Questions 1. Isn't it true that the budget discriminates against investments? Wouldn't a capital budget help? 2. Wouldn't having a separate capital budget encourage the categorization of even more spending as capital, or investment? 3. If we had budgeted for deposit insurance on an accrual basis, wouldn't we have had much earlier signals on the magnitude of the savings and loan crisis? 4. Aren't we currently redistributing a lot of resources from future generations to current taxpayers, and wouldn't a system like generational accounting provide better signals? 5. Some have suggested that the current budget does not adequately account for the effect of federal policies on the economy as a whole. How could the budget process be changed in a way that would focus attention more on the economic impact of policies? 74-592-93 - 10 Unauthorized Appropriations and the Even before formally establishing rules to require it, Congress maintained a distinction between policy and funding questions. This separation has naturally produced a tension between committees which consider authorizations (policy) and those which consider appropriations (funding). No less than its structure, the process of considering these two functions separately lends itself to controversies. The Volume of Unauthorized Appropriations Perhaps the most visible controversies stem from the amount and the incidence of unauthorized appropriations. Of the $516 billion in discretionary appropriations for FY 1993, approximately $31 billion (approximately 6%) was categorized by CBO as unauthorized, the result of the expiration of 59 authorization laws in the jurisdictions of 14 House Committees (12 Senate Committees). Only $2 billion of this was for programs that expired at the end of FY 1992. The conclusion then is that the issue of unauthorized appropriations relates to a number of longer standing policy issues, and is not simply a matter of an impenetrable timetable. Indeed, approximately two-thirds of total unauthorized appropriations fall into three areas. The annual authorization for most of the activities of the Department of Justice (involving $8.6 billion) has not been enacted since 1979, the annual authorization for civilian programs of the Department of Energy (involving $4.6 billion) was last authorized (through 1984) in 1981, and over $8 billion dollars for various international security and development and foreign assistance programs has been unauthorized since the end of FY 1987. In addition, authorizing committees point out that some unauthorized appropriations are not always captured by the CBO report, especially for unauthorized earmarking of funds, or for appropriations that exceed the authorization level. On the appropriations side of consideration, 20 of the 26 regular annual appropriations bills and three supplemental appropriations bills considered in the 102d Congress were considered under special rules which waived House Rule XXI, cl. 2 (prohibiting unauthorized appropriations and legislation in a general appropriations bill). The Senate does not have a equivalent method for consideration so that comparable data are not available. In any case, this data supports the conclusion that although most unauthorized appropriations are concentrated in a small number of policy areas, the phenomena is widepread enough to touch on a larger number of areas. Differences in House and Senate Rules Since 1837, the House has had a formal prohibition on unauthorized appropriations, and on legislating in a general appropriations bill, but the issue has remained an open one. In part, this issue has remained open because the Senate has operated under different, generally less stringent, rules in this regard, and not all provisions that would be in violation of House Rule XXI would be in violation of the corresponding Senate Rule (XVI). Indeed, this fact is widely recognized, and today dissatisfaction is often expressed by Members of the House in terms of provisions added by the Senate. The Senate rule does not establish a general prohibition on unauthorized appropriations. What strictures it does impose are attenuated by exceptions for acts or resolutions passed by the Senate during the same session, in pursuance of an estimate from the head of an Executive Department, or moved by direction of a standing committee. In addition, the prohibition does not apply against unauthorized appropriations reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. With regard to legislative language in appropriations bills, Senate rules are more permissive than those of the House. In particular, recent years have seen an increase in the practice of using the so-called defense of germaneness as a means of countering a point of order that an amendment to an appropriation bill is legislative and out of order. This practice has grown out of the requirement that all amendments to appropriations bills be germane, and the provision that if a legislative amendment is germane, it is in order despite its legislative character. The issue is also somewhat complicated by the fact that while service on the Appropriations Committee is generally an exclusive assignment in the House, Appropriators in the Senate sit on, and even chair, authorizing committees. The perception exists that as a result when it is difficult or impossible to enact authorization legislation Senators may find it less problematic than the House to enact the appropriations without an authorization or even to include authorizing language in the appropriation bill itself. Proposed Changes A wide variety of proposals have been discussed which would have an impact on the relationship between authorizations and appropriations. A. Allow House Authorizers Greater Involvement in the Disposition of Senate Unauthorized appropriations and legislation in appropriations bills have been salient issues in the House, particularly with regard to Senate actions. As a consequence, some of the proposals for reform would allow House authorizers to have a greater involvement in the disposition of Senate legislative amendments to appropriations bills and unauthorized appropriations. These reforms specifically involve amending House rules governing consideration of appropriations conference reports. B. Establish a Point of Order in the Senate Against the Inclusion of The current rules and practices of the Senate do not provide for a general prohibition on unauthorized appropriations. The prohibition that does exist applies only to amendments from the floor (with certain exceptions). Proponents suggest that establishing a point of order against unauthorized appropriations being reported from the Senate Appropriations Committee would require that the practices of the Senate, and particularly appropriators, become more like those of the House. The extent and incidence of unauthorized appropriations, however, suggests that specific unauthorized appropriations are at least equally likely to be the results of difficulties in the enactment of authorizations. C. Restrict Legislative-type Language and Earmarking in Appropriations Reports Although neither report language nor earmarking technically fall into the category of activities prohibited under the rules of either chamber, they have generated controversy, and some dissatisfaction has been expressed within both the House and Senate. Authorizers contend that while total appropriations are within limits prescribed by authorizing legislation, they often disregard language in authorization reports concerning details and priorities. Rules and precedents in both chambers allow general authorizations to be sufficient for specific appropriations. Establishing such a restriction would not only narrow the ability of the Appropriations Committees to have a direct impact on policy questions, but also make it difficult for appropriators to specify details even when authorizers have not done so. D. Remove Restrictions on Limitation Amendments to Appropriations Bills Although amendments which restrict the availability of funds in an appropriations bill for specified purposes are not considered legislative in nature, they can have a substantial policy impact. In 1983, the House imposed significant restrictions on the ability of Members to offer limitation amendments on the floor. The result has been that the incidence of limitation amendments (and appropriations amendments generally) have declined substantially. Removing the restrictions would allow Members to have greater impact on the availability of appropriations for policy reasons as well as fiscal reasons. E. Allow Deficit Neutral en bloc Amendments to Appropriations Bills. Under the precedents and practices of the House it is not in order to amend a bill in more than one place. In addition, appropriations bills are open for amendment paragraph by paragraph, with amendments in order only with respect to the paragraph currently open. The combined effect of these two practices is to prevent amendments which would decrease spending for one account and increase spending for another without resort to a special rule or unanimous consent. This rule change would allow Members to have a greater impact on budget priorities. Recent Change in House Rules The House has already adopted one change in its rules to address this concern. H.Res. 5 (103d Congress, adopted January 5, 1993) added a new clause to Rule XXVIII. This new rule provides that for an amendment in technical disagreement to an appropriations conference report which contains legislative language, a motion to insist on disagreement to the amendment will have preference if made by the chairman of the committee having jurisdiction over the provision. The motion would then be debatable for one hour divided between the authorizing committee chairman and the Appropriations Committee manager. This changes the normal order of precedence for motions in the House. Normally a motion to recede and concur (or to concur with an amendment) would have preference over a motion to insist. This new rule is projected as a means to make it more difficult to agree to Senate legislative provisions without the concurrence of the House committee with authorizing jurisdiction. Additionally, the division of debate time provided by this rule, between majority authorizer and majority appropriator, is unique because it does not guarantee any time for the minority. Issues Raised by Senate Legislative Amendments to Appropriations Bills Because most of the issues of unauthorized appropriations and legislation in appropriations bills are derived from House concern with Senate actions, some of the proposals for reform are directed towards allowing House authorizers to have a greater involvement in the disposition of Senate legislative amendments to appropriations bills and unauthorized appropriations, and involve amending House rules governing consideration of appropriations conference reports. Although these proposals would apply to both aspects, the issues are not identical. The House has a general prohibition on both unauthorized appropriations and legislation in appropriations bills, and the proposals made by authorizers in the Democratic Caucus enumerated below likewise do not make a distinction. The Senate, on the other hand does make a distinction. A point of order (under Rule XV) would likely apply against the Senate Appropriations Committee reporting legislative language, but no point of order would apply against them reporting unauthorized appropriations. |