be lawfully carried on by sea, through channels of communication which could not be obstructed by the forces of the besieging army. But such inference would not be strictly correct, for the difference between a blockade and a siege, in their character and object, have led to a difference in the rules applicable, in the two cases, to neutral commerce. Although the legal effect of a siege on land, that is, a purely military investment of a naval or commercial port, may not be an entire prohibition of neutral commerce, yet it does not leave the ordinary communications by sea open and unrestricted, as a purely maritime blockade leaves the interior communications by land. The primary object of a blockade is, as we have already said, to prohibit commerce; but the primary object of a siege is the reduction of the place. All writers on international law impose upon neutrals the duty of not interfering with this object. To supply the inhabitants of the place besieged with anything required for immediate use, such as provisions and clothing, might be giving them aid to prolong their resistance. It is, therefore, a clear departure from neutral duty to furnish supplies, even of possible utility, to a port in a state of siege, although the communication by sea may be open. It would be a direct interference in the war, tending to the relief of one belligerent, and to the prejudice of the other; and such supplies are justly deemed contraband of war, to the same extent as if destined to the immediate use of the army or navy of the enemy. Hence, although the prohibition of neutral commerce with a port besieged be not entire, yet it will extend to all supplies of even possible utility in prolonging the siege.'

1

1 Duer, On Insurance, vol. i., pp. 656-658; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii., ch vii., § 117.

The permission of the English king, granted to the city of Bremen, for lighters to navigate between the rivers Jade and Weser with innocent cargoes, notwithstanding the blockade, was held to justify the particular trade in which the ship was engaged. Restitution of ship and cargo was decreed, on payment of captor's expenses.-The Maria,' 6 Rob., 201; the 'Charlotte Sophia,' ibid., 204, n.; the 'Lisette,' ibid., 394.

A vessel destined for a neutral port, with no ulterior destination for the ship, or none by sea for the cargo, to any blockaded place, violates no blockade. Hence trade, during the Civil War in the United States, between London and Matamoras, two neutral places, the latter an inland port of Mexico and close to the Federal boundary of Mexico, even with intent to supply, from Matamoras, goods to Texas, then an enemy of the Federal States, was not unlawful on the ground of such violation.

16. The breach of a blockade is viewed, in all cases, as a criminal act; this necessarily implies a criminal intent, and to constitute such intent a knowledge of the existence of the blockade, and an intention to violate it, are indispensable. These are sometimes a presumption of law which the party is not permitted to repel, in others, an inference more or less probable, but in many cases they must be shown by positive evidence. Sometimes one will be presumed, while the other will require positive proof. Although both knowledge and intention must be combined to complete a criminal intent, it is evident that the questions themselves are perfectly distinct, and, in any particular case, may be governed by different rules of evidence. The judicial decisions in England and in the United States have given great precision to the rules of law applicable to a breach of blockade, by the clearness of their reasoning and the equity of their illustrations. They are distinguished, likewise, for general coincidence and harmony in their principles.'

§ 17. It has been held by the English Courts of Admiralty, that the notification of a blockade to a neutral government is, by construction of law, a direct personal notice to each inhabitant of that country, and that he cannot be allowed to aver his own ignorance of the blockade, or otherwise contradict the legal presumption of knowledge. To allow individuals to plead ignorance of a blockade which had been notified to their government, would wholly defeat the object of the notification. It is true that the exclusion of this evidence may operate with severity in particular cases; but an opposite construction would render a notification, in the words of Sir William Scott, 'the most nugatory thing in the world.'

1 For cases of a vessel condemned as enemy's property and for attempt to violate a blockade, see 'The Advocate,' Blatchf., Pr. Cas., 142. For a vessel and cargo condemned for the same cause, see the Shark, Blatchf., Pr. Cas., 215; the 'General C. C. Pinckney,' ib. 278; the 'Zavalla,' ib., 173. For a cargo condemned for attempt to violate blockade, and as enemy's property, see the 'Edward Barnard,' Blatch, Pr. Cas., 122. For a cargo condemned for attempt to violate blockade, and as contraband of war, see the 'Richard O'Bryan,' 2 Sprague, 197 For a vessel and cargo condemned for an actual or attempted violation of blockade, see the Solidad Cos,' Blatchf., Pr. Cas., 94, the Albion,' ibid., 95; the 'Express,' ibid., 128.

A vessel ostensibly bound to Port Royal, then in the possession of the United States forces, was condemned for an attempt to break the blockade of other ports.-The 'Ocean Bird,' 2 Sprague, 261.

If the neutral government should fail to communicate the information to its subjects, by a prompt and authoritative publication of the notice which it receives, those subjects who suffer from such neglect cannot complain of the belligerent State, but must address their complaints, and demand for compensation, to their own government.1

§ 18. A question may here arise as to what constitutes a public notification. This is usually in the form of an official communication from the belligerent to the authorities of neutral States. It may be a notice that a certain port will be blockaded on and after a certain date, or that it is the intention. of the belligerent to proceed to blockade certain ports or harbours. The latter form, being indefinite as to time, would require a subsequent notice of the commencement or time of the actual blockade. Sometimes several notifications are given, such as a notice of intention, a subsequent notice of the sailing of the naval forces for the purpose of carrying that intention into execution, and finally a notice of the actual commencement of the blockade. The two former are given, as a matter of courtesy, for the information of neutrals. The French have held that a general diplomatic notice is not sufficient to charge parties with a knowledge of a blockade, but there must be an actual notice by the blockading force. This doctrine was distinctly announced by Count Molé, in his letter of October 20, 1838, to the French Minister of Marine, in relation to the French blockade of Vera Cruz, Mexico, and is strenuously advocated by Ortolan and other French writers on international law. As already remarked, British writers and British Courts of Admiralty

1 Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. vi., pp. 147, 148; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii., § 290; Duer, On Insurance, vol. i. p. 659; the 'Jonge Petronella,' 2 Rob., 131; the 'Spes and Irene,' 5 Rob., 79; the 'Welvaart,' 2 Rob., 128.

