§ 15. The sentence of a competent prize-court of the captor's country is conclusive upon the question of property in the captured thing; it forecloses all controversy respecting the validity of the capture, as between the claimants and the captors of those claiming under them, and terminates all ordinary judicial inquiry upon the subject matter. The captors cannot be held responsible in the court of any other country, nor can the question of the ownership of the captured property be made a matter of judicial investigation when once decided by a competent prize-court. A contrary rule, allow ing the prize-courts of one country to review and reverse the decisions of the prize-courts of another country, would lead to great irregularities and endless disputes and litigation. The competency of the court and its jurisdiction may, however, as will be shown hereafter, be made the subject of judicial inquiry.' § 16. 'Where the responsibility of the captor ceases,' says Maria,' 6 Rob., 138, note; the Falcon,' 6 Rob., 198; 'La Dame Cécile, 6 It is fully within the usage of the prize-courts to entertain and perfect their jurisdiction over property captured on board a vessel, without having the vessel itself brought within their cognisance. In many cases, this is indispensable, as in the case of enemy's property captured in a neutral vessel, or when the enemy's vessel has been destroyed in capture.-The 'Edward Barnard,' Blatchf. Pr. Cas., 123. A prize-court may take judicial cognisance of a capture, without at the time having the prize within its territorial jurisdiction, and without its being brought there, during the pendency of the suit.-The 'Zavalla,' Blatchf. Pr. Cas., 173. The possession of the captors in a neutral port, is the possession of their sovereign, and gives jurisdiction to his courts.-Hudson v. Guestier, 4 Cranch., 293. The jurisdiction of the courts of France as to seizures, is not confined to seizures made within two leagues of the coast.-Ibid. Under peculiar circumstances, the English prize-court will condemn a prize, which has been taken into and lies in a neutral port, and allow it to be sold there.-The Polka,' Spinks' Prize Cases, 57. The right of adjudicating, on all captures and questions of prize, belongs exclusively to the courts of the captor's country; but it is an exception to the general rule that, where the captured vessel is brought, or voluntarily comes infra præsidia of a neutral power, that power has a right to inquire whether its own neutrality has been violated by the cruiser which made the capture, and if such violation has been committed, it is in duty bound to restore to the original owner property captured by cruisers, illegally equipped in its ports.-The 'Estrella,' 4 Wheat., 298. Dalloz, Répertoire, verb. Prises Maritimes, § 7. Although the decision of a foreign prize-court must be received in evidence, still it may be examined, to see whether the fact, in proof of which it is adduced, was clearly and certainly found by the court that gave it, and it is for the court of that nation, in which the decision of the foreign court is quoted, to ascertain what facts were so found, without inquiring into the legal validity of the grounds of the judgment.-Hobb v. Fleming, Mr. Wheaton, that of the State begins. It is responsible to other States for the acts of the captors under its commission, the moment these acts are confirmed by the definitive sentence of the tribunals which it has appointed to determine the validity of captures in war.' The sentence of the judge is conclusive against the subjects of the State, but it cannot have the same controlling efficiency toward the subjects of a foreign State. It prevents any further judicial inquiry into the subject matter, but it does not prevent the foreign State from demanding indemnity for the property of its subjects, which may have been unlawfully condemned by the prizecourt of another nation. 'The institution of these tribunals, so far from exempting, or being intended to exempt, the sovereign of the belligerent nations from responsibility for the acts of his commissioned cruisers, is designed to ascertain and fix that responsibility. Those cruisers are responsible only to the sovereigns whose commissions they bear. So long as seizures are regularly made upon apparent grounds of just suspicion, and followed by prompt adjudication in the usual mode, and until the acts of the captors are confirmed by the sovereign in the sentences of the tribunals appointed by him to adjudicate in matters of prize, the neutral has no ground 5 New R. (1865), 406. See also Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Show., 232; Doe 7. Oliver, 2 Sm. L. C.. 634; Geyer v. Aguilar. 7 T. R., 681; and Donaldson v. Thompson, 1 Camp., 429. The sentence of a foreign court of Admiralty, is evidence only of what it positively and specifically affirms in the adjudicative part of it, not what may be gathered from it by way of inference.-Fisher v. Ogle, 1 Camp., 418; Christie v. Secretan, 8 T. R., 192. Therefore, a condemnation of a vessel for attempting to violate a blockade, is not conclusive, unless it appear on the face of the sentence, free from doubt, whether the ground of condemnation be a just one by the law of nations, or merely by the municipal regulations of the condemning country.-Dalgleish v. Hodgson, 7 Bing., 495. In Bernardi v. Motteux (2 Dougl. R., 581), an action on a policy of insurance, it was held by Lord Mansfield, that a condemnation by a foreign Court of Admiralty is not conclusive evidence that the ship was not neutral, unless it appear that the condemnation went upon that ground. The supposed inconvenience and controversy about the ground of a foreign sentence, would be obviated, if foreign courts would say in their sentences'Condemned as enemy's property?' In Baring v. Clayett (3 B. and P.), it was collected, that the ground of adjudication was the ship being enemy's property, and not the infringement of some positive regulations of the foreign country. The court held such sentence, conclusive evidence against a warranty of neutrality. In Lothian v. Henderson (Ibid., 499), the House of Lords held, that a foreign sentence adjudging a ship, for whatever cause, to be enemy's property, was conclusive against its neutrality. of complaint, and what he suffers is the inevitable result of the belligerent right of capture. But the moment the decision of the tribunal of the last resort has been pronounced (supposing it not to be warranted by the facts of the case, and by the law of nations applied to those facts), and justice has thus been finally denied, the capture and the condemnation become the acts of the State, for which the sovereign is responsible to the government of the claimant.' Not only may a State demand indemnity for the