$4. Such a general suspension of hostilities throughout the nation, can only be made by the sovereignty of the State, either directly, or by authority specially delegated. Such authority not being essential to enable a general or commander to fulfil his official duties, is never implied, and, in such a case, the enemy is bound to see that the agent is specially authorised to bind his principal. But a partial truce may be concluded between the military and naval commanders of the respective forces, without any special authority for that purpose, where, from the nature and extent of their commands, such authority is necessarily implied, as essential to the fulfilment of their official duties. If the commander, in making such a compact, has abused his trust to the advantage of the enemy, he is accountable to his own State for such abuse. The nature of his trust implies,' says Rutherforth, that he has power to enter into a compact of this sort; and this power is sufficient to render the compact valid. The obligation that he is under, not to abuse his trust, regards his own State only, and not the enemy; and, consequently, it cannot affect the validity of the compact which he makes with the enemy.' A case occurring in the recent war between the United States and Mexico, serves to point out the limitation of the foregoing rule, with respect to the authority of a commander to make a general truce or armistice. By the convention of February 29, ratified by General Butler, March 5, and published in general orders No. 18, March 6, 1848, it was stipulated that the Mexican civil authorities, political, administrative, and judicial, were to be re-established and installed in their respective offices. The terms of the convention were general, and included the entire republic of Mexico. But California, although a part of the Mexican territory, had been organised into a separate military department, entirely independent of the general

without delay to the competent authorities and to the troops. Hostilities are suspended immediately after the notification. Art. 50. It rests with the contracting parties to define in the clauses of the armistice the relations which shall exist between the populations. Art. 51. The violation of the armistice by either of the parties gives to the other the right of terminating it (le dénoncer). Art. 52. The violation of the clauses of the armistice by private individuals, on their own personal initiative, only affords the right of demanding the punishment of the guilty persons, and, if there is occasion for it, an indemnity for losses sustained.

commanding in Mexico. Pico, the Mexican governor of California, basing himself on the words of this convention, demanded of the American military governor of that department, to be reinstated and recognised in his official position and character. The American commander not only refused to comply with Pico's demand, but adopted pretty severe measures to prevent any attempt on his part to exercise authority in California. If the convention, entered into by General Butler in the capital of Mexico, was really intended to include California, as its terms would seem to indicate, he, undoubtedly, exceeded his powers, and the armistice, so far as concerned California, was utterly null and void.'

§ 5. A truce binds the contracting parties from the time of its conclusion, unless otherwise specially provided; but it does not bind the individuals of the nation so as to make them personally responsible for a breach of it, until they have had actual or constructive notice. If, therefore, individuals, without a knowledge of the suspension of hostilities, kill an enemy or destroy his property, they do not, by such acts, commit a crime, nor are they bound to make pecuniary compensation; but, if prisoners are taken, or prizes captured, the sovereign is under obligation to immediately release the former and to restore the latter. To prevent the danger and damage that might arise from acts committed in ignorance of the truce, it is usual to fix a prospective period for the cessation of hostilities in different places, with due reference to their distance, and the means of communicating with them; it is also proper to provide for cases which do not come within the ordinary rules of notice, such as hostile vessels meeting at sea. But the State is responsible for the acts of its subjects after actual or constructive notice of the truce; it must punish them for the offence, and make ample compensation for the damage; should the State neglect or refuse justice on the complaints of the party injured, it becomes accessory to the wrong, and violates the compact.

§ 6. During the continuance of a general truce, each party

1 Puffendorf, De Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. viii. cap. vii. § 15; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. ii. cap. ix. § 2; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. i. tit. i. ch. xiii.; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome v. pt. iv. ch. xii.; Butler, General Orders, No. 18, March 6, 1848; Mason to Adj't Gen'l, August 23, 1848; Ex. Doc., No. 17, H. R., 31 Cong., 1st sess., pp. 601, et seq.

to it may, within his own territories, do whatever he would have a right to do in time of peace, such as repairing or building fortifications, constructing and fitting out vessels, levying and disciplining troops, casting cannon and manufacturing arms, and collecting provisions and munitions of war. He may also move his armies from one part of his territory to another, not occupied by the enemy, and call home, or send abroad upon the ocean his vessels of war. And, in the theatre of hostilities, and in the face of the enemy, he may do whatever, under all the circumstances, would be deemed compatible with good faith and the spirit of the agreement. In the case of a truce between the governor of a fortress or fortified town, and the general or admiral investing it, either party is at liberty to do what he could safely have done if hostilities had continued. For example, the besieged may repair his material of war, replenish his magazines, and strengthen his works, if such works were beyond the reach of the enemy at the beginning of the truce, and if the provisions and succours are introduced into the town in a way or through passages which the besieging army could not have prevented. But the besieged cannot construct or repair works of defence, if he could not safely have done this in case the hostilities had continued; nor introduce provisions, military munitions or troops through passages which were occupied or commanded by the enemy at the time of the cessation of hostilities; nor can the besiegers continue works of attack which might have been prevented or interrupted by the besieged; for all acts of this kind would be making a mischievous and fraudulent use of the agreement, and violating its good faith and spirit; the general meaning of such compacts is, that all things within the limits of the theatre of immediate operations, shall remain as they were at the moment of the conclusion of the truce. To receive and harbour deserters within such limits, is an act of hostility, and, therefore, a violation of the implied conditions of a truce.'

