a neutral country, was unjust; and 2nd, with respect to colonial trade, that, if a neutral engage in trade between the mother country and the colony which is thrown open merely in war, he is liable, in most instances, to the same penalty. 'But,' continues Story, 'the British have extended this doctrine to all intercourse with the colony, even from a neutral country, and herein, it seems to me, they have abused the rule. This, at present, appears to me to be the proper limits of the rule, as to the colonial and the coasting trade; and the rule of 1756 (as it was at that time applied) seems to me well founded; but its late extension is reprehensible."

§ 25. The British extension of the rule of 1756 to the doctrine of 1793, and its subsequent application to the ruin of American commerce, drew from the Government of the United States an earnest and energetic remonstrance. From the grounds then assumed, with respect to the rule of 1793. there is no reason to believe that this government will ever depart. They were taken on full deliberation, and maintained at the time with signal ability, and they have since been adopted by all her ablest statesmen and writers on public law. Some, not properly distinguishing between the principles of the rule of 1793 and that of 1756, boldly attacked the doctrine of the latter as unsanctioned by the law of nations, but it has now become the settled conviction that its main principles, when properly limited and distinguished from that of 1793, are just and correct. At the same time, the British rule is regarded as a modern innovation, forming no part of the general and permanent code of international jurisprudence-an innovation so unjust and ruinous to neutral commerce, that neutral States are bound to resist any new attempt to force its application. There is no doubt that the United States would now regard any attempt to apply it to American commerce as an act of direct and immediate hostility.2

§ 26. But there is very little probability that Great Britain

1 Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. §§ 215, 225; Story, Life and

Letters, vol. i. pp. 287, 288.

2 Monroe, Letter to Lord Mulgrave, Sept. 23, 1805; Madison, Letter to Monroe and Pinkney, May 17, 1806; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. IV. ch. iii. § 27; Wheaton, Hist. Law of Nations, pp. 374, et seq.; Wheaton, Reports, vol. i. Appendix, note iii. p. 506; Story, Life and Letters, vol. i. p. 287.

will attempt to revive it in any future war, not only on account of the resistance it will be certain to provoke, and the exceedingly doubtful character of the rule itself, but from the great change in British opinion on this subject, and more particularly from the changes which have since been made in the colonial system of the powers of Europe. The colonial trade of England being now open to the navigation of the world, the theory, on which the restriction of 1793 was based, necessarily falls to the ground. Nevertheless, a treatise on international law would be very incomplete without an examination and discussion of a question so recently regarded of paramount importance, and which caused the condemnation of such a vast amount of American property.2

As to the coasting trade of Great Britain, it is enacted by 39 and 40 Vict. c. 36, re-enacting the provisions of former statutes, that :—All trade by sea from any one port of the United Kingdom to any other port thereof shall be deemed to be a coasting trade, and all ships while employed therein shall be deemed to be coasting ships, and no port of the United Kingdom, however situated with regard to any other port, shall be deemed in law with reference to each other to be ports beyond the seas.-(s. 140).

Every foreign ship in the coasting trade is subject to the same laws, rules, and regulations to which British ships are subjected, and to no higher rates.-(s. 141).

Every coasting ship is confined to the coasting voyage.—(s. 142). Order in Council, April 15, 1854; Edinburgh Review, No. 203, art. 6.

340

CHAPTER XXIX.

PACIFIC INTERCOURSE OF BELLIGERENTS.

1. Object and character of commercia belli-2. General compacts and conventions-3. Suspension of arms, truces and armistices-4. Authority to make them-5. Acts of individuals ignorant of their existence-6. What may be done during a truce-7. Conditional and special truces-8. Their interpretation—9. Renewal of hostilities10. Capitulations-11. Individual promises-12. Passports and safe conducts-13. When and how revoked-14. Their violation, how punished-15. Safeguards-16. Cartels for prisoners-17. Cartel ships 18. Their rights and duties-19. Ransom of prisoners of war20. Ransom of captured property 21. Prohibited in England-22 Ransom bill-23. Îf ransom vessel be lost or stranded—24. Recapture of ransomed vessel and ransom bill-25. Hostages for captures and prisoners-26. Suits on contracts of ransom-27. Flags of truce § I. THE usage of civilised nations has introduced a certain friendly intercourse in war, technically called commercia belli, by which its violence may be allayed, so far as is consistent with its object and purpose, and a way be kept open which may lead, in time, to an adjustment of differences, and ultimately, to peace. Were all pacific communications between armies absolutely cut off, war would not only become unnecessarily cruel and destructive, but there would be no chance of terminating it, short of the total annihilation of the bellige rents. Grotius has devoted an entire chapter to prove, by the concurring testimony of all ages and all nations, that good faith should always be observed between enemies in war. Even Bynkershoek, who adopted sentiments respecting the rights of war now happily rejected by the whole civilised world, prohibits perfidy towards an enemy, 'not,' he says, 'because anything is unlawful towards an enemy, but because, when our faith has been pledged to him, so far as the promise extends, he ceases to be an enemy.' Vattel says, that the faith of promises made to an enemy is absolutely essential for

the common safety of mankind, and is, therefore, held sacred by all civilised nations.1

