the removal of a Lieutenant Governor of a Province should not be a political act, but should be entirely independent of Dominion local politics."

These views had been considered by the Imperial Government, and answered in a despatch of the Secretary of State for the Colonies of 3rd July, 1879, in which we read:

"It has been noticed that while, under section 58 of the Act, the appointment of a Lieutenant Governor is to be made " by the GovernorGeneral-in-Council by instrument under the great seal of Canada," section 59 provides that "a Lieutenant Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor General," and much stress has been laid upon the supposed intention of the Legislature in thus varying the language of these sections. But it must be remembered that other powers vested in a similar way by the statute in the Governor General were clearly intended to be, and in practice are, exercised by and with the advice of his Ministers; and, though the position of a Governor General would entitle his views on such a subject as that now under consideration to peculiar weight, yet Her Majesty's Government do not find anything in the circumstances which would justify him in departing in this instance from the general rule, and declining to follow the decided and sustained opinion of his Ministers, who are responsible for the peace and good government of the whole Dominion, to the Parliament, to which, according to the 59th section of the statute, the cause assigned for the removal of a Lieutenant Governor, must be communicated." .” **** “It will be clearly borne in mind that it was the intention of the British North America Act, 1867, that the tenure of the high office of Lieutenant Governor should, as a rule, endure for the term of years specially mentioned, and that not only should the power of removal never be exercised except for grave cause, but that, the fact that the political opinions of a Lieutenant Governor had not been during his former career, in accordance with those held by any Dominion Ministry who might happen to succeed to power during his term of office, would afford no reason for its exercise."

Mr. Todd, in his work on Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, takes the same views as the Imperial and Dominion Governments as regards the duty of the Governor General to act on the advice of his Cabinet in the dismissal of a Lieutenant Governor; but says (p. 415):

"By the B. N. A. Act of 1867, the Crown transferred to the central Dominion Government and Parliament the measure of control previously exercised by the Mother Country over the respective provinces ;

and since their confederation the Imperial Government has declined to interfere directly in questions of local concern in the Provinces. But this concession to the Federal Government of Imperial rights over the Provinces simply places that Government in the position towards the Provincial Governments heretofore occupied by the Crown. It does not increase or diminish the relative powers of either in respect to local affairs. This principle has been unreservedly established as regards Provincial legislation. It is well understood that each Province retains 'exclusive' rights of legislation within its assigned jurisdiction, that may not be interfered with by the Dominion Government, save only when Dominion interests or the public welfare in general might be injuriously affected by such legislation.

The same principle applies with equal force to acts of administration. The spirit and intent of the B. N. A. Act equally forbid unnecessary interference by the Dominion Executive with Provincial rights in all matters of local self-government.

This explains why a restraint is imposed by that Statute upon the prerogative right of dismissing a Lieutenant Governor.

Such functionaries cannot be removed at pleasure, as freely as the Sovereign is at liberty to remove a colonial Governor. The Act secures them against any such arbitrary exercise of the prerogative. They are only removable within five years of their appointment 'for cause assigned, which shall be communicated by message to the Senate and House of Commons' at the earliest possible period.

The object of this proviso is manifestly to guard against a removal for insufficient cause, and to afford a guarantee to the Provinces that their chief Executive officer shall not be removed for any reason that would impair or infringe upon the cherished right of local self-government.

But what, it may be asked, would be a sufficient cause for such a proceeding?

Undoubtedly, if a Lieutenant Governor overstepped his lawful powers he would be properly subject to dismissal.

Or if he exercised his lawful powers in an improper and partial

manner.

But, let the sufficient cause be what it may, it is clear that the responsibility for the act of removal devolves upon the Governor General in Council; and that the initiatory step to that end should proceed from thence.

To permit the initiative in such a momentous proceeding to be

undertaken by either House of Parliament would be an undue interference with Executive responsibility. It would weaken the just authority of the Crown, and produce a result for which no one could be held actually responsible,

Herein, it is obvious that the Dominion Government was at fault in the procedure against Governor Letellier.

They had abstained, as a government, from calling M. Letellier to account. And when the two Houses of Parliament had passed resolutions calling for his removal, the Premier informed the Governor General that, in the opinion of Ministers, it was not at all necessary, in order to justify their advice, to go behind the vote of Parliament: even if their opinion had been adverse to that arrived at by Parliament, it seems clear that they are bound to respect that decision, and to act upon it, as they have done, by advising the removal.'

This statement involves a complete abnegation of Ministerial responsibility, and a surrender of the safeguards over individual rights which Ministerial responsibility is intended to afford.

We are therefore compelled to conclude that the action taken for the removal of Lieutenant Governor Letellier was at variance with constitutional law and precedent, as well as contrary to the spirit and intent of the British North America Act; inasmuch as it was initiated by Parliament and not by the Executive Government, and did not set forth the particular acts of misconduct for which his removal was deemed to be necessary.

