Application to votes, &c. Election of Members of the Legislative Assembly thereof in such Form and by such Person as he thinks fit, and at such time and addressed to such Returning Officer as the Governor General directs, and so that the First Election of Member of Assembly for any Electoral District or any Subdivision thereof shall be held at the same Time and at the same Places as the Election for a Member to serve in the House of Commons of Canada for that Electoral District. 6. THE FOUR PROVINCES. 90. The following Provisions of this Act respecting the Pecting money Parliament of Canada, namely, the provisions relating to Appropriation and Tax Bills, the Recommendation of Money Votes, the Assent to Bills, the Disallowance of Acts, and the Signification of Pleasure on Bills reserved,-shall extend and apply to the Legislatures of the several Provinces as if those Provisions were here re-enacted and made applicable in Terms to the respective Provinces and the Legislatures thereof, with the Substitution of the Lieutenant Governor of the Province for the Governor General, of the Governor General for the Queen and for a Secretary of State, of One Year for Two Years, and of the Province for Canada. Legislative au thority of Parliament of Canada. See Sects. 53, 54, 55, 56 & 57. VI. DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS. Powers of the Parliament. 91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of CANADA, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of CANADA extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next herein-after enumerated; that is to say, 1. The Public Debt and Property. 2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce. 3. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation. 4. The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit. 5. Postal Service. 6. The Census and Statistics. 7. Militia, Military and Naval Service and Defence. 8. The fixing of and providing for the Salaries and Allowances of Civil and other Officers of the Government of CANADA. 9. Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses, and Sable Island. 10. Navigation and Shipping. 11. Quarantine, and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine Hospitals. 12. Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries. 13. Ferries between a Province and any British or Foreign Country or between Two Provinces. 14. Currency and Coinage. 15. Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money. 16. Savings Banks. 17. Weights and Measures. 18. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes. 19. Interest. 20. Legal Tender. 21. Bankruptcy and Insolvency. 22. Patents of Invention and Discovery. 23. Copyrights. 24. Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians. 25. Naturalization and Aliens. 26. Marriage and Divorce. 27. The Criminal Law, except the constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters. 28. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Penitentiaries. 29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces. The difficulties which, after an experience of a few years, have shown a work of this kind to be useful, if not necessary in some shape, were foreshadowed by Lord Carnarvon in the following terms, when the B. N. A. Act came before the House of Lords: --- "I now pass to that which is, perhaps, the most delicate and the most important part of this measure-the distribution of powers between the Central Parliament and the local authorities. In this is, I think, comprised the main theory and Constitution of Federal Government; on this depends the practical working of the new system; and here we navigate a sea of difficulties there are rocks on the right hand and on the left. If, on the one hand, the Central Government be too strong, then there is risk that it may absorb the local action and that wholesome self-government by the provincial bodies, which is a matter of both good faith and practical expediency to maintain; if, on the other hand, the Central Government is not strong enough, then arises a conflict of State rights and pretensions, cohesion is destroyed, and the effective vigour of the central authorities is encroached upon. The real object which we have in view is to give to the Central Government those high functions and almost sovereign powers by which general principles and uniformity of legislation may be secured in those questions that are of common import to all the Provinces; and, at the same time, to retain for each Province so ample a measure of municipal liberty and self-government as will allow, and indeed compel them, to exercise those local powers which they can exercise with great advantage to the community. In this Bill the division of powers has been mainly effected by a distinct classification. That classification is four-fold: 1st, those subjects of legisla tion which are attributed to the Central Parliament exclusively; 2nd, those which belong to the Provincial Legislatures exclusively; 3rd, those which are subjects of concurrent legislation; and 4th, a particular question which is dealt with exceptionally. To the Central Parliament belong all questions of the public debt or property, all regulations with regard to trade or commerce, customs and excise, loans, the raising of revenue by any mode or system of taxation, all provisions as to currency, coinage, banking, postal arrangements, the regulation of the census, and the issue and collection of statistics. To the Central Parliament will also be assigned the enactment of criminal law. The administration of it indeed is vested in the local authorities; but the power of general legislation is very properly reserved for the Central Parliament. And in this I cannot but note a wise departure from the system pursued in the United States, where each State is competent to deal as it may please with its Criminal Code, and where an offense may be visited with one penalty in the State of New York, and with another in the State of Virginia. The system here proposed is, I believe, a better and safer one; and I trust that before long the criminal law of the four Provinces may be assimilated-and assimilated, I will add, upon the basis of English procedure. Lastly, the fisheries, the navigation and shipping, the quarantine regulations, the lighting of the coast, and the general question of naval and military defence, will be placed under the exclusive control of the Central Government. "The principal subjects reserved to the Local Legislatures are the sale and management of the public lands, the control of their hospitals, asylums, charitable and municipal institutions, and the raising of money by means of direct taxation. The several Provinces, which are now free to raise a revenue as they may think fit, surrender to the Central Parliament all powers under this head, except that of direct taxation. Lastly, and in conformity with all recent colonial legislation, the Provincial Legislatures are empowered to amend their own constitutions. But there is, as I have said, a concurrent power of legislation to be exercised by the Central and the Local Parliaments. It extends over three separate subjects-immigration, agriculture, public works. Of these the two first will in most cases probably be treated by the provincial authorities. They are subjects which, in their ordinary character, are local; but it is possible that they may have, under the changing circumstances of a young country, a more general bearing, and therefore a discretionary power of interference is wisely reserved to the Central Parliament. Public works fall into two classes: first, those which are purely local, such as roads and bridges, and municipal buildings— and these belong, not only as a matter of right, but also as a matter of duty, to the local authorities. Secondly, there are public works which, though possibly situated in a single Province, such as telegraphs and canals, and railways, are yet of common import and value to the entire Confederation, and over these it is clearly right that the Central Government should exercise a controlling authority. "In closing my observations upon the distribution of powers, I ought to point out that just as the authority of the Central Parliament will prevail whenever it may come into conflict with the Local Legislatures, so the residue of legislation, if any, unprovided for in the specific classification which I have explained, will belong to the central body. It will be seen, under the 91st clause, that the classification is not intended to restrict the generality' of the powers previously given to the Central Parliament, and that those powers extend to all laws made 'for the peace, order, and good government' of the Confederation, terms which, according to all precedents, will, I understand, carry with them an ample measure of legislative authority. I will add that, whilst all general Acts will follow the usual conditions of Colonial legislation, and will be confirmed, disallowed, or reserved for Her Majesty's pleasure by the Governor General, the Acts passed by the Local Legislature will be transmitted only to the Governor General, and be subject to disallowance by him within the space of twelve months." As to the unalterable character of the Bill, Lord Carnarvon repeatedly expressed himself:— "Such an undertaking was part of the compact between the several Provinces, and it was an indispensable condition on the part of New Brunswick." In answer to Lord Lyveden, the noble Lord said: It was, of course, within the competence of Parliament to alter the provisions of the Bill; but he should be glad for the House to understand that the Bill partook somewhat of the nature of a treaty of union, every single clause of which had been debated over and over again, and had been submitted to the closest scrutiny, and, in fact, each of them represented a compromise between the different interests involved. Nothing could be more fatal to the Bill than that any of those clauses which were the result of a compromise should be subject to much alteration. It would be his duty to resist the alteration of anything which was in the nature of a compromise, and which, if carried, would be fatal to the measure." |