officialium solverunt ipsis donatariis, non sunt liberati, et tenentur solvere dictis regibus, veris creditoribus. Secunda conclusio sit ista, quod illi debitores qui non fuerunt in morâ solvendi dictis creditoribus, sed jussi fuerunt ab officialibus regis Franciæ, quod solvant illis Gallis, virtute largitatis regis, et ipsi fecerunt, quidquid eis fuit possibile, ut non solverent, et realiter eis solverunt propter jussum pœnalem, et isti sunt liberati. Tertia conclusio sit ista, quod si debitor fuit in morâ, sed erat infra tempus purgandi moram, et infra illud tempus sit exactus ab illis Gallis jussu magistratus, tunc solvendo Gallis perinde habetur ac si non esset in morâ, et sic erit liberatus. Quarta conclusio sit ista, quod debitor, qui solvit Gallis illam pecuniam debitam regibus de Arragoniâ virtute jussus magistratus, cui non potuit resistere, et pecuniam illam debitam post diem solutionis faciendæ erat solitum, quod ipsi debitores penes se retinebant pro expensis, occurrentibus in administratione officii nomine regio, si ipsam pecuniam Gallis solverunt, sunt liberati, etiam quod fuerint in morâ. Quinta conclusio sit ista, quod illi debitores, qui solutionem probant per confessionem Gallorum publicam vel privatam, ita quod non probant veram numerationem pecuniæ eis factam, non sunt liberati, sed debent solvere veris creditoribus, quantumcunque ostenderint dictum jussum. Sexta conclusio, quod illi debitores, qui se concordaverunt, et non ostendunt veram solutionem in totum vel in partem, non sunt liberati. Exitus rei approbavit istas conclusiones.' The case of the debtors of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, which has furnished such a fruitful subject for discussion by modern jurists, belongs rather to complete conquests than mere military occupation, and will, therefore, be considered in the next chapter. The only additional case in modern times, to which we shall here refer, occurred during the war between the United States and the republic of Mexico. The Messrs. Laurents, British subjects domiciled in Mexico, had purchased of the Mexican government, in 1847, certain church property, the sale of which had been previously authorised by a law of the Mexican Congress. The contract of sale was duly signed by the Laurents as purchasers, and by the agents of the government as the sellers, and the purchase money deposited in the hands of a banker, to await the execution of the conveyance by the proper government officer. By some neglect the instrument had not been signed, but the

purchasers were in possession of the property, and the money still remained on deposit when the city of Mexico was captured by the American forces. This money was seized and confiscated by General Scott as the property of the Mexican government. On the return of peace the church reclaimed the property, and, on suit, recovered its possession from the Messrs. Laurents, not on the ground of a default of payment, but of illegality of sale. The Laurents then made reclamation against the United States for the money confiscated, as British subjects, before the joint commission of the two governments. The commissioners being unable to agree, the case was referred to the umpire, who decided that, according to the rules of international law, the claimants were, at least for the time being, to be regarded as Mexican citizens, and not British subjects. Their claim was, therefore, rejected.1

1 Paponius, Recueil d'Arrêts, liv. v. tit. vi. Arrêt 2; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. §§ 565-569; Commission of Claims between U. S. and G. Britain, pp. 120-160; Philip Decius, Consilia, cap. xxv.; Matthæus de Afflictis, Decisiones Nap., Dec. 150; Pfeiffer, Das Recht der Kriegseroberung, pp. 191, 192.

480

CHAPTER XXXIV.

RIGHTS OF COMPLETE CONQUEST.

1. Conquests, how completed--2. Acquisition of parts of a State-3Subjugation of an entire State-4. Retroactive effect of confirmation of conquest-5. Transfer of personal allegiance by conquest-6. The assent of the subject required-7. Such assent determined by domicile -8. Reason of this rule-9. Application to naturalised citizens and foreign subjects-10. Rule varied by treaty and by municipal lawII. Right to citizenship under new sovereignty-12. English law on this subject-13. American decisions-14. Laws of the conquered territory-15. Conquered territory under British laws-16. Under the United States-17. Laws of conquered State, how affected by the new sovereignty-18. How affected by laws of military occupation-19. What laws of new sovereignty extend over it-20. Conquests and discoveries-21. Laws contrary to fundamental principles of new sovereignty-22. American decisions-23. Revenue laws in California24. Conquest changes political rights, but not rights of property -25. Titles to real estate-26. Necessity of remedial laws for such titles-27. Effect of conquest on the property of the State-28. Alienated domains of Hesse-Cassel—29. Debts of Hesse-Cassel.

