§ 12. It will be shown hereafter that there are certain limits to the conditions which the captor may impose on the release of prisoners of war, and to the stipulations which an officer is authorised to enter into, either for himself or for his troops. The captor may impose the condition that the prisoners shall not take up arms against him, either for a limited period or during the war; but he cannot require them to renounce for ever the right to bear arms against him; nor can they, on their part, enter into any engagements inconsistent with their character and duties as citizens and subjects. Such engagements made by them would not be binding upon their sovereign or State. The reason of this limitation is obvious: the captor has the absolute right to keep his prisoners in confinement till the termination of the war; but on the conclusion of peace he would no longer have any reasons for detaining them. They, therefore, have the right to stipulate for their conduct during that period, but not beyond the time when they would have been released had no agreement been entered into. Nor can the captor generally impose conditions which extend beyond the period when the prisoners would necessarily be entitled to their liberty. Beyond this, their services are due to, and at the disposition of, the State to which they owe allegiance, and they have no right to limit them by contracts with a foreign power.1

13. By the modern usage of nations, commissaries are permitted to reside in the respective belligerent countries, for the purpose of negotiating and carrying into effect the necessary arrangements for the support, as well as the release and exchange of prisoners of war, but difficulties sometimes occur in arranging the terms of such agreements, and it not unfrequently happens that a considerable length of time will elapse after their capture before they can be exchanged or released. Moreover, by the conditions of their parole, they are sometimes required to remain in the captor's country for a fixed term after their release. During these periods they must be subsisted either by the captor or by their own Government, and it sometimes becomes a question to which this duty properly belongs.2

1 Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. ii. cap. iii. § 5; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. i. tit. iii. § 32.

2 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 3; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 95.

§ 14. Vattel places the duty of a State to support its subjects, while prisoners in the hands of an enemy, upon the same grounds as its duty to provide for their ransom and release. Indeed, a neglect, or refusal to do so, would seem to be even more criminal than a neglect or refusal to provide for their exchange; for the exigencies of the war may make it the temporary policy of the State to decline an exchange, but nothing can excuse it in leaving its subjects to suffer in an enemy's country, without any fault of their own, when the State has the means of relieving them from the misfortune in which they are involved, by acting in its service and by supporting its cause. It follows, therefore, that although a State may properly, under certain circumstances, refuse to exchange its prisoners, it cannot, without a violation of moral duty, neglect to make the proper and necessary arrangement for their support while they are thus retained, by a captor who is willing to exchange them. It is stated by English writers that, in the wars of Napoleon, the British authorities regularly remitted the whole cost of the support of English prisoners, in France, to the French Government, but that the latter failed to make any provision whatever for the support of its subjects in the hands of the English,' leaving them to starvation, or the charity of their enemies. If this be true, it is a blot upon the character of the French Government.2

§ 15. It not unfrequently happens in a war, that, although both parties are willing to make an exchange of prisoners, much delay occurs in agreeing upon the terms of the cartel. Such delay sometimes results from a want of good faith on

1 The Earl of Liverpool, referring in 1814, to the large sum of money then due from the French to the British Government for the maintenance of prisoners of war, remarks that an article to liquidate such debts has usually been inserted in treaties of peace, but that he did not believe in the present case such an article would be likely to give the British Government the money, and that it certainly could not give it without material pressure and inconvenience to the French Government; that it occurred to him, therefore, there might be some grace in abandoning it, and that the honour of the French Government might perhaps be saved, on some other points, by a formal relinquishment of the claim in an article of the treaty; that he was sincerely desirous to see the credit of the French upheld, as far as the English Government could contribute to it without sacrifice of its public principles. Parl. Papers.

