DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR SENATE Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development (Ford) Subcommittee on Public Lands, National Parks and Forests Subcommittee on Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency and Subcommittee on Water and Power (Bradley) Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Clean Water, Fisheries, and Wildlife (Graham) Indian Affairs * the committee has no subcommittees HOUSE Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee on Environment and Natural Resources (Studds) Natural Resources Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources (Lehman) Subcommittee on Native American Affairs (Richardson) DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION SENATE Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs (Sarbanes) Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation (Ford) Subcommittee on Communications (Inouye) Subcommittee on Consumer (Bryan) Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism (Kerry) Subcommittee on Merchant Marine (Breaux) Subcommittee on National Ocean Policy Study (Hollings) Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Water Resources, Transportation, Public HOUSE Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection and Subcommittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation (Tauzin) Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation (Oberstar) Subcommittee on Surface Transportation (Rahall) 74-592-93 - 18 III. ANALYSIS OF HEARINGS CONDUCTED IN 1991 In this final segment of the study, the Joint Committee sought to capture the totality of interaction between committees and agencies by examining the hearing appearances of Executive Branch witnesses. We identified the committees and subcommittees before which witnesses of every executive entity testified during a particular period. Specifically, we examined hearings conducted in 1991 which were subsequently printed (as noted in the Congressional Information Service Index) to identify those at which Executive Branch witnesses appeared. Dates of witness appearances and other information was entered into a database for sorting and tabulation by department or agency. It proved infeasible to conduct an automated examination of CIS's own on-line information system. For 1991, we found 2,263 printed hearings at which Executive Branch officials testified. Overall, about 3,000 hearings are conducted per year. Accordingly, testimony at approximately 800 hearings was received from non-Executive Branch individuals such as state and local officials, academicians, and private citizens, or was heard in executive session and thus not printed. Several qualifiers about the data and the methodology are pertinent. First, committees are not required to print hearings, and the CIS Index contains information on printed hearings only. The small number of unprinted hearings (in the contemporary Congress approximately 5 percent of all hearings are unprinted) should not affect our overall results. Also, only hearings printed through December 1992 are reflected in this study. Second, only 1991 (the first session of the 102nd Congress) was surveyed. This was the most recent year for which nearly complete data were available; further, time constraints precluded a longitudinal survey. However, it is likely that 1991 is not atypical of other periods. Third, we categorized witnesses based on their parent departments/agencies. For example, witnesses listed in the CIS as representing the National Institutes of Health were categorized as representing the Department of Health and Human Services. This categorization was used in the interest of consistency and to facilitate a broader analysis of Executive entity--committee/subcommittee interaction. Fourth, if more than one witness from a particular department or agency testified before a committee/subcommittee during a hearing, the hearing was only counted once (for a total of 2,263). A hearing with morning and afternoon sessions (where noted in CIS) also was scored as one hearing. Fifth, we have excluded non-legislative select/special committees, namely Senate Aging and House Aging; Children, Youth, and Families; Hunger; and Narcotics Abuse and Control (House entities no longer exist). Finally, panels and task forces, used by some committees in lieu of or in addition to subcommittees, were counted as subcommittees for the purposes of this analysis. Table I, appearing at the end of the text of this section, summarizes the information on hearing appearances by executive department witnesses. The Department of Defense, with 290 appearances, was the department most often called to Capitol Hill. With testimony before a total of 92 different panels, DOD was also the department most in demand across a wide spectrum of committees and subcommittees. By contrast, the Department of Veterans Affairs appeared 31 times before 12 panels. All other departments fell between the extremes marked by DOD and Veterans Affairs. It is evident that executive departments respond not only to the committees and subcommittees with legislative jurisdiction over their programs but, in some cases, to a large array of other panels. Table II, appearing at the end of text of this section, summarizes information on hearing appearances by witnesses of the independent agencies. Several agencies are called before many committees and subcommittees. For example, although EPA is authorized by 10 full committees and 18 subcommittees (as determined by the May telephone survey), during 1991 the agency was called to testify 122 times before a total of 54 panels. Jurisdictional splintering may be minimal, in other cases, but an organization's expertise is nevertheless required by numerous panels. For example, witnesses representing the Federal Reserve System testified 36 times before 21 panels. Some relatively small and less visible agencies are infrequently called to the Hill and then only by their authorizing or funding panels. In this category are found such agencies as the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Administrative Conference of the United States, and the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board. This data confirm impressionistic evidence that many Executive Branch entities are called to testify before not only their authorizing and appropriating panels but also before a wide range of other committees and subcommittees. In short, Executive Branch interaction with the Congress is broad. TO: Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress SUBJECT: Trends in Congressional Oversight At the recent Annapolis retreat of the Joint Committee, a number of Members expressed interest in contemporary trends in Congressional oversight. Consistent with this interest, the following information is being provided to the entire membership. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 directed each standing committee to "exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution, by the administrative agencies concerned, of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, [to] study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government." Thus, Congress, for the first time, formally endorsed and encouraged Congressional oversight. In the years following 1946, the Congress continued to press itself to do more oversight. In the 1970 amendments to the 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act, Congress attempted to stimulate more oversight by requiring committees to issue biennial reports on oversight activities (now included in the biennial "Activity Report" published by each committee), increasing staff, and strengthening the GAO and CRS. Also in 1974, in an effort to streamline policy making and improve legislative structure and organization, the House adopted a set of reforms (H. Res. 988) that in part made changes in the oversight rules, including encouraging committees to establish oversight subcommittees. The Senate interest in oversight was indicated in the Final Report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate (December, 1976), for example, and by Senate support of sunset legislation in 1978. Trends in oversight behavior are evident upon examination of Congressional committee hearings and meetings held on non-legislative matters. Although this is just one indicator of oversight behavior, it is assumed to be a reliable one. However, numbers of hearings and meetings do not automatically correlate with comprehensive, systematic and effective oversight; the information presented in this report is of quantitative nature only and implies no qualitative conclusions. Reproduced here is a table appearing in Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight, by Joel D. Aberbach (Brookings; Wash., DC, 1990). This table captures the trend in oversight activity for the years 1961-1983 by displaying data on nonlegislative hearing and meeting activity for the first six months (January 1 - July 4) for each odd-numbered year (except 1979 when data could not be coded). |