government of the State or from some officer to whom the authority has been expressly or impliedly delegated. The general of an army, or the commander of a fleet, in a foreign country, or on a distant station, may be reasonably presumed to carry with him this authority, as the exigencies of the service on which he is employed, under the varying circumstances of the war, would often seem to require its exercise. His authority in such cases is, therefore, implied from the nature of the service. But where the station of the army or fleet is so near the government of the belligerent State as to enable the commander to receive direct and special instructions, it would seem that the necessity of presuming power in the officer does not exist, and it has been suggested by some, that it is the duty of the commander, in such a case, if his authority should be questioned, to justify his acts by express proof of the instructions of his government. The weight of authority, however, is in favour of the rule that a neutral individual is never at liberty to impeach the regularity of a siege or blockade, otherwise valid, by questioning the authority of the officer by whom it was established or is enforced. The officer is undoubtedly answerable to his own government for any irregular or unauthorised acts, but so long as they are acts of legitimate hostility, it is not open to a neutral State or its subjects, under any circumstance, to dispute their validity. The orders of his government are known only to that government and the officer, and cannot be inquired into by third parties. If he has acted without orders, and his acts are subsequently adopted and ratified, such ratification supplies the want of an original authority, and precludes all further inquiry. But if the act is disavowed by the government of the belligerent State, or if it can be proved that the officer exceeded his actual authority, such disavowal or excess may be urged as a valid defence. Where a blockade has been declared by the government, the commander of the blockading squadron has no discretionary power to extend its limits; and if he prohibits neutral ships from entering ports not embraced in the terms of the blockade he was appointed to enforce, the warning is illegal, and no penalty is incurred by the neutral master by whom it is disregarded.1

Duer, On Insurance, vol. i. p. 646; the 'Henrick and Maria,' 1 Rob., 146; the 'Rolla,' 6 Rob., 366; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii.

§ 3. A siege is a military investment of a place, so as to intercept, or render dangerous, all communications between the occupants and persons outside of the besieging army; and the place is said to be blockaded, when such communication, by water, is either entirely cut off or rendered dangerous, by the presence of the blockading squadron. A place may be both besieged and blockaded at the same time, or its communications by water may be intercepted, while those by land may be left open, and vice versa. Both are instituted by the rights of war, and for the purpose of injuring the enemy, and both impose upon neutrals the duty of not interfering with the operations of the belligerents. But there is an important distinction, with respect to neutral commerce, between a maritime blockade and a military siege. The object of a blockade is solely to distress the enemy, intercepting his commerce with neutral States. It does not, generally, look to the surrender or reduction of the blockaded port, nor does it necessarily imply the commission of hostilities against the inhabitants of the place. The object of a military siege is, on the other hand, to reduce the place by capitulation, or otherwise, into the possession of the besiegers. It is by the direct application of force, that this object is sought to be attained, and it is only by forcible resistance that it can be defeated. Hence, every besieged place is, for the time, a military post; for even when it is not defended by a military garrison, its inhabitants are converted into soldiers by the necessities of self-defence. This distinction is not merely nominal, but, as will be shown hereafter, leads to important consequences in determining the rights of neutral commerce, and in deciding questions of capture.'

§ 288; the Juffrow Maria Schroeder,' 3 Rob., 154; Cameron v. Kyte, 3 Knapp. R., 342; Chitty, Law of Nations, p. 259; Riquelme, Derecho Pub. Int., lib. i. tit. ii. cap. xviii.; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. ii. cap. viii. § 5.

To create the right of blockade and other belligerent rights, as against neutrals, it is not necessary that the party claiming them should be at war with a separate and independent power. The parties to a civil war are in the same predicament as two nations who engage in a contest and have recourse to arms. See Prize Cases determined in the Supreme Court of the United States, 1862; 2 Black, 635.-The Brilliante' v. United States, 11 Am. Law Rep., N.S., 334.

1 The 'Stert,' 4 Rob., 66; Kluber, Droit des Gens Moderne, § 297: Heffter, Droit International, § 154.

General Le Blois, in his work Fortifications in presence of the New

§4. It is now a well-settled principle of international jurisprudence, that a lawful maritime blockade of a port requires the actual presence of the blockading force. A mere proclamation or notification of one belligerent, that such a port of the other belligerent will be blockaded at such a time, and thus closed to neutral commerce, is not sufficient to constitute a legal blockade; the force must be actually present at the entrance to the port, or sufficiently near to prevent communication. Nor is the mere presence of a hostile force sufficient, of itself, to make the blockade a legal one; it must not only be actually present, but it must be large enough to prevent communication, or, at least, to render it dangerous to attempt to enter the port.1

§ 5. The only exception to the general rule which requires the actual presence of an adequate force to constitute a legal blockade, is the temporary absence of the blockading squad

Artillery (1865) strongly recommends that hollow projectiles be thrown upon all points of the interior of a fortified place. 'Shell the dwellinghouses,' says he; when the shells fall in the various quarters the catastrophes are in proportion to the density of the population. Death hovers above the heads of all. Each individual feels threatened as to his own existence and that of all he holds dear in the world, while at any moment his property may be desroyed by fire. . . . The Governor is made responsible for all the disasters that occur; the people rise against him, and his own troops seek to compel him to an immediate capitulation.'

• Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. i. p. 144; Wheaton, Elem. Int. Law, pt. iv. ch. iii. § 28; Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 289; the Betsey,' 1 Rob., 92; the Mercurius,' 1 Rob., 82, 83; the 'Vrouw Judith,' 1 Rob., 150; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome ii. ch. ix.; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. ix. ch. i. ; De Cussy, Droit Maritime, liv. i. tít. iii. § 11.