property of its citizens unlawfully condemned by a foreign prize-court, but, if refused, it may resort to reprisals or even to war. The right of redress in this case rests upon the same grounds as the right of redress for injuries received, and a denial of justice persisted in. This principle is supported by the authority of publicists, and by historical examples. If justice is not done to the other claimants by the prize-courts of the captors, says Rutherforth, they may apply to their own State for a remedy; which may, consistently with the law of nations, give them a remedy, either by solemn war or reprisals. In order to determine when their right to apply to their own State begins, we must inquire when the exclusive right of the other State to judge in this controversy ends. As this exclusive right is nothing else but the right of the State, to which the captor belongs, to examine into the conduct of its members before it becomes answerable for what they have done, such exclusive right cannot end until their conduct has been thoroughly examined. Natural equity will not allow that the State should be answerable for their acts, until those acts are examined by all the ways which the State has appointed for this purpose. Since, therefore, it is usual in maritime countries to establish not only inferior courts of marine, but likewise superior courts of review, to which the parties may appeal, if they think themselves aggrieved by the inferior courts, the subjects of a neutral State can have no right to apply to their own State for a remedy against an erroneous sentence of an inferior court, till they have appealed to the superior court, or to the several superior courts, if there are more courts of this sort than one, and till the sentence has been confirmed in all of them. For these courts are so many means appointed by the State, to which the captors belong. to examine into their conduct; and, till their conduct has been examined by all these means, the State's exclusive right of judging continues. After the sentence of the inferior courts has been thus confirmed, the foreign claimants may apply to their own State for a remedy, if they think themselves aggrieved; but, the law of nations will not entitle them to a remedy, unless they have been actually aggrieved. When the matter has been carried thus far, the two States become the parties to the controversy.'1 § 17. In 1753, the King of Prussia undertook to set up within his own dominions a commisson to re-examine the sentences pronounced against his subjects in the British prizecourts this was deemed an innovation upon the settled usage of nations. But, although the British government asserted the proceedings of their prize tribunals to be the only legitimate mode of determining the validity of captures made in war, it did not consider these proceedings as excluding the demand of Prussia for redress upon the government itself. The King even resorted to reprisals, by stopping the interest upon a loan due to British subjects, and secured by hypothecation upon the revenues of Silesia, until he actually obtained from the British Government an indemnity for the Prussian vessels unjustly captured and condemned. So, also, under the treaty of 1794, between the United States and Great Britain, a mixed commission was appointed to determine the claim of American citizens, arising from the capture of their property by British cruisers during the existing war with France, and a full and satisfactory indemnity was awarded in many cases where there had been a final condemnation by courts of prize. Again, in the negotiation between the Danish and American governments respecting the captures of American vessels by the cruisers of Denmark during the war between that power and England, it was admitted that, although the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the capturing nation was exclusive and complete, and had the effect of closing for ever all private controversy between the captors and the captured, still, the American government might demand indemnity for unlawful condemnations. The demand which the United States made upon the Danish Government was not for a judicial reversal of the sentences pronounced by its tribunals, but for the 1 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 16; Rutherford, Institutes, b. ii. ch. ix. § 19. indemnity to which the American citizens were entitled, in consequence of the denial of justice by the tribunal in the last resort, and of the responsibility thus incurred by the Danish Government for the acts of its cruisers and tribunal. The Danish Government was, of course, free to adopt any measures it might think proper to satisfy itself of the injustice of those sentences, one of the most natural of which would be a re-examination and discussion of the cases complained of, conducted by an impartial tribunal, under the sanction of the two governments, not for the purpose of disturbing the question of title to the specific property which had been irrevocably condemned, or of reviving the controversy between the individual captors and claimants, which had been for ever terminated, but for the purpose of determining between government and government whether injustice had been done by the tribunals of one power against the citizens of the other, and of determining what indemnity ought to be granted to the latter. There are many other instances where arrangements of this kind have been made between States, for determining and settling claims which arise from the unjust condemnation of prize tribunals. § 18. We have already stated the general principle that the sentence of a prize-court, of competent jurisdiction, in rem, is conclusive upon the title to the property condemned. It may be added, that the general presumption is, that the jurisdiction exercised by a foreign tribunal is lawful. But that presumption may be overturned by competent evidence. Where a claim is set up under a sentence of condemnation of a foreign court, every court has a right to examine into the jurisdiction of such foreign court, so far, at least, as to ascer tain its competency, in international law, to pronounce the adjudication. Whenever the jurisdiction cannot, consistently with the laws of nations, be exercised, the sentence will be disregarded. If, therefore, a vessel be condemned under circumstances which show that the court could, under the rules. of international law, have no jurisdiction, such sentence will be regarded as a nullity. For instance, a condemnation of a prize, by the consul of the belligerent, in a neutral country, is deemed invalid, because such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised consistently with the law of nations. Moreover, the jurisdiction may be inquired into, not only with respect to |