modes of procedure-some according to the course of the common law; some under the pleadings and practice of the courts of chancery in England; some under forms borrowed from the French law; many under special laws of the United States framed for the execution of treaties; and many more so anomalous that it would not be easy to reduce them to any classification. And the tribunal itself, though it was absolutely supreme, within the limits of its powers, was bounded and circumscribed in its jurisdiction by the Constitution and by Acts of Congress, which it was necessary constantly to regard. Let it be remembered, also, for just now we may be in some danger of forgetting it, that questions of jurisdiction were questions of power as between the United States and the several States. The practice of the Court therefore involved not merely the orderly and convenient conduct of this vastly diversified business, drawn from a territory so vast, but questions of constitutional law, running deep into the framework of our complicated political system. Upon this entire subject the Chief Justice was vigilant, steady, and thoroughly informed. Doubtless it would be the tendency of most second-rate minds, and of not a few first-rate minds, to press such a jurisdiction out to its extremest limits, and occasionally beyond them; while for timid men, or for those who might come to that Bench with formed prejudices, the opposite danger would be imminent. Perhaps I may be permitted to say that, though on the only important occasions on which I had the misfortune to differ with the Chief Justice on such points, I thought he and they who agreed with him carried the powers of the Court too far, yet, speaking for myself, I am quite sure he fell into neither of these extremes. The great powers intrusted to the Court by the Constitution and laws of his country he steadily and firmly upheld and administered; and, so far as I know, he showed no disposition to exceed them. "I have already adverted to the fact that his physical infirmities rendered it difficult for him to write a large proportion of the opinions of the Court. But my own impression is that this was not the only reason why he was thus abstinent. He was as absolutely free from the slightest trace of vanity and self-conceit as any man I ever knew. He was aware that many of his associates were ambitious of doing this conspicuous part of their joint labor. The preservation of the harmony of the members of the Court, and of their good-will to himself, was always in his mind. And I have not the least doubt that these considerations often influenced him to request others to prepare opinions, which he could and otherwise would have written. As it was, he has recorded many which are important, some which are very important. This does not seem to me to be the occasion to specify, still less to criticize them. They are all characterized by that purity of style and clearness of thought which marked whatever he wrote or spoke; and some of them must always be known and recurred to as masterly discussions of their subjects. "It is one of the favors which the providence of God has bestowed on our once happy country, that for the period of sixty-three years this great office has been filled by only two persons, each of whom has retained, to extreme old age, his great and useful qualities and powers. The stability, uniformity, and completeness of our national jurisprudence are in no small degree attributable to this act. The last of them has now gone. God grant that there may be found a successor true to the Constitution, able to expound and willing to apply it to the portentous questions which the passions of men have made." END OF THE MEMOIR. APPENDIX. Supreme Court of the United States, December Term, 1856. Dred Scott, Plaintiff in Error, vs. John F. A. Sanford. Mr. Chief-Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the Court: This case has been twice argued. After the argument at the last Term, differences of opinion were found to exist among the members of the Court; and, as the questions in controversy are of the highest importance, and the Court was at that time much pressed by the ordinary business of the term, it was deemed advisable to continue the case, and direct a re-argument on some of the points, in order that we might have an opportunity of giving to the whole subject a more deliberate consideration. It has accordingly been again argued by counsel, and considered by the Court; and I now proceed to deliver its opinion. There are two leading questions presented by the record: 1. Had the Circuit Court of the United States jurisdiction to hear and determine the case between these parties? And, 2. If it had jurisdiction, is the judgment it has given erroneous or not? The plaintiff in error, who was also the plaintiff in the Court below, was, with his wife and children, held as slaves by the defendant in the State of Missouri; and he brought this action in the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, to assert the title of himself and his family to freedom. The declaration is in the form usually adopted in that State to try questions of this description, and contains the averment necessary to give the Court jurisdiction; that he and the defendant are citizens of different States—that is, that he is a citizen of Missouri, and the defendant a citizen of New York. The defendant pleaded in abatement to the jurisdiction of the Court, that the plaintiff was not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, being a negro of African descent, whose ancestors were of pure African blood, and who were brought into this country and sold as slaves. To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the defendant joined in demurrer. The Court overruled the plea, and gave judgment that the defendant should answer over. And he therefore put in sundry pleas in bar, upon which issues were joined; and at the trial the verdict and judgment were in his favor. Whereupon the plaintiff brought this writ of error. Before we speak of the pleas in bar, it will be proper to dispose of the questions which have arisen on the plea in abatement. That plea denies the right of the plaintiff to sue in a court of the United States, for the reasons therein stated. If the question raised by it is legally before us, and the Court should be of opinion that the facts stated in it disqualify the plaintiff from becoming a citizen, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, then the judg ment of the Circuit Court is erroneous, and must be reversed. It is suggested, however, that this plea is not before us; and that, as the judgment in the court below on this plea was in favor of the plaintiff, he does not seek to reverse it, or bring it before the Court for revision by his writ of error; and also that the defendant waved this defence by pleading over, and thereby admitted the jurisdiction of the Court. But, in making this objection, we think the peculiar and limited jurisdiction of courts of the United States has not been adverted to. This peculiar and limited jurisdiction has made it necessary, in these courts, to adopt different rules and principles of pleading, so far as jurisdiction is concerned, from those which regulate courts of common law in England, and in the different States of the Union which have adopted the common law rules. In these last-mentioned courts, where their character and rank are analogous to that of a Circuit Court of the United States,-in other words, where they are what the law terms courts of general jurisdiction, they are presumed to have jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears. No averment in the pleadings of the plaintiff is necessary in order to give jurisdiction. If the defendant objects to it, he must plead it specially; and unless the fact on which he |