§ 2. Belligerent States, and their armies and fleets, frequently have occasion, during the continuance of a war, to enter into agreements of various kinds; sometimes for a general or partial suspension of hostilities, for the capitulation of a place, or the surrender of an army, for the exchange of prisoners, or the ransom of captured property; and sometimes for the purpose of regulating the general manner of conducting hostilities, or the mode of carrying on the war. All these agreements, of whatsoever kind, are included under the general name of compacts or conventions. These compacts, which relate to the pacific intercourse of the belligerents, suppose the war to continue; those which put an end to it, come under the general head of treaties of peace, which have been considered in a previous chapter."2

1 Grotius, De Jure Bel. ac Pac., liv. iii. ch. xxi.; Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Pub., cap. i.; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. x. § 174.

* In 1870, the French being unable to defend Versailles, suffered the first German troops to enter therein under the following conditions,

viz.:

1. Respect for persons and properties, for public monuments and objects of art.

2. Preservation by the Garde Nationale alone, of arms (without powder), uniforms and posts, for the service of police in the town, and at the prison.

3. The German troops will be lodged in the barracks, and in public buildings turned into barracks. The officers will be lodged among the inhabitants, if necessary (as also soldiers, if the barracks do not suffice).

4. The civil and military hospitals will be respected, and the wounded not imprisoned, according to the Convention of Geneva.

5. The food for marching and forage shall be delivered to the German troops, without any contribution of war. Done at the Hôtel de Ville, the 19th September, 1871.'

This convention was signed, by a Major of the Prussian army, subject to the ratification of the General of his Division. The next day this General informed the Mayor, that this convention could not be ratified, because Versailles was an open town, and not a fortress or stronghold, and that this decision, which had been submitted to the Crown Prince, was according to the laws of war. The articles of convention were therefore null and void. The National Guard were obliged to give up their arms. The Mayor was assured, that the 'laws of humanity' would be observed towards the inhabitants, and that the public buildings, especially the museum, would be respected.

Notwithstanding this, in consequence of the complaints made to him of the robberies and violence on the part of the soldiers, the Mayor was forced to complain to the General, that very same evening.-Delerot,

Versailles.

As an example of courtesy between belligerents, it may be men

$ 3. If the cessation of hostilities is only for a very short period, or at a particular place, or for a temporary purpose, such as for a parley, or a conference, or for removing the wounded, and burying the dead, after a battle, it is called a suspension of arms. This kind of compact may be formed between the immediate commanders of the opposing forces, and is obligatory upon all persons under their respective commands. Even commanding officers of detachments may enter into this kind of compact, but such an agreement can only bind the detachment itself; it cannot affect the opera tions of the main army, or of other troops not under the authority of the officer making it. A suspension of arms i only for a temporary purpose, and for a limited period. I the suspension of hostilities is for a more considerable lengt of time, or for a more general purpose, it is called a truce o an armistice. Truces are either partial or general. A partia truce is limited to particular places, or to particular forces, a a suspension of hostilities between a town or fortress and th forces by which it is invested, or between two hostile armi or fleets. But a general truce applies to the general opera tions of the war, and whether it be for a longer or short period of time, it extends to all the forces of the belligere States, and restrains the state of war from producing its prop effects, leaving the contending parties, and the question between them, in the same situation in which it found the Such a truce has sometimes been called a temporary pea 'but when we call it so,' says Rutherforth, we use t word peace only in opposition to acts of war, and not in opp sition to a state of war.1

tioned that in 1802, on Captain Carden, of the British ship Macedonia presenting his sword to Commodore Decatur, of the American ship t United States,' that officer declared he could never take the sword of man, who had so nobly defended the honour of it.—James, Nav. Hi vol. vi., 121.

1 Rutherforth, Institutes, b. ii. ch. ix. § 22; Martens, Précis du Dr des Gens, § 293.

The Brussels Conference, 1874, declares-Art. 47. An armistice st pends warlike operations by a mutual agreement between the be gerents. Should the duration thereof not be fixed, the belligerents m resume operations at any moment; provided, however, that prop warning be given to the enemy, in accordance with the conditions of t armistice. Art. 48. An armistice may be general or local. The form suspends all warlike operations between the belligerents; the latter or those between certain portions of the belligerent armies, and within fixed radius. Art. 49. An armistice should be notified officially a