Representative David Price

The policy frustrations and failings of the early 1960s suggested the need for a performance-based critique and reform agenda, a need that was lessened but not removed by the post-1964 spate of congressional productivity. This "strain of reform" helped produce numerous positive changes, particularly after the arrival of the post-Watergate class of 1974: the reining in of the House Rules Committee and its establishment as an arm of the leadership; strengthened leadership control over committee assignments, bill referral and floor operations; and a measure of accountability by committee chairmen to the party caucus.

The reforms of the 1970s were not driven solely by a desire for efficient and responsive policy-making; other goals, most notably a desire to democratize the chamber and to distribute authority and resources more widely, also fueled major changes.

Today, self-styled proponents of reform make the task of the Joint Committee especially difficult. There exists today a particularly virulent strain of institutional criticism, what is sometimes aptly termed Congress-bashing. Such criticism actually helps prevent positive change. One suspects that many contemporary congressional critics are aiming not for a more assertive, competent institution, but, rather, for the opposite.

Nevertheless, there is a need to mitigate the "endless scramble" for campaign funds, and to place the management of Congress on a more professional and businesslike footing.

It is important to remember the earlier reform agenda aimed at a stronger Congress, holding its own with the executive branch in the constitutional balance of power and producing good public policy. This is the kind of reform that is threatened by the Congress-bashers and by their preferred nostrums such as congressional term limits and the line-item veto.

A positive formula for change would attend to the need for strengthened party operations in Congress. There is need to strengthen party leaders' capacity to develop and promote a policy agenda and to nudge committee decisionmaking in consistent directions. Party caucuses need to be strengthened as organs of policy discussion and debate; the leadership must be enabled to overcome committee fragmentation and parochialism in bringing proposals to the floor; and strong vote-gathering operations must be maintained.

The Committee should consider changes in the operations of committees. The pendulum has swung too far in the direction of diffusion and decentralization, and a reasonable consolidation can save money, reduce Members' overextension, encourage a focus on general rather than particular interests, and increase the overall coherence of policy-making.

The Committee needs to revisit what proved to be the most difficult and least successful reform effort of the 1970s: the simplification and rationalization of committee jurisdictions.

The present system's scattering of jurisdiction over key policy areas (particularly those, such as energy and the environment, that have come into prominence since the jurisdictional lines last were drawn), its generating of overlapping and competing claims, and its provision of multiple checkpoints for obstruction and delay have gone far past the point of diminishing returns.

A minimalist strategy for resolving the jurisdictional morass would concentrate on resolving House-Senate disparities. Whatever one thinks of the jurisdictional divisions among the Appropriations subcommittees, the worse sorts of problems are avoided by virtue of the fact that the Appropriations subcommittees in the House and Senate have the same jurisdictions. To approximate that degree of synchronization among standing committees in the House and Senate would be a major step forward.

The Joint Committee should examine the way committee and subcommittee leaders are chosen. It might be possible to allow Members of equal full committee seniority to contest subcommittee chairmanships when they initially become available.

The key litmus test for any changes is whether they would leave Congress stronger and make it a more competent and effective institution able to produce better policy.

Questions and Answers

Hamilton: Given the 1974 committee jurisdiction impasse, what is your political sense on tackling rationalizing committee jurisdictions this time around? Is it too tough?

Price: I wouldn't approach this task from ground zero. I would support coordinating the standing committees between the chambers the way the Appropriations committees are coordinated. But yes, the Joint Committee should tackle jurisdictions.

Dreier: What are your thoughts on reducing the number of committees?

Price: This is definitely a problem, more in the Senate than in the House. Cutting out the select committees makes sense. Cutting the numbers of subcommittees makes sense. I would support the subcommittee reduction that we have done so far, especially cutting minor committees. But loose talk about there being too many committees and subcommittees needs to be kept in perspective. The committees and subcommittees are important but their numbers and jurisdictional conflicts have gone beyond the point of diminishing returns.

Spratt: What are your thoughts on the current two-step authorizingappropriating process, and on biennial budgeting?

Price: I'm not sure putting appropriations on a two-year cycle is a particularly good idea. I'm also not sure a two-year budgeting cycle is a good idea. In the states, off-year appropriations sessions often blossom into full-blown appropriations. The budget process needs to be more long-term, but it shouldn't be a two-year cycle.

Spratt: If committee jurisdictions are rationalized, one risk is that the membership would become stratified. The present mix makes sure that legislation is not tilted. If there was an environmental committee, isn't there a risk that it could turn into a strong advocacy committee?