§ 7. Where a truce is granted for a certain specified object, its effects are limited to the purpose mentioned, and if either party should attempt to perform any act to the disadvantage

1 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. iv. ch. ii. § 22; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. §§ 197, 198; Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. i. p. 16.

of the other, not comprehended in the object of such truce, this other party has the undoubted right to hinder it by force, notwithstanding the compact. So, where the truce is conditional, and the conditions which have been agreed upon are broken by one party, the truce is no longer binding upon the other. 'All truces granted for a certain purpose,' says Rutherforth, are confined to this purpose; and the party who makes use of the cessation of hostilities, to do anything that is not included within this purpose, and that is to the disadvantage of the other party, breaks the truce. For as this purpose is the sole reason of the compact, the right arising from the compact can extend no farther than this purpose extends.' 'And usually,' says the same author, 'a breach of truce, on one part, will justify the other part in beginning hostilities again before the time of the truce would have otherwise expired.'1

§ 8. Truces, and other military compacts are to be interpreted by the same rules as treaties or other agreements. Most questions relating to such compacts may be easily determined, either by considering the nature and character of the compact itself, or by applying to it the common rules of interpretation. Nevertheless, a difference of opinion will often arise respecting the proper construction to be given to particular terms, which are, in their nature, ambiguous. Thus, writers on the laws of war have discussed the question, whether a truce for a given period, as, for instance, from the first of January to the first of February, will include or exclude the first day of each of these months. Grotius is of opinion, that the first day of January would be excluded, and the whole of the first day of February included. Puffendorf, Heineccius, and Vattel, would include in the truce both the day of its commencement and the day of its termination. Rutherforth can see no good reason why one day should be excluded and the other included. • One would rather think,' he says, 'that the first day is the limit of the truce at one end, as the last day is the limit of it at the other end; and, consequently, that there is the same reason for reckoning the first day that there is for reckoning the last day, as a part of the time which is included in the truce.'

1 Rutherforth, Institutes, b. ii. ch. ix. § 22.

The rule, however, proposed by the English commissioners in their report on the practice of the English courts in 1831, is to compute the first day exclusively, and the last day inclusively, in all cases. The general rules laid down by text-writers, respecting the interpretation and observance of truces and other compacts in war, are necessarily somewhat indefinite, and questions almost always arise in their application to particular cases; it is, therefore, important that stipulations should be inserted in such compacts specifying what may and what may not be done by each party, both within and without the limits of the place, in case of a siege, or of the immediate theatre of military operations, if it be between belligerent forces in the field. Moreover, if the cessation of hostilities is for a given period of time, in order to avoid all ambiguity, the time should be precisely stated, as from a certain hour of a certain day to a certain hour of another certain day; and if dates only are given, it should be stated whether or not either or both are included.'

§ 9. As a truce, or armistice, merely suspends hostilities, they are renewed at its expiration without any new declaration or notice; for as every one is bound to know the effect of such termination, no public declaration is required. But if the truce was for an indefinite period of time, justice and good faith require due notice of intention by the party who terminates it. If, however, the conditions of the truce be broken by one belligerent, there is no doubt that the other may immediately resume hostilities without any declaration. It is sometimes stipulated in the truce, that the violator shall pay a certain penalty for the violation. In such case the penalty should be demanded before a return to war, and, if paid, the right of hostilities does not occur. A truce is not broken by the acts of private persons, unless they are ordered or ratified by public authority. But, unless the private offenders are punished or surrendered, and unless the thing seized is restored, or compensated for, it is legally presumed that the act of the private offender was duly ordered or ratified. This is the rule of public law.

1 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. xvi. §§ 244, 245; Rutherforth, Institutes, b. ii. ch. ix. § 22; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. iii. cap. xxi. $9; Puffendorf, De Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. viii. cap. vii. § 8; Heineccius, Elem. Juris., lib. ii. cap. ix. § 208.