack Christianity more than Christian schools. The new state religion (in violation of the separation of church and state) is secular humanism (man-worshipping-man). Prayer and Bible reading have now been removed from the public schools; the unelected bureaucrats are going after the private Christian schools.

The April 1979 newsletter of the Virginia Assembly of Independent Baptists says: Several major reasons why these procedures should not be promulgated are: 1. IRS has no statutory authority to promulgate such procedures.

2. IRS is a tax collecting agency and should not be used to enforce social planning and change.

3. The First Amendment rights of every church-related school, guaranteed by our Constitution, will be violated.

But Godly people and their private schools must be in harmony with their religious beliefs, their principles, laws and foundations. This alone more than anything else brings them in conflict with the unelected federal government such as IRS.

IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz has stated that "our tax law places the IRS near the forefront in making delicate decisions involving definitions of 'religion' and 'church' and also places on the Service a substantial responsibility in making determinations relating to racial discrimination." This is far removed from collecting money, the sole purpose of the IRS. And these "determinations" will have the effect of law without ever going through the legislative process.

The U.S. Supreme Court has defined humanism to be a religion. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, attorney William B. Ball led the Amish to victory over humanistic public education. He pointed out that the court defines religion as "belief-not body, creed or cult." He argued that Torcaso v. Watkins makes it "quite clear that . . . theistic belief is but one sort of religion and that non-theistic belief may equally qualify as 'religion.'

The tactics used in announcing these new regulations were deceitful. The IRS did not publish these very substantive regulations in the proposed rules and regulations section but buried them in the "notices" section of the Federal Register. Congress has insisted that rule making be done in the open. Once again, the unelected bureaucrats and the White House ignored (or confronted) the will of Congress in their unethical attempt to force their will on the people.

Representative Larry McDonald (D-Ga.) says:

"In my opinion, this is the first step in what could become a major assault on the tax exempt status of all churches and charitable institutions regarding any action the government decides is not "socially" desirable. Once the regulators possess the ability to take away the tax exempt status of churches and charitable organizations, they will have the financial lever they need to terminate those organizations who fail to comply with their dictates. They will be able to tax or not tax various programs simply by decree. . . This threatened expansion of federal power could greatly infringe upon the rights of all Americans to worship freely, and is an action which must not go unchallenged."

On what basis does IRS hang these discriminatory, persecuting, arbitrary rulings? On "public policy"-whatever that is. IRS Commissioner Kurtz has said that "we have almost no specific statutory guidance" but will use "public policy" in implementing these changes (that will have the effect of law). He pointed out that the IRS has constructed the "religious purpose" test of Sec. 501 (c)(3):

"Are the practices and rituals associated with the belief or creed illegal or contrary to clearly defined public policy? If a group's actions, as contrasted with its beliefs, are contrary to well established and clearly defined public policy, then tax preferences are inappropriate. The group will fail to meet the Religious Purpose test."

In other words, "public policy" will determine what one's religion should be and whether it will be tolerated as determined by the IRS. Has 1984 arrived in 1979? An example of this floating standard comes to the surface with such words as "guidelines" and "community." How can something as vague as a "guideline" be the

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