By the 1980s, however, budget-making became significantly "top down" in both Congress and the White House. As the deficit grew in size so, too, did the authority of the Budget Committees and party leaders. And as partisan conflict grew sharper in both the House and Senate, the role of party leaders became even more important in assembling coalitions and establishing policy priorities. What these new developments suggest is that the Budget Committees might be recast as "leadership committees." The change would focus budget control in the leadership and make the entire budget-making process more accountable to the public. Another result would be to strengthen the Budget Committees' capacity to negotiate fiscal trade-offs and to employ reconciliation (directing other committees to make revenue and spending savings) in a more coordinative manner. On the other hand, these "leadership panels" might become so fractious and partisan that little advantage would flow from this change. C. The Pre-1974 Period, With Exceptions Many factors accounted for enactment of the 1974 Budget Act, but the lack on Congress' part of having the capacity to take a big picture look at budgetary actions--relating revenues to expenditures, for example--was among the most important. Congress moved from a piecemeal and haphazard process to one with greater coherence, coordination, and information. Probably no one wants to go back to the budgetary deficiencies identified with the pre-1974 period. Instead, the concern for some today is multiple budgets: the President's and Congress'. Confusion often occurs with two budgets in part because people can select various economic assumptions and numbers to explain an action. Public understanding and accountability is attenuated by this situation. One suggestion to remedy the problem: restore presidential leadership and responsibility for the national budget, which was the case pre-1974, by eliminating budget resolutions. Drafting budget resolutions are the prime responsibility of the two Budget Committees. The elimination of budget resolutions suggests that the functions of the budget panels could be merged with one or more committees in either chamber or with joint committees. Some other panel(s), in short, would provide an overview of the national budget (aggregate levels of spending and revenue, for instance), because lawmakers are likely to want that and related fiscal information. To be sure, without budget resolutions specifying aggregate levels of revenue and spending, lawmakers would probably want to acquire that and related information from some other legislative entity. Members, in brief, want an overview of the national budget. On the other hand, eliminating budget resolutions need not mean elimination of the budget panels. They could still function to monitor spending decisions, conduct scorekeeping, direct the reconciliation process, and oversee the Congressional Budget Office. D. Enhance the Authority of the Budget Committee Given the significant role of the Budget Committees in promoting coordination and integration in Congress' fiscal decision-making, it may be time to equip the two panels with broader authority over budgetary procedures. For example, if Congress established a joint budget resolution, the Budget Committees would have major responsibility for negotiating aggregate spending, revenue, and deficit targets with the President. No doubt this change would trigger earlier bargaining between Congress and the White House over budgetary totals and involve the President and Budget Committee leaders more heavily in enforcement (committee allocations, e.g.) of the budget process as it unfolds over the course of a fiscal year. The role of the budget panels also might be strengthened in the reconciliation process. For example, the budget panels might be given broader authority in reconciliation instructions to suggest specific changes in spending and revenue programs. Further, the budget panels might be permitted to prepare substitutes if standing committees fail to meet the targets set forth in the reconciliation instructions. Suggested Questions 1. On the matter of a joint budget committee, isn't there a possibility that if authorizers are not adequately represented on this important new panel that it could produce even more tension between appropriators and authorizers? How can we keep the size of this panel within reasonable limits so it can accomplish its work with reasonable dispatch? 2. The Budget Committees are among the panels on Capitol Hill that try to extend Congress' traditional short-term focus into longer-term planning. Consistent with its role, what more can be done by the Budget Committees to promote multiyear thinking in the budgetary area? 3. The Budget Committees were established as an overlay to the existing authorization-appropriations process. If the two panels are granted more authority, could this promote more jurisdictional strife among the various fiscal committees? 4. People often talk about the pre-1974 budgetary era as haphazard and piecemeal. Were there any virtues in this "old" process (2 layers rather than 3, for example) that might be revisited in the context of today's fiscal decisionmaking? 