action on the budget, in part by reducing the frequency of possible congressionalpresidential conflict.

Opponents, however, point out potential shortcomings to each of these approaches. Simply stretching out deadlines, they contend, would not, by itself, alter past budgetary behavior. The potential for missed target dates attributable to protracted negotiations between the President and Congress, or between the House and Senate would still be present. Opponents of the split session approach maintain that it implies a significant change in congressional behavior since it posits the unlikely prospect that some committees would be virtually dormant every other year. They also point out that a separate session for oversight and authorizations divorced from actual appropriations could lack impact. Overall, they contend that with budgetary decisions expected to last two years, the stakes could be raised to a level that would itself contribute to delays.

One of the chief premises upon which the benefits of biennial budgeting are based is a recognition that much Federal budgeting is incremental in nature, and that there is no need to revisit each and every decision annually. Supporters contend that the institution of a biennial budget cycle would therefore result in not only significant workload savings within Congress, but also greater stability and predictability to facilitate planning by Federal agencies.

The most common concern voiced by critics of biennial budgeting is the reliability of budget projections. Estimates for biennial budgets must take into account actions which are as long as three years in the future. Critics contend that locking agencies into such a lengthy planning horizon would make the system subject not only to misestimates but also to deliberately inflated estimates. Even careful and well intentioned estimates could well prove insufficient to such a task. The result could be a system that is biennial in name only. If off-year adjustments are substantial, the workload savings promised by a biennial cycle could prove illusory.

Issues raised by reintroducing a deadline for committees to report authorizing legislation

Also proposed as part of a reform agenda, and supported by the House Republican Conference as part of its alternative to the House Rules package, is the reintroduction of a deadline for reporting authorizing legislation. A similar deadline (May 15) was provided for in the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, but was eliminated in the revision of the Act by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.

Supporters contend that this reform could potentially help to streamline the congressional workload by providing for the consideration of authorizing legislation and appropriations in two distinct periods, particularly if current restrictions on the

timing of consideration of appropriations bills were kept. Proponents also assert that by imposing such a deadline early in the year Congress would augment the existing distinction between authorizations and appropriations, as well as reinforce the implicit requirement in House and Senate rules that appropriations be considered prior to appropriations (Rule XXI, clause 2(a) in the House and Rule XVI in the Senate).

Those opposed to this reform point out that this was a part of the budget process from 1975 to 1985, and that it tended to create a bottleneck of legislation that made it difficult to complete floor action on authorizing measures prior to consideration of appropriation bills. They also argue that since House and Senate rules implicitly require authorizations to be considered prior to appropriations, the specifying of a calendar date for reporting authorizations is either superfluous or counter-productive. Limiting the period in which authorizations can come to the floor may have a negative impact on the ability of Congress to enact them, and thereby potentially increase the volume of unauthorized appropriations.

Issues raised by Sunset Legislation

Many people believe that too many Federal programs operate on automatic pilot; that once established they never die, contributing to waste in the Federal budget. One proposal therefore, is requiring a periodic review of each program. These proposals are generally intended to limit the duration of programs, typically to 10 years, unless Congress takes positive action to reauthorize them. Despite the longer time horizon, such proposals are similar to zero-based budgeting as discussed in the mid and late 1970s. These were intended to require that every dollar of spending for Federal programs be justified annually, rather than allow perpetual programs to be modified by periodic, incremental decisions.

Critics of these reforms argue that 10 years, or any fixed period, is an arbitrary length of time, and that it doesn't guarantee that programs will be addressed in a timely manner, or that they will be thoroughly examined when they are. They point out that experience with zero-based budgeting during the Carter Administration generated a great deal of paperwork, but not much else. Additionally, any sunset process which included a provision for the automatic termination of programs could result in unintended terminations as a consequence of committee inaction or filibuster in the Senate. This would essentially allow a minority to cancel a program that had already been enacted by a majority.

Supporters of these proposals maintain that any fixed duration for programs would be a maximum, and that nothing would prevent Congress from establishing a shorter period for particular programs, or from making interim examinations or judgements. Further, they contend that much of he negative experience with zerobased budgeting was due to the short time horizon. By lengthening the time

horizon, Congress could spread out the process and the workload so that oversight and review would be less likely to be overload the capabilities of Congress.

A more specific issue raised by the enactment of sunset legislation is its application. Should it apply only to the authorizations for specific programs, or should it apply more broadly, to laws establishing Federal Departments or Agencies, to entitlements, to tax expenditures, or even to all laws? If a major goal of sunset legislation is to have budgetary impact, exempting entitlements or tax expenditures would weaken that impact considerably. On the other hand, a broad application may inhibit the ability of Federal entities, or even private sector businesses, to plan adequately.

Also unclear is just what termination of a program under sunset legislation would mean. Under current rules and practices, funds provided for an unauthorized program or agency can be spent, would the same apply under sunset, or would the failure of Congress to reauthorize a program effectively be a limitation on spending?

