one pound (except the salaries of officers) brought against the union; and, when any such bill has been allowed, &c., a note of such allowance shall be made upon the face of the bill before the amount is paid. Art. 209. The master shall not, except in case of necessity, purchase or procure any articles for the use of the workhouse, &c., nor pay any monies on account of the workhouse, or of the union, without the authority of the guardians, &c.

The learned Judge asked the jury, first, whether the defendant knowingly supplied the chaff for the use of the poor in the workhouse, and, secondly, whether he supplied it for his own profit. He told them that if the defendant really believed that he was furnishing the chaff to the master of the work house for his own personal use, they must find a verdict for the defendant: that, as to the suggestion that the master had no power to enter into such a contract, he did not think that was material; it was almost impossible that the board, who met but once a week, could make all the contracts; the master might make them in the first instance, and submit them to the board. The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiffs,

Overend now moved to arrest the judgment, or for a new trial. This is an action for an offence against a penal statute, which must be laid to be done, and be tried, where the offence was committed: 31 Eliz. c. 5, s. 2, and 21 Jac. 1, c. 4, s. 2. [Wilde, B.-The venue was originally laid in the proper county.] The 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 22, after reciting that "unnecessary delay and expense is sometimes occasioned by the trial of local actions in the county where the cause of action has arisen," enacts" that in any action depending in any of the said superior Courts the venue in which is by law local," the Court or a Judge may order a suggestion to be entered that the trial may be had in another county.

1861.

GREENHOW

v.

PARKER.

1861.

GREENHOW

v.

PARKER.

This enactment applies only to actions which are local at common law, such as actions for trespasses to real property. -Secondly, the learned Judge misdirected the jury in leading them to believe that the master may have had authority to buy the chaff, which is contrary to Article 209; and by Article 85, it is clear that nobody could have had authority to pay the defendant without the allowance of the board of guardians.

POLLOCK, C. B.-We think that the ruling of the learned Judge was correct. The 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 22, empowers the Court or a Judge to order a suggestion to be entered "in any action depending in any of the superior Courts, the venue in which is by law local." This action comes within the words of the section. As to the other point, the language of the 55 Geo. 3, c. 137, s. 6, is very general; and I agree with the learned Judge who tried the cause that a guardian who, for profit, supplies goods to the poor is liable to the penalty, whether the person who contracts with him is authorized to do so or unauthorized. Therefore there will be no rule.

MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. I should regret it if we were obliged to hold the first objection valid; but the language of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 22, is clear.

BRAMWELL, B.-I agree that there ought to be no rule. As to the first point, the 21 Jac. 1, c. 4, s. 2, is out of the question, because it does not extend to any offence on any penal statute passed subsequently: Rex v. Gaul (a), Anonymous (b). The 31 Eliz. c. 5, s. 2, provides that "the offence against any penal statute shall not be laid to be done in any other county but where the contract or other matter alleged to (a) 1 Salk. 372. (b) 5 Mod. 425.

be the offence was in truth done." Here the offence was not laid to be done in any other county than where the supply took place. The statute goes on to provide that in any such action the defendant may traverse that the offence was not committed in the county where the same is alleged. Now if the statute directed that the trial should take place where the offence was committed, it would seem that the appropriate mode by which a defendant should avail himself of his privilege would be, not by traversing the allegation, but by moving in arrest of judgment, on the ground that, by law, the trial ought to take place where the offence was committed. Mr. Overend contends that the statute is express that the trial shall take place in such county; that, however, is not expressly enacted-it is only an incidental consequence. When, therefore, we hold that the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 22, authorized us to order a trial to be had in another county, we do not decide that a particular statute is repealed by a subsequent general Act, because the right of the defendant to a trial in the county of Westmoreland is one which is given him by the general law of the land. This is an action in which the venue is, by law, local, and therefore the Judge had power to order the trial to be had in another county:

Rule refused.

1861.

GREENHOW

V.

PARKER.

ΑΝ

INDEX

TO THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS.