of defensive alliance; two of them quarrel and make war on each other; what shall the third do? The treaty does not bind it to assist either the one or the other. For it would be absurd to say that it has promised assistance to each against the other, or to one of the two to the prejudice of the other. All that is incumbent on it is, to employ its good offices for reconciling its allies; and if such mediation fail, it remains free to assist the one which shall appear to have justice on its side.' The latter part of this quotation should, perhaps, be adopted only with certain restrictions. If the alliances are such as to leave the third party in the position of a neutral, and exempt him from all obligations to assist either party, he cannot be considered at liberty to assist the one whose cause he may deem just. This fact alone would not constitute a justifiable cause of war. Moreover, as a neutral he is bound to treat both the belligerents as having justice on their side. What Vattel probably means to say is, that the third party is at liberty, so far as his alliances are concerned, to side with the belligerent whose cause he deems just.'

19. A warlike association is where the alliance is of such an intimate and perfect character as to form a union of interests; where each of the parties is bound to act with his whole force, and all are alike principals in the war at its commencement, or become so during its progress. Every associate of my enemy,' says Vattel, 'is indeed himself my enemy; it matters little whether any one makes war on me directly, and in his own name, or under the auspices of another; the same rights which war gives me against my principal enemy, it also gives me against all his associates. This results directly from my right of security and of selfdefence, for I am equally attacked by the one and the other. But the question is, to know who are lawfully to be accounted my enemy's associates, united against me in a war?' 2

§ 20. Vattel discusses at some length the question, who are, and who are not to be regarded as such associates in the 1 Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. i. cap. ix.; De Felice, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome ii. lec. xxviii.

* Wolfius, Jus. Gentium, §§ 730-6; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, § 300; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. vi. sec. ii. § 3; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. i. tit. 1. cap. xii.

war? and makes the following distinctions. He regards as associates, first, those who make common cause with the enemy, although not appearing as principals; second, those who assist the enemy without being bound to do so by any treaty; third, those who, under the obligations of an offensive alliance, assist the principal in carrying on the war; fourth, those who make defensive alliance with the enemy after the commencement of the war, or on the certain prospect of its declaration, or with special reference to the defence of the enemy against the actual opposing belligerent; and fifth, those who have formed with the enemy, even before hostilities have commenced, a real league or society of war. All such are associates in the war. But if the defensive alliance is general in its character, leaving it doubtful when the casus foederis will take place, or if it has not been made particularly against me, nor concluded at a time when I was openly preparing for war or had already begun it, or if the allies have only stipulated in it, that each of them shall furnish a stated succour to him who shall be first attacked, such allies are not necessarily associates in the war. If auxiliaries are furnished to my enemy, they are enemies, but the nation that furnishes them are not such of necessity. By attacking such nations for that reason, says Vattel, 'I should increase the number of my enemies, and instead of a slender succour which they furnished against me, should draw on myself the united force of those nations."

21. As a general rule, it is not necessary to make a formal declaration of war against the associates of the enemy before treating them as belligerents. The nature of their obligations, or the character of their acts, makes them public enemies, and puts them in the same position towards us as if they were principals in the war. Our belligerent rights against them commence, in some cases, with the war, and in others, with their first act of hostility against us. The existence of the alliance, with the acknowledgment of its obligation, and a preparation for carrying on the war, would make them public enemies, even before they actually

1 Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur, Pub., lib. i. cap. ix.; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. ii. ch. ix. § 1.

* See Ann. Reg., 1779, p. 58, et. seq.

take part in the military operations, as was the case between France and Great Britain in 1778.1

§ 22. But, in modern times, there are very few alliances between States which so bind them together as necessarily to make them associates in a war; it is, therefore, in general, a matter of prudence to seek to disarm the enemy's allies by treating them as friends. It is a cheap and honourable means of weakening an opponent's power, and may save the effusion of much innocent blood. The contrary course is not only impolitic on our part, but tends to prolong the war by making it more general, and by involving new elements of discord, and more complicated and conflicting interests. Neutrality may be absolute or qualified; absolute when the neutral is bound to neither belligerent by a treaty which may affect the other, and qualified, when the execution of a treaty with one would affect the other. The relation of the United States to France and Great Britain, at the beginning of the war of 1793, is an example of such qualified neutrality.2

1 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. vi. § 102; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. iii. ch. ii. § 15; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 60; Heffter, Droit International, § 120; and see ante, vol. i. ch. xvii.

2 By the 17th and 22nd articles of the treaty of amity and commerce in 1778, the United States had conceded to France admission for her prizes and privateers into the United States ports, exclusively of her enemies; also admission for her public vessels of war in cases of stress of weather, pirates, enemies, or other urgent necessity, to refresh, victual, repair, &c., but this latter concession was not exclusive.

On the breaking out of the French Revolution, in 1793, the American administration entertained no doubt of the propriety of recognising the new authority of France. That every nation possessed a right to govern itself according to its own will, is stated to be the principle on which the American Government itself was founded. General Washington, while approving unequivocally of the Republican form of government, resolved to maintain the neutrality of the United States; on the rupture between Great Britain and France in that year, he addressed a circular letter to his Cabinet ministers containing the following questions :1. Shall a proclamation issue for the purpose of preventing interferences of the citizens of the United States in the war between France and Great Britain? Shall it contain a declaration of neutrality or not? What shall it contain?

2. Shall a minister from the Republic of France be received?

3. If received, shall it be absolutely or with qualifications? and if with qualifications, of what kind?

4. Are the United States obliged by good faith to consider the treaties heretofore made with France as applying to the present situation of the parties? May they either renounce them or hold them suspended till the Government of France shall be established?

5. If they have the right, is it expedient to do either? and which? 6. If they have an option, would it be a breach of neutrality to consider the treaties still in operation?

There is an obvious difference between an alliance and such neutrality, although it is sometimes difficult to draw the line of separation. This subject will be considered in another chapter.

7. If the treaties are to be considered as now in operation, is the guarantee in the treaty of alliance applicable to a defensive war only, or to war either offensive or defensive?

8. Does the war in which France is engaged appear to be offensive or defensive on her part? or of a mixed and equivocal character?

9. If of a mixed and equivocal character, does the guarantee in any event apply to such a war?

10. What is the effect of a guarantee such as that to be found in the treaty of alliance between the United States and France?

II. Does any article in either of the treaties prevent ships of war other than privateers of the Powers opposed to France from coming into the ports of the United States to act as convoys to their own merchantmen? or does it lay any other restraints upon them more than would apply to the ships of war of France?

12. Should the future regent of France send a minister to the United States, ought he to be received?

13. Is it necessary or advisable to call together the two houses of Congress, with a view to the present posture of European affairs? If it is, what should be the particular objects of such a call?

The President was advised-That a proclamation should issue forbidding citizens of the United States to take part in any hostilities on the seas, or to carry to any of the belligerent Powers articles deemed contraband, or to commit acts inconsistent with the duties of a friendly nation to all those at war; and that he should receive a minister from the French Republic. But there was a division of opinion respecting his reception; the Secretary of State and the Attorney-General considered that the ordinary practice should not be departed from; the Secretaries of the Treasury and of War held the opposite opinion, but the President appears eventually to have decided in favour of the former. The Secretary of State and the Attorney-General conceived that the revolution in France had produced no change in the relations between the two nations. The obligations created by pre-existing treaties remained the same; and there was nothing in the alteration of the government or in the character of the war which could impair the right of France to demand, or weaken the duty of the United States faithfully to comply with, the engagements which had been solemnly formed. The Secretaries of the Treasury and of War, admitting in its fullest latitude the right of a nation to change its political institutions according to its own will, denied its right to involve other nations absolutely and unconditionally in the consequences of the changes which it might think proper to make. They maintained the right of a nation to absolve itself from the obligations, even of real treaties, when such a change of circumstances takes place in the internal situation of the other contracting Power, as so essentially to alter the existing state of things, that it may with good faith be pronounced, to render a continuance of the connection which results from them, disadvantageous or dangerous. They reviewed the most prominent of the later transactions in France, to show that the course of the revolution had been attended with circumstances, which militated against a full conviction of its having been brought to its then existing stage by such a free, regular, deliberate act of the nation, as ought to silence all scruples about the validity of what had been done. They doubted whether the existing

possessors of power could be considered as having acquired it with the real consent of France, or, as having seized it by violence-whether the existing system could be considered as permanent or merely temporary. They were of opinion, that it was for future consideration, whether the operation of the treaties between the United States and France ought not to be provisionally suspended. On the questions relative to the application of the clause of guarantee, the Cabinet was divided. The opinion was unanimous against convening Congress.

During this war, vessels of war of England and of other belligerents, her allies, freely entered the ports of the United States in every case of necessity.