Questions

1. Are there situations where authorizations are crowded out by appropriations? Would this be improved by setting aside a period each year when appropriations bills could not be considered? Would this situation be improved by establishing a two-year cycle for appropriations?

2. Is the primary goal of biennial budgeting to assist longer term planning, both in Congress and in agencies which spend Federal funds, or to reduce the congressional workload?

3. Is it equally important to consider two-year budget resolutions and two-year appropriations?

4. Would a two-year budget resolution need stronger enforcement mechanisms?

5. Would a two-year budget resolution need to be a joint resolution in order to more effectively involve the President?

6. How far should the application of sunset legislation go? Should it cover all laws? Should it cover tax laws? Should it cover entitlements? Should it cover only explicit authorizations of appropriations?

7. Should sunset legislation provide for the automatic termination of programs which are not reauthorized? Would sunset legislation without provision for the automatic termination of programs lack the necessary impact to be effective?

BUDGET COMMITTEE STRUCTURE: SOME OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

The House and Senate Budget Committees were established by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344). Central to that Act was a concurrent budget resolution, which contains aggregate spending and revenue levels, functional allocations of spending, and (optionally) reconciliation instructions. The two budget committees have responsibility for crafting the budget resolution and monitoring the budgetary effects of legislation.

Some lawmakers and commentators perceive shortcomings in the current budget system, especially its complexity and its time-consuming nature. Some restructuring of budget operations may be in order to achieve greater coherence, more simplification, and time-saving. Four suggestions that involve the Budget Committees are worth noting in this regard: creation of a Joint Budget Committee, recasting the Budget Committees as "leadership panels," returning, in some respects, to the pre-1974 budget era, and enhancing the authority of the budget panels.

Proposed Changes in Budget Committee Structure

Congressional history reveals that efforts to restructure Congress' committee system are fraught with perils. Jurisdiction means power and influence, and lawmakers are often reluctant to move "turf' around on the theory that committee realignment will promote better policies and policymaking. Hence, proposals to restructure the House and Senate Budget Committees may encounter resistance because of lawmakers' concern about tampering with committees.

A. Joint Budget Committee

Certain Members have proposed that Congress establish a Joint Budget Committee to replace separate budget panels in each chamber. This recommendation has the virtues of simplifying the budget process and saving Members' time, because the same concurrent budget resolution would be submitted to each house. As a result, conference committee negotiations on the budget resolution may be expedited as the bicameral negotiating panels deal with discrete floor amendments in bicameral disagreement rather than two separate budget packages. In short, a Joint Budget Committee may expedite Congress' ability to get a budget resolution adopted in a timely manner.

Another advantage that might be associated with a Joint Budget Committee is its "elite" membership. To be sure, questions about the size and composition of the Joint Committee will have to be worked out. But if the joint

panel was viewed as leadership-oriented, then its power and influence could be maximized with the result that the Joint Committee might more easily enforce the budget resolution.

Finally, a Joint Budget Committee might augment Congress' fiscal influence in dealing with the executive branch as more House-Senate cooperation strengthens the legislative branch's bargaining opportunities with the executive. At a minimum, a Joint Budget Committee would reduce duplicative hearings and redundant staff work and briefings.

Some disadvantages may be associated with the Joint Budget Committee idea. If the membership of the panel is skewed toward representatives of the tax and appropriations panel, then clashes with authorizers might be exacerbated. Another potential problem involves House-Senate differences. The two chambers are fundamentally unlike in many respects: customs, rules, and procedures, for example. The House and Senate, too, are subject to different electoral time frames and exhibit differences in the capacity of their membership to be policy specialists or policy generalists. These and other types of dissimilarities, which can produce friction between the chambers, may make more difficult the work of a Joint Budget Committee.

B. Reconstitute the Budget Panels as "Leadership Committees"

Party leaders are fundamental actors in contemporary budgeting. They influence who is assigned to the budget panels, (the Majority Leader and Minority Leader in the House are ex officio members of the Budget Committee), monitor fiscal activities, and mobilize winning coalitions on the floor. It may be time to formally recognize what lawmakers informally understand: in this era of fiscal austerity and concern about national priorities, budgeting is central to the influence of party leaders. In brief, it may be worth granting the Speaker and House Minority Leader and the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader of the Senate the right to name the leaders and members of the two budget committees, subject to caucus or conference approval.

From its inception, the House Budget Committee has been more partisan than its Senate counterpart. Part of the explanation for this difference involves the ideological composition of the House panel compared to the Senate panel. (The House panel also operates with a rotational principle, 6-year limit of service, and with representation from other named standing committees. The Senate Budget Committee is a permanent assignment for Senators.) During its early history, the two panels largely accommodated the fiscal requests of other standing committees. Perhaps the newness of the budget process encouraged this general attitude.