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$ 19. The practice of poisoning wells, springs, waters, or any kind of food, for the purpose of injuring an enemy, is now also universally condemned. In addition to the reasons given for prohibiting the use of poisoned weapons, there is the additional one, that by poisoning waters and food, we may destroy innocent persons, and non-combatants. The practice is, therefore, condemned by all civilised nations, and any State or general who should resort to such means, would be regarded as an enemy to the human race, and excluded from civilised society.1

§ 20. The same may be said of assassination, or treacherously taking the life of an enemy. Not unfrequently the success of a campaign, or even the termination of the war, depends on the life of the sovereign, or of the commanding general. Hence, in former times, it sometimes happened that a resolute person was induced to steal into the enemy's camp, under the cover of a disguise, and having penetrated to the general's quarters, to surprise and kill him. Such an act is now deemed infamous and execrable, both in him who executes, and in him who commands, encourages, or rewards it. The consuls Caius Fabricius and Quintus Æmilius rejected with horror the proposal of Pyrrhus's physician to poison his master, and cautioned that prince to be on his guard against the traitor.2 The proposal of the Prince of the Catti to destroy

1 Grotius, de Jur. Bel. ac. Pac., lib. iii. cap. iv. § 17; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. vii. §§ 24, 25; Rayneval, Inst. du Droit Nat., &c., liv. iii. ch. iv.; Heffter, Droit International, § 125; Burlamaqui, Droit de la Nat. et des Gens, tome v. pt. iv. ch. vi.; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. i. tit. iii. § 24.

On February 14, 1862, in the House of Lords, Lord Stanhope called the attention of Lord John Russell to the report, that a second squadron of ships, laden with stone, was to be sunk by the Government of the United States, in the Maffitts Channel of Charleston Harbour. The sinking of large ships, laden with stone, on banks of mud at the entrance of a harbour, could only end in the permanent destruction of the same, and such was not justified by the laws of war. It was not an act of man against man, but against the bounty of Providence, which had vouchsafed harbours for the advantage and intercourse of one people with another. On this ground we (the British) were well entitled to protest against the act. Lord John Russell approved of the protest, and considered the destruction of commercial harbours a most barbarous act. He stated that the French Government took the same view, and were decided to remonstrate with the United States Government.

On February 28, Lord John Russell informed the House that he had received a despatch from Lord Lyons, to the effect that Mr. Seward stated there had not been a complete filling up of Charleston Harbour, and that no more stone ships would be sunk there.

1 In 1806 a foreigner waited on Mr. Fox, then Secretary of State, and

Arminius, was rejected, although Arminius had treacherously cut off Varus, together with three Roman legions, both the Senate and Tiberius deeming it unlawful to poison even a perfidious enemy. It was on the same principle that Alexander formed his judgment of Bessus, who had assassinated Darius. During the middle ages, however, war degenerated into cruelty and barbarism, and poisons and assassinations were frequently resorted to. The assassination of William, Prince of Orange, by the Spaniards, in the war of the Netherlands, is now regarded with universal detestation. But this detestation of the civilised world is not confined to the perpetrators of such acts; those who command, encourage, countenance, or reward them, are equally execrated. And a Government, or a general, who should neglect to punish a subject, or a subordinate, for such a crime, would be justly regarded as odious.

§ 21. But we must distinguish between a treacherous murder and a surprise, which is always allowable in war. A small force, under cover of the night, may pass the enemy's lines, penetrate to his head-quarters, surprise the general, and take him prisoner, or attack and kill him. It was his duty to guard against such attacks, and to prevent a surprise. Such acts are therefore not only justifiable but commendable; it is

made an offer of assassinating Bonaparte, if it met with the approbation of the English Ministry. Mr. Fox had the man secured, and wrote to M. Talleyrand, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, informing him of the circumstance. 'I gave orders to the police officer who accompanied him to send him out of the kingdom as soon as possible;' but afterwards I saw my error in having suffered him to depart, without having previously informed you, and I ordered him to be detained. Our laws do not permit us to detain him long; but he shall not be sent away, till after you shall have had full time to take precautions against his attempts when he goes, I shall take care to have him landed at a seaport as remote as possible from France. He calls himself Guillet de la Gevrillière.'

