Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protection of the lives, health and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public morals.

The Legislature cannot by any contract divest itself of the power to provide for those objects. They belong emphatically to that class of objects which demand the application of the maxim salus populi suprema lex, and they are to be attained and provided for by such appropriate means as the legislative discretion may devise. That discretion can no more be bargained away than the power itself. (Citing—Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S., 645.)

In Munn v. Illinois (94 U. S., S. C., 125), held :

That under the police powers inherent in every Sovereignty the Government may regulate the conduct of its citizens, one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good; and where warehouses are situated, and their business is carried on exclusively within a State, she may, as a matter of domestic concern, prescribe regulations for them, notwithstanding they are used as instruments by those engaged in inter-State, as well as in State, commerce; and may limit the rates to be charged for the storage and handling of grain, and require a license to be taken out and a bond to be given, and until Congress acts in reference to their inter-State relations, such regulations can be enforced even though they may indirectly operate upon commerce beyond her immediate jurisdiction.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: The exercise of these powers does not conflict with that part of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution which ordains that " no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

While this provision of the amendment is new in the Constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the powers of the States, it is old as a principle of civilized government. It is found in Magna Charta. When one becomes a member of society he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relation to others, he might retain. This is in the very essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas. From this source come the police powers

under which it has become customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, &c., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold.

Looking then to the common law, from whence came the right which the Constitution protects, we find that when private property is " affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati only." This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale more than two hundred years ago in his treatise De Portibus Maris (1 Harg. Law Tracts 78), and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the law of property ever since. Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. When therefore one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus created. .

This statement of Lord Hale was cited with approbation, and acted upon by Lord Kenyon in Bolt v. Stennett (8 T. R. 606). And the same has been held as to warehouses and warehousemen in Aldnutt v. Inglis (12 East, 527).

In later times the same principle came under consideration in the Supreme Court in Alabama. That Court was called upon in 1841 to decide whether the power granted to the City of Mobile to regulate the weight and price of bread was unconstitutional, and it was contended that it would interfere with the right of the citizen to pursue his lawful trade or calling in the mode his judgment might dictate, but the Court said: "There is no motive for this interference on the part of the Legislature with the lawful actions of individuals or the mode in which private property shall be enjoyed, unless such calling affects the public interest, or private property is employed in a manner which directly affects the body of the people. Upon this principle in this State tavern-keepers are licensed, and the County Court is required, at least once a year, to settle the rates of innkeepers."

In City of New York v. Miln (11 Peters 102), Held:

That a State may lawfully require from the master of every vessel arriving in her ports information of the character of the passengers, and that a law passed by the State of New York to this effect was a mere police regulation, and not in conflict with the provision of the

Constitution of the United States conferring the exclusive power on Congress to regulate commerce.

Held, also, that all those powers which relate to merely municipal regulation or which may more properly be called internal police, are not surrendered or restrained; and consequently in relation to these the authority of a State is complete, unqualified and exclusive.

In Railroad Company v. Richmond (96 U. S., S. C., 529), Held:

That an Ordinance of the Council of the City of Richmond, prohibiting the use by a Railroad corporation of its locomotives in certain streets of the city, does not infringe upon its constitutional rights, by depriving the Company of its property without due process of law.

That all property in a city is subject to the legitimate control of government unless protected by contract rights. Appropriate regulation of the use of property is not "taking" property, within the meaning of the Constitutional prohibition. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: "The power to govern implies the power to ordain and establish suitable police regulations; and that, it has often been decided, authorizes municipal corporations to prohibit the use of locomotives in the public streets, when such action does not interfere with vested rights.

Such prohibitions clearly rest upon the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas, which lies at the foundation of the police power.

In New Orleans v. United States (10 Peters U. S., S. C., 662), Held: That the Federal Government has no power to exercise police control over the quays and public places within the State of Louisiana formerly belonging to the Crown of France or Spain,-that the Treaty of cession of Louisiana to the United States could not enlarge the powers of the Federal Government, the State of Louisiana having been admitted into the Union on the same terms as the original States.