§ 1. As already remarked, the conqueror's title to immovable property taken from the enemy, may be completed in various ways, as, by a treaty of peace or of cession, by entire subjugation and the incorporation with the conquering State, by civil revolution and the consent of the inhabitants, or by the mere lapse of time and the inability of the former sovereignty to recover its lost possessions. We will proceed to consider these different modes of confirmation. The title to conquered territory is made complete by a treaty of peace, either by express provisions of cession, or by the implied condition of uti possidetis. If the stipulation of cession is introduced in the treaty, it is usual to require of the conqueror certain stipulations with respect to the inhabitants of the ceded conquered territory, in order to secure to them rights not guaranteed by the positive law of nations. But the conqueror's title is equally made complete by the silent operation of a general treaty of peace, for, as the principle of uti possidetis is the basis of every

such treaty, unless the contrary is expressed, the conquered territory remains with the conqueror, and his title cannot afterwards be called in question. But a treaty is not the only mode in which the rights of conquest are confirmed and made valid. If the State to which the conquered territory belonged is entirely subjugated, and its power destroyed, the title of the conqueror is considered complete from the date of the subjugation of the former sovereign owner. In this case there could be no treaty of cession or confirmation, for, by supposition, the former owner no longer exists as a Sovereign State; it, therefore, can neither confirm nor call in question the conqueror's title. So, also, if the State to which the conquered territory belonged be so weakened by the war as to afford no reasonable hope of ever being able to recover its lost territory, but, from pride or obstinacy, it refuses to make any formal treaty of peace, although destitute of the requisite means of prolonging the contest, the conqueror is not obliged to continue the war in order to force the other party into a treaty. He may content himself with the conquest already made, and annex it to, or incorporate it with, his own territory. His title will be considered complete from the time he proves his ability to maintain his sovereignty over his conquest, and manifests, by some authoritative act, as of annexation or incorporation, his intention to retain it as a part of his own territory. Both of these requisites-ability to maintain and intention to retain-are necessary to complete the conquest; and the latter must be manifested by some unequivocal act, as annexation or incorporation, made by the sovereign authority of the conquering State. Without some such authoritative act, the conquered territory is held by the rights of military occupation only, and not as a complete conquest. So far as neutrals are concerned, it belongs to the conquering State, but does not form a part of it. It is held by the right of possession and not by complete title, and is therefore subject to the rights of postliminy. Again, if the conquest be accompanied by a civil revolution and a change of internal government, as where a colony or province revolts against the former sovereign, and, with the assistance of the conqueror, establishes its own independence, and unites itself to the conqueror, the sovereignty of the former owner may be regarded as extinguished by the act of separation, independence and voluntary annexa

tion or incorporation, and without a treaty of peace, or of cession. The new internal government so organised and recognised, acts for itself, independently of its former sovereign. Such cases, however, are of rare occurrence. In whatever way the conquest is completed, the institutions of the conquering power usually require some definitive act in order to annex or incorporate the conquered territory, so as to complete the conquest and perfect the title. In such cases no alienation to a third party can be made complete till the conquest itself is perfected by such definitive act. Thus, the President of the United States, when war is duly declared, may conquer and take possession of foreign territory, but the joint action of the President and Senate is required to complete it by treaty, and Congress alone can annex it, or incorporate it into the Union. Without such act of treaty confirmation, or of lawful annexation or incorporation, the title to any conquest made by the United States would still be considered in international law as incomplete.1

§ 2. The conqueror who acquires a province or town from the enemy, acquires thereby the same rights which were possessed by the State from which it is taken. If it formed a constituent part of the hostile State, and was fully and completely under its dominion, it passes into the power of the conqueror upon the same footing. It is united with the new State upon the same terms on which it belonged to the old one; that is, with only such political rights as the constitution and laws of the new State may see fit to give it. It retains no political privileges or immunities, but may acquire those it never possessed before. In political rights it may be the gainer or the loser by the change; if from being a part of an absolute monarchy it becomes a part of a republic, its liberties will be enlarged, or, if the reverse, they will be restricted. But such restriction, in any case, must be in conformity with the rights of conquest and the laws of war. When New Mexico formed a part of the Mexican Republic, it enjoyed the right

1 Wheaton, Elem Int. Law, pt. ii. ch. iv. § 5; Fleming et al. v. Page, 9 Howard R., 603; Heffter, Droit International, §§ 69, 133, 178, 185; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. §§ 568 et seq.; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int. lib. i. tit. i. cap. xii.; Meerman, Von dem Recht der Eroberung, passim; Kluber, Droit des Gens Mod., § 256; Martens, Précis du Droit des Gens, § 277; Sirey, Recueil, etc., xvii. 1, 217; xxx. 1, 280; the' Boedes Lust,' 5 Rob., 233; the 'Flotina,' 1 Dod. R., 450.