2 Alison, Hist. of Europe, vol. iii. pp. 394, 395; Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, vol. xx. pp. 634, 694; Hardenburg, Mémoires d'un Homme d'Etat, tome ii. p. 438; tome ix. p. 105; Las Cases, Mémoires de Sainte-Hélène, tome vii. pp. 39, 40; Annual Register, 1811, p. 76.

both sides, the parties entering into negotiations with no intention of coming to an agreement. Again, when the cartel has been negotiated, it is sometimes impossible to carry it into effect immediately, the peculiar circumstances of the war and the character of the military operations interrupting, or preventing, its execution. Such delays are the more frequent in great wars, which embrace several countries and seas, within the theatre of their operations. In all cases where the circumstances prevent an exchange of prisoners of war, or render it impossible for them to receive the means of support from their own State, it is the duty of the captor to furnish them with subsistence; for humanity would forbid his allowing them to suffer or starve. But if their own Government should refuse to make arrangements for their support, exchange, or release, and if the captor should give them sufficient liberty to enable them to earn their own support, his responsibility ceases, and whatever sufferings may result, are justly chargeable upon their own Government. Under ordinary circumstances, prisoners of war are not required to labour beyond the usual police duty of camp and garrison; but where their own State refuses, or wilfully neglects to provide for their release or support, it is not unreasonable in the captor to require them to pay with their labour for the subsistence which he furnishes them. But this can be done only in extreme cases, and even then they should be treated kindly and with mildness, and no degrading or very onerous labour should be imposed on them. All harshness and unnecessary severity would be contrary to the modern laws of war.1

1 Wildman, Int. Law, vol. ii. p. 26; Scott, United States Army Reg., 1825, §§ 709-716; The St. Juan, 5 Rob. Rep., p. 39; Heffter, Droit International, § 129.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares: Art. 23. Prisoners of war are lawful and disarmed enemies. They are in the power of the enemy's Government, but not of the individuals or of the corps who made them prisoners. They should be treated with humanity. Every act of insubordination authorises the necessary measures of severity to be taken with regard to them. All their personal effects, except their arms, are considered to be their own property. Art. 24. Prisoners of war are liable to internment in a town, fortress, camp, or in any locality whatever, under an obligation not to go beyond certain fixed limits; but they may not be placed in confinement (enfermés) unless absolutely necessary as a measure of security. Art. 25. Prisoners of war may be employed on certain public works which have no immediate connection with the operations on the theatre of war, provided the employment be not excessive, nor humiliating to their military rank if they belong to the army, or to their official or

16. But, sometimes the captor refuses to enter into any cartel for the exchange of his prisoners, or even to release

social position if they do not belong to it. They may also, subject to such regulations as may be drawn up by the military authorities, undertake private work. The pay they receive will go towards ameliorating their position, or will be placed to their credit at the time of their release. In this case the cost of their maintenance may be deducted from their pay. Art. 26. Prisoners of war cannot be compelled in any way to take any part whatever in carrying on the operations of war. Art. 27. The Government in whose power are the prisoners of war, undertakes to provide for their maintenance. The conditions of such maintenance may be settled by a mutual understanding between the belligerents. In default of such an understanding, and as a general principle, prisoners of war shall be treated, as regards food and clothing, on the same footing as the troops of the Government who made them prisoners. Art. 28. Prisoners of war are subject to the laws and regulations in force in the army in whose power they are. Arms may be used, after summoning, against a prisoner attempting to escape. If retaken, he is subject to summary punishment (peines disciplinaires) or to a stricter surveillance. If after having escaped he is again made prisoner, he is not liable to any punishment for his previous escape. Art. 29. Every prisoner is bound to declare, if interrogated on the point, his true name and rank, and in the case of his infringing this rule, he will incur a restriction of the advantages granted to the prisoners of the class to which he belongs. Art. 30. The exchange of prisoners of war is regulated by mutual agreement between the belligerents.

It will be proper here to mention the change effected in the practice of modern warfare, through the Convention of Geneva, which may be regarded as a natural consequence of the almost universal consensus of civilised nations, that some determined rules should be established for the protection of the sick, and wounded, of either belligerent in war, and also of those, whose duty it is to bestow care and attention on them; for civilisation should tend to alleviate the calamities of war, by weakening the enemy without the infliction of any unnecessary suffering.