5. If leadership influence over the budget panels is enhanced, is there any worry that the budget panels might be embroiled even deeper in partisan division? Joint Resolution on the Budget The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, as amended, establishes a budget process through which the House and Senate can coordinate the various legislative actions effecting Federal budget policy. This process is centered around a concurrent resolution on the budget--the budget resolution--which provides a framework for balancing the disparate decisions made each year about revenues, spending and other budget-related matters (such as limitation on the public debt). The budget resolution sets (currently for the next five fiscal years) total new budget authority and outlays, the size of the deficit, and other budget aggregates, as well as spending and credit amounts for each functional category of the budget. The budget resolution also initiates reconciliation, the process used by Congress to change existing spending and revenue laws to conform with the various aggregate limitations contained in the budget resolution. Budgetary policy is a shared responsibility of the executive and legislative branches, and a degree of cooperation between Congress and the President is necessary for significant steps toward deficit reduction and other budgetary goals. Divided government, a lack of "political will," and other factors have been blamed over the past decade for the regular impasses that occurred on the budget. Some Members of Congress and outside observers have also argued that budget procedures are at least partially responsible because they provide incentives for the executive and legislative branches not to cooperate in the initial formulation of budgetary policy. Part of the problem may be the nature of the budget resolution. As a concurrent resolution, rather than a joint resolution or a bill, the budget resolution is not a law and does not require the President's signature. With split partisan control of Congress and the White House, from 1981-1992 the two branches typically proceeded independent of one another in the early stages of budget decision making, delaying or even fostering conflict in succeeding stages of the budget process when implementing legislation must be signed by the President. As a result, proposals have been made to make the budget resolution a joint resolution. The purpose of this memo is to describe the potential implications of such a change on (1) deliberations about budget policy; (2) the power of Congress relative to the executive branch; and (3) the enforcement of budget agreements. Background The impact of a joint budgetary resolution would depend in part on who controls Congress and the White House. Under divided government, some fear that making the budget resolution a law might lead to partisan gridlock on the budget earlier in the process. With a concurrent resolution on the budget, the two branches can operate independently at the planning stage. The President submits his budget to Congress, and Congress passes its own budgetary goals in a concurrent resolution which does not require the President's signature. However, the two branches are forced to confront each other later in the process over reconciliation, appropriations bills, and the other legislative items that implement the actual outcome of the congressional budget process. Under unified partisan control, the impact of making the budget resolution a joint resolution would depend on how much consensus exists within the majority party about budgetary priorities. When there is substantial agreement between the President and the congressional majority, the primary impact of a joint resolution may be to institutionalize negotiations and cooperation that would have occurred anyway. In contrast, if conflict exists over budgetary priorities between the President and his fellow partisans in Congress, adoption of a joint budget resolution would require that the two branches confront this disagreement early in the budget process, rather than later when implementing legislation is considered. In short, whether partisan control of the government is divided or unified, cooperation between the branches on the budget is necessary at some stage of the process. Even under conditions of divided government the question is not whether the Congress and the President must bargain over budget policy, but when. Timing and Quality of Deliberations Proponents of the joint budget resolution argue that it would enhance the dialogue about budget priorities and make it easier for the public to apportion responsibility for budget outcomes. Proponents argue that under the current system, while early agreements are always possible, the parties are not compelled to engage in real bargaining until late in the process. In contrast, requiring that the President sign the budget resolution could force the key actors to confront their disagreements early on in the process. Clearly one result might be an early veto and an impasse between the branches. But proponents of the joint resolution approach argue that, under these conditions, an impasse would have emerged eventually anyway, and it is advantageous to face such difficulties early on. A joint resolution also would make more clear that budgeting is a shared responsibility and that the blame for gridlock should be shared. Opponents of the joint budget resolution argue that it would not enhance deliberation or inter-branch cooperation. First, negotiations on the budget often do not begin early in the year because of the complexity of the issues. In general, the timing and quality of negotiations on the budget do not depend on budget procedures, but on the degree of consensus about priorities between the key actors in Congress and the executive branch. If such a consensus exists, |