Mr. Fox evidently intended to deal with this spy under the Alien Act (43 G. III. c. 155).

It is, however, open to doubt whether this spy may not have been sent by Bonaparte himself, to test the newly-appointed statesman. He has been said to have been for ten years the Emperor's secret agent, to have been sent to Warsaw in 1804, to poison Louis XVIII., and to have been mixed up in the disturbances at Vienna, the following year; and after his return from England on this occasion, to have been employed by Bonaparte in Germany, Spain, and Portugal.

Peltier, the editor of a French newspaper published in London, called the Ambigu, was prosecuted by the Attorney-General in the English courts, and convicted of a libel on Bonaparte in 1802; but he escaped punishment owing to war breaking out between the two nations. (Ann. Reg. 1803, p. 230).

he disguise and treachery which gives to the deed the charicter of murder or assassination. The conduct of Leonidas and the Lacedæmonians, who broke into the enemy's camp and made their way directly to the Persian monarch's tent, was justified by the common rules of war, and did not authorise the king to treat them more rigorously than any other enemies. The act of Mucius Scævola, in entering, in disguise, the tent of Porsenna with the intention of killing him, was praised by the age in which he lived, but would not be justified by the rules of modern warfare.

22. War makes men public enemies, but it leaves in force all duties which are not necessarily suspended by the new position in which men are placed towards each other. Good faith is, therefore, as essential in war as in peace, for without it hostilities could not be terminated with any degree of safety, short of the total destruction of one of the contending parties. This being admitted as a general principle, the question arises how far we may deceive an enemy, and what stratagems are allowable in war? Whenever we have expressly or tacitly engaged to speak the truth to an enemy, it would be perfidy in us to deceive his confidence in our sincerity. But if the occasion imposes upon us no moral obligation to disclose to him the truth, we are perfectly justifiable in leading him into error, either by words or actions. Feints, and deceptions of this kind, are always allowable in war. It is the breach of good faith, express or implied, which constitutes the perfidy, and gives to such acts the character of lies.1

23. Stratagems in war are snares laid for an enemy, or deceptions practised on him without perfidy, and consistent with good faith. They are not only allowable, but have often constituted a great share of the glory of the most celebrated commanders. Since humanity obliges us,' says Vattel, 'to

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1 Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 94; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. cc. viii., x.; Leiber, Political Ethics, b. vii. §§ 24, 25; Grotius, De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. iii. cap. viii. §§ 4, 5; Puffendorf, de Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. viii. cap. vi. §6; Garden, De Diplomatie, liv. vi. § 7; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. ii. cap. vi. §§ 1, 2; Bynkershoek, Quaest. Jur. Pub., lib. i.

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Stratagems (ruses de guerre) and the employment of means necessary to procure intelligence respecting the enemy or the country (terrain), (subject to Art. 36, that the population of an occupied territory cannot be compelled to take part in military operations against their country) are considered lawful means.-Brussels Conference, 1874,

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Art. 14

prefer the gentlest methods in the prosecution of our rights, if by a stratagem, by a feint devoid of perfidy, we can make ourselves masters of a strong place, surprise the enemy, and overcome him, it is much better, and is really more commendable, to succeed in this way than by a bloody siege, or the carnage of a battle. These feints, or pretended attacks, are frequently resorted to, and men and ships are sometimes so disguised as to deceive the enemy as to their real character, and by this means enter a place or maintain a position advantageous to their plan of attack or of battle. But the use of stratagems is limited by the rights of humanity and the established usages of war. Even if devoid of perfidy, and consistent with the faith due to the enemy, they must not violate commercial usage, or contravene the stipulations of particular treaties. Vattel mentions the case of an English frigate, which, in the war of 1756, is said to have appeared off Calais, and made signals of distress, with a view of decoying out some vessel, and actually seized a boat and some sailors who generously came to her assistance. If the fact be true, that unworthy stratagem deserves a severe punishment. It tends

