providing the President with the authority to eliminate such narrow-interest appropriations, wasteful spending would decrease. They view the President, who represents a national constituency, as more likely to reflect the broader public interest in his budget choices. Several issues are raised by both line item veto proposals and the statutory alternatives discussed above. These include the additional authority provided to the President, the effect of the item veto on federal spending and the budget deficit, and the possibility that requiring Congressional action on more proposed rescission would create a substantial additional workload for the Congress. Additional Authority to the President Each of these proposals would provide additional authority to the President. The constitutional amendment, enhanced rescission and separate enrollment approaches would require a two-thirds vote to override a veto, while the expedited rescission proposal would require only a simple majority. In any of these cases, the argument for providing the President with such authority usually surrounds his position as a representative of the general interest, in contrast to the more narrow constituencies served by Members of Congress. For this reason, it is argued, the President is less likely to engage in low priority locally oriented--so called "pork barrel"--spending. These projects would then have to gain a support by at least a majority in each House in order to be enacted. Presidents would not only be given the authority to eliminate or reduce particular line items, but could also use the threat of a veto to pursue their own spending priorities. This increased bargaining power could be used to encourage the Congress to approve Presidentially-supported spending, or it could be used by the President to induce the Congress to enact other policies that the President supports, such as spending reductions or tax increases. Effect of the Item Veto on Spending and the Deficit Whether enacted as an amendment to the Constitution or statutorily, the item veto may have limited effect on total spending and the deficit. Since the veto would apply only to discretionary spending, its potential usefulness in reducing the deficit or controlling spending is necessarily limited. This point can be illustrated by looking at the budget for fiscal year 1993. The outlay caps for discretionary spending, which were created by the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), total $547 billion. Other spending, including mandatory spending and interest on the national debt, is projected to be $906 billion. Discretionary spending, which is the only portion of the budget that would be subject to the item veto, therefore represents less than 40 percent of total projected spending in fiscal year 1993. Further, some argue that the item veto would apply to the area of the budget that is, comparatively speaking, under control. Discretionary spending has grown far slower than mandatory spending, a trend that is expected to continue under current policies. Mandatory spending (fueled by an increase in health care spending) increased by an average of 8.7 percent a year between fiscal years 1987 and 1992, compared with less than 4 percent for discretionary spending. The item veto has limited potential to reduce the discretionary portion of the budget mainly because appropriated spending has already been limited by other means. The BEA's discretionary spending caps represent a statutory agreement between the President and the Congress on the level of discretionary spending. It is hard to imagine, in this case, that the item veto would be likely to lead to additional reductions in a regime where spending is capped. Further, as noted above, whether granting additional authority to the President would lead to a decrease in spending depends on the degree to which the President supports reduced deficits rather than increased spending. Because an item veto would shift the balance of power between the President and the Congress, it probably would affect the distribution of spending by substituting some Presidential budget priorities for Congressional ones. Evidence from studies of the states' use of the item veto supports this claim; state governors have used it to shift state spending priorities rather than to decrease spending. Some analysts would argue that shifting spending priorities is sufficient reason to adopt the item veto if the President is less likely to engage in pork-barrel spending. An item veto, they argue, would make the President more responsible for spending choices, and lessen the tendency for the two branches to blame each other for the proliferation of "wasteful" spending. Applying the line item veto not only to discretionary spending, but to tax legislation as well (as has been suggested by Senator Bradley) would increase the stakes substantially. The President could presumably veto individual sections of a tax bill--sections that either increased or decreased taxes--while approving the remainder of the bill. Increasing Congressional Workload All forms of the item veto have the potential to increase the workload of the Congress. Presumably, providing the President with the authority to veto individual items could increase the number of Presidential vetoes substantially, and each of these vetoes (or rescission proposals) could prompt Congressional action in each House. Such an increase in Congressional workload could eat up many hours of Congressional committee and floor time. Recognizing this, some proponents of increasing the President's rescission powers would prefer that the President be able to identify all items in a single appropriation bill in one rescission message, which would then be acted on as one package by the Congress. They would thus usually limit the President to a maximum of thirteen messages for regular appropriation bills. The advantage of this is that it would presumably reduce the amount of effort expended by the Congress in dealing with these proposals. There is a significant potential drawback, however. One important advantage often cited for the item veto is that vetoed spending items are forced to stand on their own, rather than being buried within large appropriation bills which are presented to the President for an all-or-nothing decision. Spending bills which cover a great many items can promote vote-trading (often called logrolling) as Members trade support for particular spending items with each other, knowing that no individual proposals will be required to face an up-or-down vote alone. While such agreement may be less likely to hold up in the case of votes on individual items, if a large number of items is included in a single rescission message, the ability of the Congress to obtain the votes to disapprove the rescission is greatly enhanced. Conclusion Debates about whether to adopt the item veto will undoubtedly focus on all three of these issues, and possibly others. Perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind is that the item veto should not be adopted because it is anticipated to reduce spending substantially. The strongest case for the reform relies on a belief that Presidents can identify projects with purely local benefits and are willing to act against them without substituting their own local-benefit projects. The extent to which this belief is true is highly dependent on the priorities of an individual President. Simply put, the item veto is a tool for fiscal restraint only in the hands of Presidents who place a top priority on reducing spending and the deficit. Questions 1. Why should we believe that the item veto will lead to a decrease in spending? For example, what if a President decided to trade his support for Congressional "pork" for the support of a Member for spending that he cared about (the Space Station or the Superconducting Supercollider, to name two)? 2. Wouldn't enacting the item veto or some statutory alternative substantially increase the workload of the Congress, given the number of additional committee and floor votes that it would lead to? 3. Many people point to the state experience with the line item veto as evidence that it should be enacted at the federal level. What does this experience tell us about the likely effect of the veto for the federal government? 4. Isn't it true that the item veto would apply only to the area of the budget which is already under control? Isn't the real issue getting a handle on entitlement spending, especially for health care? 5. Won't the primary effect of the item veto be to redirect spending from Congressional priorities to Presidential priorities? And isn't that a good thing, given the tendency of the Congress to engage in pork-barrel spending? I. SUMMARY OF OPTIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS REFORM OPTIONS FOR ELIMINATING A LAYER OF CONSIDERATION OR Eliminate the budget resolution. Establish a biennial budget resolution. Eliminate appropriations as a separate jurisdiction. D. Establish two-year appropriations. E. F. G. H. Restructure the Appropriations Committee to reduce the number of subcommittees. Eliminate authorization as a separate step in the funding process. Require longer-term authorizations. Adopt an omnibus appropriations bill. I. Adopt an omnibus budget bill (including taxes and appropriations). II. OPTIONS FOR REDUCING CONFLICT BETWEEN AUTHORIZERS AND A. Prohibit appropriations report language which contravenes provisions in an authorization. B. C. D. E. F. G. Change House Rules to eliminate unauthorized appropriations without concurrence of authorizing committee. 1. Prohibit special rules containing waivers of House Rule XXI without concurrence of authorizing committee chairman or super-majority. 2. Allow House authorizing committee chairmen to offer limitation amendments on programs within their jurisdiction. Make the Appropriations Committee an exclusive assignment in the Senate. Apply Senate Rule XVI prohibition against unauthorized Prohibit authorizations from specifying dollar amounts. Establish a deadline for committees to report authorizing |