Price: This impulse should be countered; balance should be maintained and a broader view should be encouraged. The committees and their members should not be too narrowly focused.

Representative C. Christopher Cox

The focus should be on the budget process. The chronic failure to balance the budget is the inevitable result of a poorly designed congressional budget process, which not only permits but encourages violations of the very laws designed to force rational choices among competing priorities.

Cox's plan is contained in the Budget Process Reform Act. It would require that Congress enact a legally binding budget (in the form of a joint, rather than a concurrent, resolution) by May 15 of each year. Until the budget is signed into law, no authorization or appropriations bill could come up on either the House or the Senate floor. The budget would set ceilings on all federal spending (except Social Security and the interest on the debt) for the coming fiscal year.

The budget will fit on one page--setting specified ceilings on government spending within the 19 summary categories currently used in the budget.

Congress would be permitted to enact spending legislation in excess of the budget ceilings only by a supermajority vote.

Because Congress would be required to determine the desired level of spending for each federal program except Social Security and the interest on the debt, open-ended "blank-check" appropriations--such as those for entitlement programs, which authorize the spending of "such sums as may be necessary"-would no longer be allowed.

The President gets a "line-item reduction." Waiving the Budget Act is no longer permitted.

The Act provides a safeguard against the contingency that Congress should fail by October 1, to complete action on appropriations for any program or activity.

Representative Dick Zimmer

He is a strong supporter of reforming the budget process, restructuring committees and staff, improving floor procedures, increasing congressional accountability, etc.

His principal reform proposal, "simple, yet potentially powerful," is the single-subject rule for legislation -- a rule requiring that each bill contain only one subject.

This rule would help Members know what they're voting for by eliminating the confusion that results from a number of unrelated bills "being cobbled together." It would prevent Members from having to vote against a bill they support because an unrelated provision they oppose is attached, or vice versa. It would prevent some Members from building a majority for a "bad bill" by attaching other Members' pet bills to it. It would make Representatives more accountable to the constituents by making their voting records more comprehensible.

Some form of a single-subject rule exists in 41 of the 50 state constitutions.

Representative Dana Rohrabacher

He is most concerned about the two step authorizations-appropriations process; this is a duplicative system. Since 1974, the Appropriations Committees have been the cause of too much pork, and the committees have become essentially meaningless since they repeatedly ignore authorizations ceilings. Substantive law is being made through the appropriations process.

Currently, the primary function of Members of Congress is to be the in-house lobbyists for the interests that are represented in the Appropriations Committees.

The authorizations and appropriations process should be merged.

Representative Michael N. Castle

Congress should outline a clear agenda each year.

With respect to committees, the number of committees and subcommittees and their staff should be reduced. There needs to be better coordination in scheduling committee and subcommittee meetings. To accomplish this a

centralized computer scheduling system should be developed. Multiple referrals should be ended. The terms of committee chairs and ranking minority members should be limited. Membership on committees should be rotated. Also, proxy voting should be ended. Finally, special joint congressional committees with responsibility for key pieces of legislation should be established.

The legislative day should start earlier. More time in session on the House floor should be dedicated to debating priority legislation. The Committee of the Whole should be abolished. Every bill and committee report should be made available to Members 48 hours before chamber action.

The budget process should be revamped; the budget resolution should be binding and unauthorized appropriations should not be protected by closed rules.

Congress should eliminate automatic cost of living increases for all entitlement programs, except Social Security.

Congress should eliminate more perks and privileges, for example, unsolicited mass mailings.

Congress should be subject to the laws it enacts. There should be no double standard exempting Congress from laws that all other Americans must comply with.

Representative Bill Goodling

Believes the fact that Congress has exempted itself from laws it imposes on the private sector is just another symptom of how out of touch it is with the real world. To suggest that Congress can know what labor laws are good for the private sector and impose these burdens without being subjected to them ourselves is not satisfactory for an institution that is supposed to represent all the people.

He is in favor of abolishing the select committees. No Member can dispute the merits of the subjects examined by the select committees. However, it can be argued that precious funds can be used in a more effective manner.

He makes it clear that he is not anti-senior citizen or anti-children, youth and families, and not pro-hunger or pro-drug abuse. Instead, he is pro-reform and anti-bureaucracy.

Representative Ike Skelton

The Joint Committee should focus on reforms that will save the Members time, and allow them the opportunity to think and to reflect on problems and issues. There are four subsets of this issue: