prosecuted the voyage in defiance of the notice or warning. To be binding, the notice or warning must be clear, and not so ambiguous or insidious as to be calculated to mislead the neutral master, otherwise it is illegal and void. Where it is expressed in such general terms as to embrace other ports not blockaded, it is not even valid as to the blockaded port, although included in the general language. Where the notice is irregular and insufficient, no penalty is incurred by its contravention. Proof of the actual knowledge of the party at the inception of the voyage, supersedes, in all cases, the necessity of a warning, nor is it of any importance by what means or in what form he received the information, if the information was credible in its nature, and came in such a form and from such a source as to leave no reasonable doubt on his mind as to its authenticity; he is not permitted to aver that he placed no confidence in a communication that had just claims to his belief. Again, if the voyage was commenced without a knowledge of the blockade, but he was afterward notified of its existence by a cruiser, or officer of the blockading State, and he continue his voyage with the evident intention of entering the blockaded port, he is liable to condemnation.'

§ 23. An actual entrance into a blockaded port is by no means necessary to render a neutral ship guilty of a violation of the blockade. Indeed, such a construction would essentially defeat the very object of a blockade, by rendering the capture of a ship lawful only after such capture had ceased to be possible. Hence it is universally held that an attempt to enter the port, knowing it to be blockaded, completes the offence to which the penalty of the law is attached. It is the attempt to commit the offence which, in the judgment of the

1 Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. i. pp. 147, 148; Duer, On Insurance, vol. i. p. 663; the Henrick and Maria,' 1 Rob., 146; the Vrow Judith," 1 Rob., 150; the 'Apollo,' 5 Rob., 286; the Columbia,' 1 Rob., 156; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 302; Heffter, Droit International, § 155.

A vessel sailing ignorantly to a blockaded port is not liable to capture. -Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch. 335.

The prize courts look with disfavour on the excuse that the purpose of a vessel, in attempting to enter a blockaded port, was to obtain necessary supplies. The 'Argonaut,' Blatchf. Pr. Cas., 62.

Upon a question of breach of blockade, the owners of a vessel are deemed in a prize court conclusively bound in all cases by the act of the master, and so, as a general rule, are persons interested in the cargo.The Aries,' 2 Sprague, 198. But this is qualified by the case of the 'Springbok,' 5 Wall., 1.

law, constitutes the crime, and is as much a breach of neutrality as an actual entrance into the prohibited port. It would be absurd to say that the penalty is not incurred till the unlawful design is fully accomplished, for the offender would, in most cases, be placed, by its accomplishment, beyond the reach of the law. Nor is the word 'attempt' to be understood in a literal and narrow sense. It is not limited to the conduct of the ship at the mouth of the blockaded port, but is applicable to her whole conduct from the moment she has knowledge of the existence of the blockade, and the consequent prohibition of neutral commerce. If she has this knowledge before she begins her voyage, the offence is complete the moment she quits her port of departure; if that knowledge is communicated to her during the voyage, its continued prosecution involves the crime, and justifies the penalty; if it is not given to her till she reaches the blockading squadron, she must immediately retire, or she is made liable to confiscation. It is not the mere mental intention that the law punishes, but it is the overt act by which the execution of an unlawful intent is begun. This overt act is the starting for, or proceeding toward, the prohibited port, with the knowledge that it is blockaded. The same rules prevail in all analogous cases of unlawful voyages.1

24. Several continental writers of authority contend that the inception of a voyage for a blockaded port, with a knowledge of the existence of the blockade, is not such an offence as to render the vessel subject to seizure upon the high seas.

1 Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 28; the 'Vrow Johanna,' 2 Rob., 109; the 'Spes' and the 'Irene,' 5 Rob., 76; the Shepherdess,' 5 Rob., 262; the ‘James Cook,' Edw. R., 261; the 'Betsy,' I Rob., 332; the Nereide,' 9 Cranch. R., 440; Vos and Graves v. N. Ins. Co., 1 Caines Cas., 7; 2 Johns., 180; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch. R., 335; Fitzsimmons v. N. Ins. Co., 4 Cranch. R., 185.

A vessel may sail for a blockaded port after a notification of blockade, for the purpose of inquiry whether the blockade continues.— 1 Park on Ins. 180.

A vessel approaching a blockaded port with intent to violate the blockade is not entitled to be warned off.-The Hallie Jackson,' Blatchf. P. C., 41.

Entry into a blockaded port to obtain necessary supplies excused.— The Forest King,' ibid. 45, and see post, § 32.

The captors of a vessel taken off a blockaded coast are not entitled to prove the intention of her crew to violate the blockade, if such intention does not appear from the ship's papers and the depositions.-The 'Aline and Fanny,' 2 Jur. N. S., 142; the 'Fortuna,' ibid. 71.