In

Instances, notably the examples of Cyrus, and of the Emperor Aurelian, in ancient history are not wanting, to illustrate the generous feeling of compassion or sympathy for the sick and wounded in war. the middle ages, the members of the Teutonic Order of Knighthood devoted themselves to the service of sick and wounded soldiers. This order was founded in 1190, during the siege of Acre, by some Bremen merchants, who being moved with compassion at the sight of the miseries which the besiegers suffered, erected a kind of hospital or tent, where they gave constant attendance to all such unhappy objects, as had recourse to their charity. Their dress was a white mantle, with a black cross on it. (Raymondi Duellii Hist. Ord. Teut.) In more modern times, we read of the agreement between Louis XV. of France with Frederick the Great, that those persons who might attend on the sick and wounded, during war, should be treated as neutrals. Napoleon III., after the battle of Montebello (1859), restored to the enemy all wounded prisoners, without requiring any exchange. The philanthropy of Miss Nightingale and her little band of nurses, the energy of the Russian nuns, and the devotion of the French Saurs de Charité, in the cause of the wounded, during the Crimean war, is well known.

THE CONVENTION OF GENEVA was signed on behalf of Switzerland, Baden, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Hesse-Darmstadt, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, and Würtemberg, August 22, 1864, and

them on parole. He may, for reasons satisfactory to himself, persist in retaining in confinement the prisoners which he has

the following Powers have since acceded to it :-Austria, 1866; Bavaria, 1866; Great Britain, 1865; Greece, 1865; Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 1865; The Pope, 1868; Persia, 1874; Russia, 1867; Saxony, 1866; Sweden and Norway, 1864; Turkey, 1865.

The articles are as follows:

ART. I.--Ambulances and military hospitals shall be acknowledged to be neuter, and, as such, shall be protected and respected by belligerents so long as any sick or wounded may be therein.

Such neutrality shall cease if the ambulances or hospitals should be held by a military force.

ART. II.-Persons employed in hospitals and ambulances, comprising the staff for superintendence, medical service, administration, transport of wounded, as well as chaplains, shall participate in the benefit of neutrality, whilst so employed, and so long as there remain any wounded to bring in or to succour.

ART. III.-The persons designated in the preceding article may, even after occupation by the enemy, continue to fulfil their duties in the hospital or ambulance which they serve, or may withdraw in order to rejoin the corps to which they belong.

Under such circumstances, when these persons shall cease from their functions, they shall be delivered by the occupying army to the outposts of the enemy.

ART. IV. As the equipment of military hospitals remains subject to the laws of war, persons attached to such hospitals cannot, in withdrawing, carry away any articles but such as are their private property. Under the same circumstances an ambulance shall, on the contrary, retain its equipment.

ART. V. Inhabitants of the country who may bring help to the wounded shall be respected, and shall remain free. The generals of the belligerent Powers shall make it their care to inform the inhabitants of the appeal addressed to their humanity, and of the neutrality which will be the consequence of it.

Any wounded man entertained and taken care of in a house shall be considered as a protection thereto. Any inhabitant who shall have entertained wounded men in his house shall be exempted from the quartering of troops, as well as from a part of the contributions of war which may be imposed.

ART. VI.-Wounded or sick soldiers shall be entertained and taken care of, to whatever nation they may belong.

Commanders-in-chief shall have the power to deliver immediately to the outposts of the enemy soldiers who have been wounded in an engagement, when circumstances permit this to be done, and with the consent of both parties.

Those who are recognised, after their wounds are healed, as incapable of serving, shall be sent back to their country.

The others may also be sent back, on condition of not again bearing arms during the continuance of the war.

Evacuations, together with the persons under whose directions they take place, shall be protected by an absolute neutrality.

ART. VII.-A distinctive and uniform flag shall be adopted for hospitals, ambulances, and evacuations. It must, on every occasion, be accompanied by the national flag. An arm-badge (brassard) shall also be allowed for individuals neutralised, but the delivery thereof shall be left to military authority.