effect allowed in this case by the charge in the trial court, affirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State, would be to allow a special contract to have binding force and effect though made in violation of the filed schedules which were to be equally observed by the shipper and carrier. If oral agreements of this character can be sustained then the door is open to all manner of special contracts, departing from the schedules and rates filed with the Commission. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Carl, supra, p. 652. To maintain the supremacy of such oral agreements would defeat the primary purposes of the Interstate Commerce Act, so often affirmed in the decisions of this court, which are to require equal treatment of all shippers and the charging of but one rate to all, and that the one filed as required by the act. The Supreme Court of the State in this case affirmed the instruction of the trial court upon which the case was given to the jury and held that the oral contract was binding unless it was affirmatively shown that the written agreement, based upon the filed schedules, was brought to the knowledge of the shipper and its terms assented to by him. This ruling ignored the terms of shipment set forth in the schedules and permitted recovery upon the contract made in violation thereof in a case where there was no proof that there was an attempt to violate the published rates by a fraudulent agreement showing rebating or false billing of the property, and no circumstances which would take the case out of the rulings heretofore made by this court as to the binding effect of such filed schedules and the duty of the shipper to take notice of the terms of such rates and the obligation to be bound thereby in the absence of the exceptional circumstances to which we have referred. It follows that the ruling of the state court affirmed in the Supreme Court deprived the plaintiff in error of rights secured by the Federal statute, when properly Opinion of the Court. 233 U. S. construed, which were set up and claimed in the state court. Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissents. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY v. MOORE. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA. No. 451. Argued February 26, 1914. Decided April 6, 1914. Decided on authority of the preceding case. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. S. T. Bledsoe, with whom Mr. J. R. Cottingham and Mr. George M. Green were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.1 Mr. John B. Daish, with whom Mr. H. H. Smith and Mr. J. W. Beller were on the brief, for defendant in error.1 MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court. The defendants in error brought suit in the District Court of Lincoln County, Oklahoma, against the plaintiff in error for damages, alleging that they were the owners of a certain race horse which had been shipped by 1 Argued simultaneously with Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Robinson; for abstracts of arguments, see ante, p. 173. 233 U.S. Opinion of the Court. them over the railroad of the plaintiff in error from Kansas City, Missouri, to Lawrence, Kansas, and which had been injured in transit. There was a verdict and judgment for the defendants in error, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (36 Oklahoma, 433). It appears that the horse, for the injury to which this suit was brought, was a part of the shipment under which the horse in the previous case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Robinson, just decided, ante, p. 173, was carried as therein stated, and that the facts relating to the shipment and cause of injury set forth in the present case are the same as those in the Robinson Case. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, after noticing the fact that, except as to the value of the animals, the extent of their injuries and the resulting damages, the two cases were identical in every material feature, followed the Robinson Case. The present case therefore is controlled by the decision in the Robinson Case, and from what we have there said it follows that the judgment here under review must be reversed. Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissents. Syllabus. 233 U.S. MYERS v. PITTSBURGH COAL COMPANY. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT. No. 816. Argued February 27, 1914.-Decided April 6, 1914. The duty of the master to use reasonable diligence to provide a safe place for the employés to work is a continuing one which is discharged only when he provides and maintains a place of that character. Where workmen are engaged in a hazardous occupation, such as underground mining, it is the duty of the master to exercise reasonable care for their safety, and not to expose them to injury by use of dangerous appliances or unsafe places to work, when such appliances and places can, by the exercise of due care, be made reasonably safe. Where, on the evidence, reasonable men might well find that a man, found in a mangled and dying condition in a mine on a track beneath an overhead wire, was killed by negligence, and it cannot be said that no such conclusion could be reached on the testimony, it is not error to submit the question to the jury; and where, as in this case, the testimony can fairly support the verdict, it should not be set aside. Where the court clearly instructed the jury that the defendant mineowner was not liable in case the haulage system alleged to have caused the accident was in charge of a person for whose conduct the owner was not responsible under the law, and that the owner was only liable in case that system was under charge of a person for whose conduct the owner was responsible, the charge in this respect is not unfavorable to the owner and affords no ground for reversal. It is not error for the court to refuse to affirm a particular and immaterial point in regard to the alleged negligence of the defendant when it would only serve to possibly confuse the jury and the point has already been covered by the charge. Where the court was not requested to charge that the employé had assumed the risk of want of proper appliances, and no exception was taken to the failure to charge as to assumption of risk, the appellate court is not called on to consider that question. The trial court having entered judgment on a verdict for plaintiff and the Circuit Court of Appeals having reversed, and without remanding or directing a new trial, ordered judgment for defend 233 U.S. Argument for Respondent. ant, this court, finding there was no reversible error in the conduct of the trial, reverses the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals and affirms the judgment of the trial court and remands the case to the District Court which has succeeded to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court which tried the case. 203 Fed. Rep. 221, reversed. THE facts, which involve the validity of a verdict for death of an employé claimed to have been occasioned by the negligence of the master, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles K. Robinson, with whom Mr. Edward C. Goodwin and Mr. Frank H. Kennedy were on the brief, for petitioner. Mr. Don Rose, with whom Mr. Charles Marshall Johnston was on the brief, for respondent: There was no evidence from which the jury should be permitted to find what caused Myers' death. There was no negligence on the part of defendant. There was not failure to provide adequate light at a dangerous place. It was not a customary or usual practice in the business to have lights at switches at the time of the accident in any mine. The employer is bound to furnish machinery, appliances and equipment that are of ordinary character and reasonable safety, and the fact that they are of ordinary character is the conclusive test of their reasonable safety. Titus v. Railroad Co., 136 Pa. St. 618, 626; Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. St. 348; Reese v. Hershey, 163 Pa. St. 253, 257; Keenan v. Waters, 181 Pa. St. 247; Higgins v. Fanning & Co., 195 Pa. St. 599, 602; Service v. Shoneman, 196 Pa. St. 63; McCarthy v. Shoneman, 198 Pa. St. 568; Boop v. Lumber Co., 212 Pa. St. 525; Fick v. Jackson, 3 Pa. Sup. Ct. 378; Washington &c. R. R. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554; Southern Pac. Ry. v. Seley, 152 U. S. 145, 151; Kilpatrick v. Railroad, 121 Fed. Rep. 11; Law v. |