Under the proclamation of blockade by the United States, April 19, 1851, it was not necessary for the lawful capture of a vessel seized for violating the blockade, that a warning should have been previously endorsed on her register, when at the time of capture she possessed knowledge of the blockade.-The Hiawatha,' Blatchf. P. C., 1.

Although a notification of blockade does not, proprio vigore, bind any country but that to which it is addressed, yet in a reasonable time it must affect neighbouring States with knowledge as a reasonable ground of evidence. A vessel seized for breach of blockade by egress was condemned, the court holding the master to have been cognisant of the blockade, although his government had received no notification thereof, and he and his crew swore to ignorance of the fact.-The 'Adelaide,' 2 Rob., 1II.

regard a public or diplomatic notice of a blockade as, by construction of law, a direct, personal notice, to each inhabitant of the State so notified.1

§ 19. Instead of a direct official notification to a neutral government of the establishment of, or intention to institute, a blockade of a particular port, a general notice to that effect is sometimes given by official publication in the newspapers. By this means information is distributed among the mercantile community more generally and expeditiously than through the ordinary channels of official communication with the neutral government. Thus, where the vessel intercepted is destined to a blockaded port, and there is clear and posi tive proof that the existence of the blockade was generally known at her port of departure when she sailed, neither the master nor his owners, nor the shippers of the goods, wil! be permitted to aver their personal ignorance of that which it is scarcely possible they should not have known, or, at any rate, by due inquiry might have ascertained. To allow proof of personal ignorance in such a case, by admitting the affidavits of the master or his crew, would be a direct invitation to perjury and fraud.2

§ 20. Where a neutral vessel is intercepted on her passage, with a cargo from a blockaded port, and the cargo is proved to have been shipped after the blockade had commenced, and was known at the port, the party is precluded from denying his knowledge of its existence. The personal ignorance of the master, in such a case, could only have arisen from a fraudulent determination not to know,-an obstinate exclusion of knowledge it was his duty to have acquired; and if his personal ignorance could be proved, it would not form even an equitable defence. He is, therefore, very justly precluded from denying his knowledge of what is morally impossible he should have been ignorant of, except for a fraudulent intent.3

1 Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. ix. ch. v. §§ 1, 2; Duer, On Insurance, vol. i. p. 659; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 291.

2 The Adelaide, 2 Rob., 111; the 'Frederick Molke,' 1 Rob., 86; the 'Hare,' 1 Act. Ap. Ca., 261.

A notice of blockade to the officials of a neutral government is suffi cient notice to the subjects of such government. The Hiawatha, Blatchf. P. C., I.

On notice of blockade a neutral vessel has a right to withdraw from the blockaded port, with all the cargo honestly laden on board, before the commencement of the blockade.-Ibid.

> The 'Frederick Molke,' 1 Rob., 86; the 'Vrouw Judith,' 1 Rob., 150.

§ 21. There are many cases where the inference of a knowledge of the blockade is so probable as to create a strong presumption, but a presumption not entirely conclusive, and which may be repelled by unimpeached and positive proof. Thus a public notification to one neutral State will be presumed, in due time, to reach the inhabitants of a neighbouring power not officially notified of the blockade, as such information, generally circulated in one country, must of necessity in time reach the knowledge of the inhabitants of an adjoining country. But as such notification does not, proprio vigore, bind the inhabitants of any State but that to which it is addressed, the presumption of such knowledge, in a reasonable time, may be repelled by positive evidence. So, where a blockade has lasted for such a considerable time as to render it highly probable that its existence must have been known at the port of departure, a knowledge of it will be presumed, and it will rest upon the party to show by satisfactory proof that he was not apprised of the blockade. Again, where the neutral vessel is intercepted on her egress from a blockaded port, with a cargo shipped immediately after the blockade had commenced, and while it might have been unknown to the inhabitants of the port when the vessel sailed, the party will be allowed to rebut the presumption of law by satisfactory proof of his ignorance of the establishment of the blockade. In all cases of this kind, where the presumption of knowledge is not absolute and conclusive, the neutral claimant is allowed to prove his own innocence. And the captor can judge from the nature and circumstances of each particular case, whether the neutral vessel is acting in good faith, and is really ignorant of the existence of the blockade, or whether the pretended ignorance is a mere fraudulent attempt to deceive.1

§ 22. Where there are no legal or probable grounds for imputing to the master of a neutral vessel the knowledge of the existence of a blockade which he is charged to have violated, it rests upon the captor to establish the fact of this knowledge by positive evidence. To warrant a condemnation, the proof must be clear and definite that such vessel had been duly notified of the blockade, and had undertaken or

'The Calypso,' 2 Rob., 298; the Hurtige Hane,' 3 Rob., 328; Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des Prises, tit. vi. ch. ii. § 2.