is, peaceable secession would have been impossible, even if the right to secede at pleasure had been expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States to each State. The common interests of all the States had become too interdependent and identified, since the establishment of the Federal Government, to admit of severance without disasters worse than the bloodiest war in defence of the Union. But, nevertheless, no publicist, judging by the practices of nations, can doubt that, in the forum of political ethics, the slave States were justified in their course. And every publicist knows that it is not the party which fires the first shot that is responsible for the war, but the party which makes war necessary. "Neither is the opinion of some of the schoolmen to be received," says Lord Bacon, “that a war cannot justly be made but upon a precedent injury or provocation. For there is no question but a just fear of an imminent danger, though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of war."

Mr. Lincoln had the misfortune to be inaugurated President of a divided country, without any hope of amicable adjustment. He had grave and difficult official responsibilities laid upon him, besides those which ordinarily belong to the office of President. He was President of a Government of only expressly granted powers under a written Constitution. exercise any other powers would be usurpation. No motive of patriotism could rescue the acts from a

To

breach of the Constitution. The very whisperings of one's heart, placed in such circumstances, are likely to be deceitful. For it may well be doubted, whether the worst of usurpers and tyrants do not believe that they are moved only by a regard to the welfare of their country. Even the Earl of Strafford, on his trial for treason, defended his usurpations, on the ground that they were done for the welfare of the people. "Salus populi," said he, "suprema lex; nay, in cases of extremity, even above acts of Parliament."

President Lincoln and his Cabinet were from the first in great alarm, and at once began to lean for support on the military arm of Lieutenant-General Scott. Suspecting, very naturally, that Maryland sympathized with her sister slave States, every citizen of the State was imagined to be engaged in plots against the Federal Government. Hence it was that, on the 25th of May, 1861, John Merryman, a citizen of Baltimore County, in the State of Maryland, was arrested by a military force, acting under orders of a Major-General of the United States Army commanding in the State of Pennsylvania, and was committed to the custody of the General commanding Fort McHenry, within the district of Maryland. On the 26th of May, 1861, a writ of habeas corpus was issued, upon the petition of Merryman, by Chief-Justice Taney, sitting at chambers, directed to the commandant of the Fort, commanding him to produce the body of the petitioner

before the Chief Justice, in Baltimore City, on the 27th of May, 1861. On that day, the writ was returned

served," and the officer to whom it was directed declined to produce the petitioner, giving as his excuse the following reasons:

1. That the petitioner was arrested by the orders of the Major-General commanding in Pennsylvania, upon the charge of treason in being publicly associated with and holding a commission as lieutenant in a company having in their possession arms belonging to the United States, and avowing his purpose of armed hostility against the Government.

2. That he (the officer holding the prisoner in custody) was duly authorized by the President of the United States, in such cases, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety.

The Chief Justice immediately passed the following order:

"Ordered, That an attachment forthwith issue against General George Cadwalader for a contempt, in refusing to produce the body of John Merryman, according to the command of the writ of habeas corpus returnable and returned before me to-day, and that said attachment be returned before me at twelve o'clock to-morrow, at the room of the Circuit Court. Monday, May 27, 1861. R. B. TANEY."

The attachment was issued as ordered.

At twelve o'clock on the 28th of May, 1861, the

Chief Justice again took his seat on the Bench, and called for the Marshal's return to the writ of attachment. It was as follows:

"I hereby certify to the Honorable Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, that, by virtue of the within writ of attachment to me directed on the 27th day of May, 1861, I proceeded, on this 28th day of May, 1861, to Fort McHenry, for the purpose of serving the said writ. I sent in my name at the outer gate; the messenger returned with the reply, 'that there was no answer to my card,' and therefore could not serve the writ, as I was commanded. I was not permitted to enter the gate. So answers WASHINGTON BONIFANT,

U. S. Marshal for the District of Maryland."

After the Marshal's return was read, the Chief Justice said that the Marshal had the power to summon the posse comitatus to aid him in seizing and bringing before the Court the party named in the attachment, who would, when so brought in, be liable to punishment by fine and imprisonment; but where, as in this case, the power refusing obedience was so notoriously superior to any the Marshal could command, he held that officer excused from doing anything more than he had done.

After expressing his views of the law of the case in general but very decided terms, he said that he should cause his written opinion, when filed, and all the pro

ceedings, to be laid before the President, in order that he might perform his constitutional duty, to enforce the laws by securing obedience to the process of the United States.

In a day or two afterwards, the Chief Justice put his opinion in writing, and filed it in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.

After stating the facts of the case, the Chief Justice, in the written opinion, says: "As the case comes before me, therefore, I understand that the President not only claims the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus at his discretion, but to delegate that discretionary power to a military officer, and to leave it to him to determine whether he will or will not obey judicial process that may be served upon him. No official notice has been given to the courts of justice, or to the public, by proclamation or otherwise, that the President claimed this power, and had exercised it in the manner stated in the return. And I certainly listened to it with some surprise, for I had supposed it to be one of those points of constitutional law upon which there was no difference of opinion, and that it was admitted on all hands that the privilege of the writ could not be suspended except by act of Congress.'

The Chief Justice then inquires into the law of habeas corpus in England, in order to show what must be the law in our country, which inherited, and endeavored to improve the guarantees of personal