A legal blockade cannot exist where no actual blockade can be applied. If the besieging force cannot apply its power to every point of the blockaded State, it is no blockade of that quarter where its power cannot be brought to bear. An internal canal navigation, where no blockade existed or could exist, was held exempt from all consequences of blockade. -The 'Stert,' 44 Rob. 66.

Under particular circumstances, a single vessel may be adequate to maintain the blockade of one port, and co-operate with other vessels at the same time in the blockade of another neighbouring port. Condemnation accordingly (reversing the decision of the Vice-Admiralty Court), for breach of a blockade so maintained.—The 'Nancy,' 1 Acton, 63.

Blockading ships are at liberty to take a prize if it comes in the way, but they are not to chase to a distance, for that would be a desertion of their duty of blockade.- La Mélanie,' 2 Dodson, 130.

There are two sorts of blockade-one by the simple fact only, the other by a notification accompanied with the fact. The 'Neptunus,'

1 Rob., 171.

A proclamation by a Commander, without an actual investment, will not constitute a legal blockade.-The Betsey,' I Rob. 93.

ron produced by accident, as in the case of a storm. Such accidental removal of blockading force, if it be only for a very short time, does not suspend the legal operation of the blockade, and an attempt to take advantage of such an accidental removal is regarded as a fraudulent attempt to break the blockade. But if the blockading forces should be so scattered or injured by the storm, as to be unable to resume their stations without repairs, and within a reasonable time, the blockade will be considered as terminated, in the same manner as if the blockading squadron had been driven away by a superior force of the enemy. Some ports are subject to such periodical storms during one or more months of the year, that any blockading squadron is obliged to leave its station, and seek refuge in some other harbour till the season of storms is passed. In such cases the legal operation of the blockade is suspended. It should be remembered, however, that some text-writers do not admit this exception of the temporary and accidental absence of the blockading force. They say that the blockade is not mere theory, but the material result of a material fact (résultat matériel d'un fait matériel), and, consequently, cannot exist in the absence of that fact. That, therefore, the blockade must be regarded as raised the moment the blockading force is removed, no matter whether the absence is for a long or short period, or whether produced by accident, by storm, or by an opposing force.1

§ 6. A constructive, or, as it is sometimes called, a paper blockade, is one established by proclamation, without the actual presence of an adequate force to prevent the entrance of neutral vessels into the port or ports so pretended to be blockaded. In other words, it is an attempt on the part of one belligerent, by mere proclamation and without possessing, or if possessing, without using the means of establishing a real blockade, to close the port or ports of the opposite belligerent to neutral commerce. Can such fictitious or paper blockades render criminal the entrance of neutral vessels into ports so proclaimed to be, but not actually, blockaded? If so,

The Columbia,' 1 Rob., 154; the Triheten,' 6 Rob., 65; the 'Hoffnung,' 6 Rob., 116; the 'Frederick Molke,' 1 Rob., 73; the 'Juffrow Maria Schroeder,' 3 Rob., 155; Radcliff v. U. Ins. Co., 7 Johns., 38; Laing, v. U. Ins. Co., 2 Johns., 178.

a mere paper proclamation is equally as efficacious in war as the largest and most powerful fleets.1

§ 7. The ancient text-writers all agree, that a blockade, which does not really exist, but is merely declared by proclamation, is not sufficient to render commercial intercourse unlawful on the part of neutrals. Grotius forbids the carrying of anything to 'a town actually invested, or a port closely blockaded;' and Bynkershoek evidently concurred with Grotius, in requiring a strict and actual siege or blockade, such as where a town is actually invested with troops or a port closely blockaded by ships of war (oppidum obsessum, portos clausos). This is shown from his remarks upon the various decrees of the States-General. The general practice of the Continental powers accorded with the opinions of these writers. In the convention of 1801, between Great Britain and Russia, intended as a final adjustment of the disputed points of maritime law which had given rise to the armed neutrality of 1780 and 1801, the general law of nations as to what constitutes a blockade is very correctly expressed. The third article, section fourth, of that convention, declares : 'That in order to determine what characterises a blockaded port, that denomination is given only where there is, by the disposition of the power which attacks it with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering.' The same definition of a blockade is implied in the previous treaties between Great Britain and the Baltic powers, and in that of 1794, with the United States. In 1804, instructions were sent by the Board of Admiralty to the naval commanders

1 The Betsey,' 1 Rob., 92; the 'Mercurius,' 1 Rob., 84; Reddie, Researches, Historical, etc., vol. ii. p. 16; Pistoye et Duverdy, Traité des Prises, tit. vi. ch. ii. § 2; Heffter, Droit International, § 157.

With respect to blockade, though the law remains unaltered, the application of it to practice has been very much altered by the introduction of steam power. A port must be strictly blockaded; but for the purposes of blockade two or three steam vessels might now be as effective as twenty sailing vessels were formerly. (See Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, May 16, 1861.)

A blockade is not to be extended by construction. The mouth of the Rio Grande was not included in the blockade of the ports of the Southern States, set on foot by the Federal Government, during the late American Civil War; and neutral commerce with Matamoras, a neutral town on the Mexican side of the river, except in contraband destined to the enemy, was entirely free. Semble, a belligerent cannot blockade the mouth of a river, occupied on one bank by neutrals with complete rights of navigation. The Peterhoff,' 5 Wall., 28.