In re Stavin and Corporation of Orillia (36 U. C., Q. B., 159),

Held by a unanimous Court (Richards, C. J., Morrison and Wilson, J. J. A.): That it was within the authority of the Legislature of the Province of Ontario to grant to a Municipal Corporation a power of limiting the number of taverns in a municipality, or prohibiting the sale by retail of spirituous liquors by shopkeepers in such municipality,—that this is a power which may be properly exercised by the Local Legislature as a matter chiefly of police, of a merely local and private nature, when it does not interfere with the sale of imported or manufactured liquors otherwise than by retail.

In Pierce v. Bartrum (1 Cowper 270) it was held:

That a by-law of a city prohibiting the slaughtering of cattle by butchers within the city limits was not in restraint of trade, but only a reasonable regulation of it by the Local Government.

Story (Com. on Cons. sec. 1066-1014,) says:

The acknowledged powers of the States, over certain subjects having a connection with commerce, are entirely distinct in their nature from that to regulate commerce. Among these are inspection laws, health laws, and laws regulating turnpike roads, and ferries, all of which, when exercised by a State, are legitimate-arising from the general powers belonging to it—unless so far as they conflict with the powers delegated to Congress.

They are not so much regulations of commerce as of police, and may truly be said to belong, if at all to commerce, to that which is purely internal, though they may be controlled by Congress when they interfere with their acknowledged powers.

In Cowan v. Wright (23 Grant Ch. 616) Blake, V. C., said :

That exclusive power is conferred upon the Local Legislatures by the B. N. A. Act, 1867, to deal with property and civil rights in the Provinces. The true principle,is, adopting the language of the Court in re Goodhue, that under the Confederation there has been a Federal, not a Legislative Union; that to the Provincial Legislatures are committed the powers to legislate upon a range of subjects which is indeed limited, but that within the limits prescribed the right of legislation is absolute. And that the Local Legislatures have that power in all cases, where the property and rights sought to be affected are in the Province, to the same unlimited extent that the Imperial Parliament has in the United Kingdom.

Dobie & Board of Temporalities Fund of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in connection with the Church of Scotland (3 L. N. 244) Held, Dec., 1879, by the Superior Court, Montreal, and confirmed by the Q. B., appeal side, 19th June, 1880:

That under sec. 92, $13, of B. N. A. Act, the Provincial Legislatures. are competent, to the exclusion of the Federal Parliament, to deal with property and civil rights in the Provinces; that in the exercise of that power they may validily legislate over the property of the Presbyterian Church, and to do so they may respectively alter the settlement of that property, made by Acts of the heretofore United Provinces

of Upper Canada and Lower Canada, and that, therefore, the Quebec Provincial Act 38 Vic. c. 64 is not ultra vires.

In the Superior Court, Jetté, J., decided as follows:

Having heard the parties by their counsel respectively upon the merits of this cause, examined the procedure, papers fyled, and the evidence, seen the admissions fyled by the parties, and deliberated :

Considering that the petitioner alleges in his demand that the Corporation, defendants, was created, under the name of "The Board for the management of the Temporalities Fund of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in connection with the Church of Scotland," for the possession and administration of a certain fund belonging to the said Church, and previously created by resolution of the Synod of the said Church, in January, 1855, and that by the statute creating and incorporating the said Board, it was, among other things, provided and warranted that the property of the said fund should belong exclusively to the said Church; that the income of the said fund should be subject to divers annual charges laid upon it at the time of its creation in favor of the ministers of the said Church, and finally, that the members of the said Board should always be ministers or members of the said church, in full communion therewith and that four of them should go out and be replaced every year;

Considering that the said petitioner alleges besides, that when the said fund was created he was one of the ministers entitled to a charge or annual allowance of $450, to be taken out of the revenue of the said fund; that it was then covenanted and admitted as a fundamental principle of the creation of the said fund, that, in order to be entitled to any revenue derived from it, it should be requisite to be a minister of the said Church; and that the petitioner is still at this day in full possession of his rights and privileges in this respect, having remained a minister of the said Church, and in full communion therewith; considering that the petitioner alleges moreover, that by an Act of the Legislature of the Province of Quebec passed in 1875, being 38 Vic. c. 64, the condition of administration of the said fund has been changed in a manner to continue in office the members of the said Board for the time being, and to provide for replacing them only in the case of vacancy by death, resignation or absence, and by persons other than members of the said Presbyterian Church of Canada in connection with the Church of Scotland, and that the said Act authorizes, moreover, the said Board to take from the principal of the said fund,—but that, the said