1 No trace can be found of this occurrence; Vattel merely tells us that it is said to have happened. The following example, however, is trustworthy, and has been verified by affidavit made before the (colonial) mayor of New York, February 13, 1783. In that year the Sybille,' a French frigate of thirty-eight guns, Captain Le Comte de Krergaron de Soemaria, enticed the British ship 'Hussar,' twenty guns, Captain J. M. Russell, by displaying an English ensign reversed in the main shrouds, and English colours over French at the ensign staff. She was also under jury-masts, had some shot holes, and in every way intimated herself to be a distressed prize to some of the British ships. Captain Russell at once approached to succour her, but she immediately, by a preconcerted and rapid movement, aimed at carrying away the bowsprit of the 'Hussar,' raking, and then boarding her. This ruse de guerre, of so black a tint, was only prevented taking full effect, by the promptitude of Captain Russell, who managed to turn his ship in such a way as only to receive half the raking fire. He then engaged with the Sybille,' and, on eventually capturing her, publicly broke the sword of the French captain, whom he considered had sullied his reputation by descending to fight the 'Hussar' for above thirty minutes under false colours, and with signals of distress flying. She' (the Hussar'), said Captain Russell, had not had fair play, but Almighty God has saved her from the most foul snare, of the most perfidious enemy.' He confined the captain of the 'Sybille' as a State prisoner. It appears that the latter was subsequently brought to trial by his own Government, but was acquitted.

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James narrates (Nav. Hist., vol. vi.) that, in 1813, two merchants of New York, encouraged by a promise of reward from the American Government, formed a plan for destroying the British 74-gun ship 'Ramilies,' Captain Sir Thomas Masterman Hardy. A schooner was laden with several casks of gunpowder, having trains leading from a

to damp a benevolent charity, which should be held sacred in the eyes of mankind, and which is so laudable even between enemies. Moreover, making signals of distress is asking assistance, and by that very action, promising perfect security to those who give the friendly succour. Therefore, the action attributed to that frigate implies an odious perfidy. Ortolan refers to the conduct of an English frigate and two vessels at Barcelona, in 1800, as of the same character as that of the English frigate off Calais, described as above by Vattel. On September 4th, 1800, the English took forcible possession of a Swedish vessel, then neutral, near Barcelona, put a large number of English soldiers and marines on board, and entering the harbour in the night under this neutral flag, and in a neutral vessel, surprised and captured two Spanish frigates which were lying at anchor. Ortolan denounces this as an act of perfidy, and as not being a stratagem allowable by the usages species of gunlock, which, upon the principle of clock-work, went off at a given period after it had been set. On deck were some casks of flour, as it was known that the 'Ramilies' was short of provisions, and it was supposed that Captain Hardy would immediately seize her to revictual his ship. Thus murderously laden, she approached the 'Ramilies,' which detached a boat with thirteen men and a lieutenant to cut her off. The crew immediately abandoned the ship, which was taken by the lieutenant. A few hours afterwards she blew up, the lieutenant and ten of the sailors were killed, and the other three men were shockingly scorched.

1 This is evidently extracted from the Précis des événements militaires,' vol. vii., p. 117, which contains several misrepresentations concerning the affair. The real facts seem to be that, while Barcelona was under blockade of British ships of war, two Spanish corvettes, of twenty-two guns each, were lying in harbour. Sir Thomas Louis determined to cut them out, and ordered eight boats to assist the Niger,' under Captain (afterwards Sir James) Hillyar, in so doing. The attack was late in the evening, and one of the boats was at that time boarding a Swedish galliot, bound into the port. To join this boat, and give directions to the officers, Captain Hillyar went alongside, and continued there with all his boats, while the vessel stood in toward the mole. As they approached to the distance of three-quarters of a mile, Hillyar and his party quitted the vessel two shots were at this moment fired, which passed over the galliot, and two or three minutes after the enemy's outer ship, in Barcelona, discharged her broadside at them; the shot fell short. This proved that the Spaniards did not respect the neutrality of the Swedish flag, and consequently that it did not avail in protecting the British boats, which immediately pulled in. The outer ship was immediately boarded. The other ship thereupon opened fire, but was also carried. The affair was achieved after dark, when no flag could be distinguished, but even if the case had been as the Spaniards represent, it did not prevent their firing upon a defenceless neutral. The Swedish vessel neither contributed to the success of the enterprise, nor to the safety of the men, but it made an impression to the disadvantage of Hillyar, and it required much explanation before the Admiralty, and Lord Nelson, saw the matter in its true light. (See Brent., Nav. Hist. i.)

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