Indeed, they regard such seizure as a violation of the liberty of the seas and of the independence of the sovereign State to which the vessel belongs. But English and American publicists have generally held, and the decisions of British and American Courts of Admiralty seem to sustain, the opinion, that the inception of the voyage, with a knowledge of the blockade, and the intention to enter is sufficient in law to constitute the offence and incur penalty, and that the intention will be presumed from the fact of commencing the voyage with the knowledge of the existence of the blockade. They say that the vessel had no right to commence the voyage with such knowledge, and that the act of inception is, in itself, as a general rule, illegal and punishable as a breach of neutrality, and, therefore, that the master or owners are not permitted to aver that they merely intended to proceed to the blockaded port to ascertain, by due inquiry, whether the blockade still continued, and to enter it only in case the blockade had ceased,1

§ 25. But this general rule is subject to some important exceptions, or rather the inference, from the inception of the voyage with knowledge of the blockade, of intention to violate it, may, in some cases, be removed by proof to the contrary. Thus, where the vessel sails from a distant country, she may clear with a provisional destination to the blockaded port, without incurring the penalty of a breach of the blockade, provided it be clearly and positively proved that she intended to proceed to the blockaded port only in case she ascertained, by due inquiry during the voyage, that the blockade had been raised. This may be shown by instructions to the master not to pursue the voyage unless, by inquiry at a port of the blockading power, or of some neutral State, he found that the blockade had ceased. These instructions to the master must clearly set forth the necessity of the previous inquiry, and the mode in which it has to be made, in order to furnish satisfac

1 Olivera v. Union Insurance Co., 3 Wheaton R., 196, note. Vide, also, cases referred to ante, § 23.

Á vessel sailing from a neutral port with intent to violate a blockade is liable to capture and condemnation as a prize from the time of sailing, and the intent to violate the blockade is not disproved by evidence of a purpose to call at another neutral port, not reached at time of capture, with an ulterior destination to the blockaded port.-The Circassian, 2 Wall., 135. And see the 'Nayade,' 1 Newb., 366.

tory proof of the intentions of the parties. The presumption is against them, and to repel the presumption the equivocal evidence of ambiguous instructions will not be sufficient. But no matter how distant the country from which the vessel sails, she has no right to proceed to the entrance of the blockaded port with a view to ascertain from the blockading force whether she can be permitted to enter. An inquiry from the blockading force is only justified when the master who finds himself in its presence was ignorant that the blockade existed. In other cases, a vessel found in a situation to make the inquiry, if destined to the blockaded port, is liable, from her previous knowledge, to instant capture. A neutral merchant, says Sir William Scott, has no right to speculate on the greater or less probability of the termination of a blockade, and, on such speculation, to send his vessel to the very mouth of the blockaded river or port, with instructions to the master to enter, if no blockading force appeared, otherwise to demand a warning, and proceed to a different port. A rule that would permit this would be introductory of the greatest frauds.'

§ 26. 'It seems a just inference from the decisions,' says Mr. Duer, that where the blockade has been constituted simply by the fact of an investment, although its existence was known at the port of departure, previous to the sailing of the neutral ship, she may clear out, provisionally, for the blockaded port; but that, in this, as in former cases, the inquiry upon the result of which the right to complete the voyage must depend, must be made at a port of the blockading State, or of a neutral power. I see no reason to doubt that the prohibition to proceed to the mouth of the blockaded port embraces all cases of a previous knowledge, from whatever source the knowledge may have been derived; and that, in all, its violation is subject to the same penalty.'"

§ 27. There are other cases where the criminal intent to violate a blockade is deduced from the facts existing at the time of capture, and forming a presumption which the party is not permitted to repel by his own denial. Thus, vessels,

1Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 303; the 'Spes' and 'Irene,' 5 Rob., 80; the Posten,' 1 Rob., 536, note; the Little William,' 1 Act. Ad. R., 141.

2 Duer, On Insurance, vol. i. pp. 669, 670.

though not ostensibly destined to the blockaded port, cannot innocently place themselves in a situation that would enable them to violate the blockade at their pleasure. Even when they are bound, by their papers, to different ports, their suspicious approximation to that under blockade will subject them to condemnation. Were they permitted, on the pretence of an intention to proceed to another port, to approach so close to that blockaded as to be able to slip in without obstruction, whenever they choose, it would be impossible that any blockade could be long maintained. Hence, it is not unfair to hold, that the intention of the party, in such cases, to violate the blockade, is a necessary and absolute presumption; although the excuse of necessity, when established, is doubtless to be admitted. The proof, however, must be clear and satisfactory, to remove the inference of guilt.'

§ 28. For a neutral ship to enter a blockaded port, is altogether unlawful. If she entered with a cargo, the legal presumption is, that she went in with the fraudulent intention of delivering it, and if she come out again without delivering it, that fact will not remove the presumption, because some change of circumstance may have altered that intention. If she entered in ballast, it is to be presumed that she went in for the purpose of bringing away property, and, for the same reason as above, her egress, still in ballast, will not oust that presumption. On this point, we quote the remarks of Duer: 'A neutral ship,' he says, 'is not permitted to enter a blockaded port, even in ballast, for, although an exception of this kind is allowed in the case of an egress, the reasons on which it is founded are not applicable to an inward voyage. The egress is necessary to restore the ship to the beneficial use of the owners, and can tend, in no degree, to aid the commerce that is meant to be prohibited; but there can be no necessity for sending a ship to a blockaded port, and the intention of procuring a freight is the only assignable motive of the voyage. It is a fair presumption that it is intended that she shall return with a cargo, purchased or prepared in the blockaded port, not that she shall return in ballast, thus rendering the entire expedition a fruitless expense; nor that

1 The 'Gute Erwartung,' 6 Rob. 182; the 'Arthur,' 1 Edw. R., 202; the 'Charlotte Christine,' 6 Rob., 103.