If we go behind the formal resolutions of Parliament, and inquire into the reasons urged by the advocates of these resolutions for their adoption, we find it alleged, as a primary motive to justify the dismissal of the Lieutenant Governor, that, by his dismissal of his Ministers at a time when they were able to command a majority in Parliament, he had exercised an arbitrary and obsolete power, which was incompatible with the recognition of Responsible Government. The leader of the Opposition in the Commons, in advocating the adoption of the resolution against Governor Letellier, said that, 'in England the power of dismissal of a Government having the confidence of Parliament is gone forever, and that, if it were gone there, it ought never to have been attempted to be introduced into a colony under the British Crown.'

The

It is scarcely necessary to point out that this rash and ill-considered declaration has no warrant either in theory or practice. reserved powers of the Crown, which, like all prerogatives, are held in trust for the benefit of the people, clearly include the right

of appealing, at all times, from a Ministry, strong (it may be) in the possession of the confidence of the existing Parliament to the electorate, whose decision must ultimately prevail. Meanwhile the Crown is constitutionally competent to dismiss any Ministry in whom the Sovereign is no longer able to confide, and invite the assistance of other Ministers who are willing to be responsible for this act of the Crown. To deny to the Sovereign the possession of these reserved powers, however seldom it may be needful to exercise them, would be, in effect, to destroy the strength and vitality of the Monarchy.

And this is equally true of the powers of a Governor in the colonies of Great Britain.

The right of a Governor or Lieutenant Governor to dismiss his Ministers, when he has ceased to have confidence in them, is undeniable; and that right is not impaired by the fact of their being able to command a majority in the Representative Chamber. This principle has been repeatedly affirmed in colonies under Responsible Government (see p. 432 et seq. of same work), and it is now placed beyond the reach of cavil by the corroborative testimony of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Letellier case, that there can be no doubt that the Lieutenant Governor of a province has an unquestionable constitutional right to dismiss his Ministers if, from any cause, he feels it incumbent upon him to do so.'

This abstract right being admitted, we may go further and declare that it is the bounden duty of a Governor to dismiss his Ministers if he believes their policy to be injurious to the public interests, or their conduct to be such, in their official capacity, that he can no longer act with them harmoniously for the public good. But, before a Governor proceeds to this extremity, at least towards a Ministry having the confidence of the Assembly, he should be assured that he can replace them by others who will be acceptable to the country and to the Assembly, as well as to himself, and who will be prepared to assume full responsibility for his act in effecting the change of Government.

By a dissolution of the Assembly, consequent upon a change of Ministry, this question is brought directly under the review of the constituencies.

In the Letellier case, the Province of Quebec-which was the only part of the Dominion directly interested in the wisdom of the Lieutenant Governor's act in the dismissal of his Ministers-ratified the same by the support which they afforded to Mr. Joly, the Minister who became constitutionally responsible for the action of the Lieutenant Governor.

To revert for a moment to the votes of censure against Governor Letellier, which we have characterized as vague and ambiguous;' it is noticeable that these votes, whenever they were proposed, and whether they were negatived or affirmed, were invariably decided as strict party questions. This fact leads us to object still further to the proceedings in this case, and to deprecate any reliance upon it as a precedent for further guidance.

It may be said, however, that the unanimous defence of Mr. Letellier by his own political friends was in itself a presumption that. he had been unduly influenced by party bias in his official conduct instead of uniformly exhibiting the neutrality which is essential to the position of a Constitutional Governor.

If this had been Mr. Letellier's offence, why was not the charge of partiality and political preferences distinctly formulated against him, and his sentence of dismissal based upon proof of the same? Such proof, if it existed, could not have been difficult to procure, and for the credit of the country, as well as in view of the importance of establishing a great constitutional precedent upon an adequate and unimpeachable foundation, it should have been adduced on this occasion, and the order in council for Mr. Letellier's removal predicated upon it."

The opinion of this learned constitutional writer, which has been necessarily abridged, may be summed up as follows:

1. The Dominion Cabinet, in the removal of a Lieutenant, Governor, must constitutionally take the initiative and responsibility of the act.

2. Parliament acts unconstitutionally, by initiating such proceedings, and Cabinet Ministers cannot shield themselves behind a vote of Parliament.

3. The reasons given for M. Letellier's removal were vague and ambiguous, and not of a character to justify it.

4. The right of a Governor or Lieutenant Governor to dismiss his Ministers is unquestionable.

5. The duty of correcting the error of a Governor or Lieutenant Governor, in the change of his Ministers, devolves upon the Electorate.

6. The dismissal of Ministers can only be made on the responsibility of successors who must be sustained by the Electorate.

7. The successors of the dismissed Ministers having been sustained by the Electorate, the Lieutenant Governor could not be constitutionally removed inasmuch as his removal constituted an undue interference with the rights of Provincial autonomy.

The Bystander, Toronto, 1880, p. 264, comments on these views as fol

A careful and perfectly judicial review of the Letellier case brings