that “lands allotted to members and freedmen [of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes] shall not be affected by any deed, debt, or obligation of any character contracted prior to the time at which said land may be alienated under this Act, nor shall said lands be sold except (§ 16) after issuance of patent." To this the plaintiff replies that, as Emmer Sisney was a white woman, this prohibition against sale by her had been repealed by the act of April 21, 1904 (c. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 204) which provides that "all restrictions upon the alienation of lands of all, allottees of either of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians who are not of Indian blood : hereby removed." are, That statute did not authorize white members of the tribe to sell future acquired property, but did permit nonIndian allottees to sell what had been actually assigned to them in severalty. (Cf. 34 Stat., § 19, p. 144.) The distinction between a member and an allottee is not verbal but was made in recognition of a definite policy in reference to these lands. The Revised Statutes (§ 2116) declare that no conveyance from an Indian tribe shall be of any validity in law or in equity unless authorized by treaty. As the tribe could not sell, neither could the individual members, for they had neither an undivided interest in the tribal land nor vendible interest in any particular tract. Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U. S. 640. But in pursuance of the legislation following the Report of the Dawes Commission (Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665), provision was made for dividing and distributing the tribal land in severalty among the members of the tribe. But, recognizing the probability of improvident and hasty sales being made, Congress provided that the land could not be sold until after the patent had actually issued, and even then only one-quarter could be sold in one year, three-quarters in three years, and the balance in five years. The act of 1904, relied on by plaintiff, removed some of the re strictions and permitted those members of the tribe, who were not of Indian blood, to sell land after it had been actually allotted in severalty. But it did not permit even a non-Indian to sell a mere float or expectancy, since he would not likely receive the full value of what thereafter might be patented to him. The plaintiff further contends that ever if the deed was inoperative when made, yet as Emmer Sisney was a white woman she had the capacity of a white person of full age to convey an expectancy, so that when she acquired title in 1906 it inured to the benefit of Franklin and Apple, as the grantees under the deed of 1905. But the trouble with this contention is that Emmer Sisney cannot be treated as a white woman, for the purpose of conveying an expectancy, and an Indian for the purpose of securing an allotment. When she applied to be enrolled as a citizen of the Choctaw Nation she, ipso facto, subjected herself to the restriction upon alienation of Indian land imposed upon all members of the tribe. All who dealt with her, as to land thereafter allotted to her, were charged with knowledge that the act of 1902 declared that such land should not be affected by any contract made before allotment. The deed of 1905 was therefore a nullity and did not estop her or her assigns from showing that it had been made in direct violation of the statute. For, to permit an Indian's deed, void when made, to operate as a conveyance of title to lands subsequently allotted, would be to disregard the express language of the statute and defeat the protective purposes for which the law was passed. Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U. S. 613, 624. The result is not changed by the provision of § 642 of Mansfield's Digest that 'if a person, without title, shall convey real estate and subsequently acquire title the legal or equitable estate afterwards acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee as if the estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance.' The chapter of Mansfield's Digest of Arkansas Law containing this section was extended (32 Stat. 841) to the Indian Territory "so far as the same may be applicable and not inconsistent with any law of Congress." It has no effect here because it is inconsistent with the act of 1902 which declared that Indian land should not be affected by a deed made before patent. The deed to Franklin having been made before allotment was void, and the judgment is Affirmed. TEVIS v. RYAN. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA. No. 189. Argued January 23, 26, 1914.-Decided April 6, 1914. Covenants in a contract between individuals who control a corporation, in regard to disposition of its outstanding stock, construed in this case to import a personal responsibility on the parties and not on the corporation. In this case, the cause of action being not on the contract alone, but also upon alleged fraudulent conduct, evidence as to oral declarations of the defendant was admissible to show the misrepresentations alleged as basis for the claim of fraudulent inducement to make the contract and fraudulent use of the property entrusted to the defendant thereunder. Notice to either of joint contractors is notice to both. A written paper offered and admitted as evidence of a demand and not objected to as coming too late is not inadmissible because it contains other matter. The proper course for the party objecting is to ask an instruction limiting the effect of the paper to the demand or else to base the objection on its coming too late. A contract, providing that in a specified contingency the interest of the parties surrendering control to the other party shall revest in them in the same proportion and ratio as they held on the making of the contract, was properly construed as contemplating that VOL. CCXXXIII-18 Statement of the Case. 233 U.S. the surrendering parties be restored to the same proportionate interest in the property as they held prior to the making of the agreement. In affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona which has been reduced by remittitur, this court does not necessarily hold that the rulings of the court below were indubitably correct, and it also takes into consideration Rev. Stat. Arizona 1901, par. 1588, providing in substance that the trial court shall not be reversed for want of form if there is sufficient matter of substance in the record to enable the Supreme Court to decide the case upon the merits, and that excessive damages may be remitted pending the appeal. This court is not lightly disposed to disturb the decision of a territorial Supreme Court turning, as it does in this case, largely upon local practice. 13 Arizona, 282, affirmed. THIS action was brought by defendants in error against Tevis and McKittrick, two of the plaintiffs in error, in a district court of one of the counties of the then Territory of Arizona. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiffs below for $132,000. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the Territory held that because of error affecting the amount of the damages, $64,564.63 of the verdict ought to be remitted, and that upon the filing of a remittitur judgment should be entered in favor of plaintiffs below for the remaining sum of $67,435.37. 13 Arizona, 120. Both parties filed petitions for a rehearing, with the result that the court adhered to its former view. 13 Arizona, 282. Plaintiffs having filed the remittitur, judgment was entered in their favor for the last mentioned sum, and the present writ of error was sued out. The controversy arises out of the following transactions. In the year 1902 plaintiffs and defendants were stockholders in an Arizona corporation known as the Turquoise Copper Mining & Smelting Company, which owned mining properties in Cochise County, Arizona. The stock consisted of 100,000 shares, of the par value of $10 each, of which the Ryans together owned four 233 U.S. Statement of the Case. sevenths and Tevis and McKittrick owned three-sevenths. The Ryans were in control of the board of directors. About $160,000 had been expended towards the development of the mines, and this had been contributed by the respective parties in proportion to their holdings of stock, plaintiffs having contributed about $90,000, defendants about $70,000. One Bryant had secured a judgment and levied execution upon the property of the company, under which the mines had been sold on July 30, 1902, to one McPherson, subject to redemption on or before January 31, 1903. In this situation of affairs plaintiffs met the defendant McKittrick in Wilcox, Arizona, on November 29, 1902, and, after some negotiation, a written contract was drawn up and by them signed. Defendant Tevis was not present at this meeting, and the agreement was made contingent upon his signing, as he did a few days later. It reads as follows: "This agreement, made and entered into this 29th day of November, 1902, by and between W. S. Tevis and W. H. McKittrick, of Bakersfield, California, parties of the first part, and Jepp Ryan, T. C. Ryan, and E. B. Ryan, of Leavenworth, Kansas, parties of the second part, "Witnesseth: That, whereas, the parties above mentioned represent all the stock in the Turquoise Copper Mining and Smelting Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Territory of Arizona, and doing business in Cochise County, Arizona, and "Whereas, the parties of the first part now own and control three-sevenths of the capital stock of the said corporation, and the parties of the second part foursevenths of the capital stock thereof; and "Whereas, the parties of the first part are desirous of securing the controlling interest of the said capital stock of the said corporation, and thereby obtain the full management of the affairs of the said corporation; "Now, therefore, in consideration of, that the capital |