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takes to enlist soldiers in a foreign country, without the sovereign's permission,—and, in general, whoever entices away the

Britain having been, as it is said, "the navy yard of the insurgents," it was of course impossible to prevent the Confederate Government, reduced to desperate straits by the blockade, and in want of ships of war, from resorting to the ship-builders' yards of Great Britain. It was impossible to prevent the ship-builders, who looked upon the furnishing of such vessels as purely commercial transactions, the Messrs. Laird who built the "Alabama," having been perfectly willing, as appears from their correspondence with a Mr. Howard, who professed to have authority to enter into a contract with them to build vessels for the Federal Government, to supply ships to the latter as well as to the insurgents,-and who appear to have thought that, so long as the ships were not armed in British waters, such transaction would not be within the Foreign Enlistment Act,-from entering into such contracts. All the Government could do was to use reasonable care to see that the Act was not violated.'

'Two vessels of war, and two only, the "Florida” and the "Alabama," equipped in British waters, found their way into the hands of the Confederates. Whether, in respect of them, the British authorities were wanting in due diligence will be matter for future consideration, when these vessels come specifically under review. The most unjustifiable charge that the Government were wilfully wanting in the discharge of their duty from motives of partiality has, I hope, been already disposed of. Every other vessel built or equipped in British waters for the war service of the Confederate Government was prevented by the act of the British Government from coming into their hands. Immediate and untiring attention was paid to the frequent applications of Mr. Adams, which, for the most part, turned out to have proceeded on erroneous information. It may have been that, in the cases of the "Florida" and the "Alabama," the local officers may have been somewhat too much disposed to leave it to the United States' officers to make out the case against the vessels. But such, as we have seen, had been the traditional view of the matter, not only in England but in the United States. These officers may have attached too much importance to the fact that the vessels, though equipped for receiving arms, were not actually armed before leaving the port. In that they only shared the opinion of two distinguished judges in the Court of Exchequer. But when the authorities had become thoroughly alive to what was going on, no vessel of war to which the notice of the Government was called, and which proved to be intended for war, was suffered to escape. An enumeration of the instances on which inquiry was instituted by Her Majesty's Government, with the results, will set this part of the case in its true light, and show the flagrant injustice of the wholesale accusations which have been so unwarrantably made.'

He thus concludes this exhaustive and lucid investigation on the laws of neutrality :—

'I have now gone through the cases of all the different vessels in respect of which claims have been preferred for losses sustained through the alleged want of due diligence on the part of the British Government. After all that has been said and written, it is only in respect of two vessels, both equipped, at the very outset of the civil war, and before the contrivances resorted to had become known by experience, that this tribunal, which has not shown a disposition to take too indulgent a view of the fulfilment of neutral obligations, has been able to find any default in British authorities at home, while in respect of a third, the tribunal, by a majority of one voice only, has fixed the Government with liability for an alleged

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subjects of another State, violates one of the most sacred rights of the prince and the nation. This crime is distinguished by the name of kidnapping, or man-stealing, and is punished with the utmost severity in every well-regulated

error in judgment of the Governor of a distant Colony in respect of allowance of coal, and for the want of vigilance of the police in not preventing men from joining a Confederate vessel at night. We have here the best practical answer to the sweeping charges so perseveringly brought against the British Government and people.

"I concur entirely with the rest of the tribunal, in holding that the claim for cost of pursuit and capture must be rejected. This item of expense formed part of the general expense of the war. The cruisers employed on this service would, probably, have been kept in commission had the three vessels in question never left the British shores.'

In 1870, during the Franco-German War, the British Government directed the seizure of a steamer about to leave England for the purpose of laying down a deep sea telegraphic cable between certain ports of one of the belligerents. On application under the 23rd section of the 33 and 34 Vict. c. 90, by the owners of the ship and her cargo for the release of the same, it was held by the Court of Admiralty that primâ facie the transaction was a commercial one between subjects of Great Britain and of a Government in friendly relations with her; that it was not a case to consider whether the vessel might have been seized by a Prussian cruiser as being employed in the service of France, or as carrying contraband of war of a novel kind, but falling under the old principle; the carrier of contraband may violate the proclamation of the neutral State, of which he is a member, and deprive himself of the right to protection from her, but the punishment of his offence is, by the general law of nations, left to the belligerent who has the right of capture. The offence is not cognisable by the municipal law of Great Britain. The only bearing of the law of contraband on the case would arise from the analogies furnished by that law, namely, that as 'circumstances arising out of a particular situation of the war and condition of the parties engaged in it' (the 'Jonge Margaretha' 1 Rob., 193) might clothe an article ancipitis usûs, with the character of contraband, so it might be argued that the character of the International' might bring her within the category of a ship despatched for the naval service of France. The statute, by specifying 'military telegraphy,' had not excluded the possibility of showing, that in the particular circumstances of the case, postal telegraphy must be considered, as the telegraphy employed in the military service of the State. The Company was formed to furnish ordinary postal telegraphs; the contract with the French Government was to furnish telegraphy of this kind only. No other kind was furnished. It was probable that this telegraphic line would be partially used for effecting communication between the French army and that Government, but neither did this appear to be the main object of the line, nor could it, without additions and adaptations, with which this Company had no concern, be made even partially to subserve this end. The probability that the line might be occasionally used for military, among other, purposes, was not sufficient to divest the line of its primary and paramount commercial character, and to subject the Company to the very severe penalty imposed by the statute. There was a 'reasonable and probable cause' for the detention of the ship and cargo, and for putting the applicants on their defence. Release of the vessel decreed, but without costs or damages.-The International,' 3 Mar. Law. Cas., 523.

State. Foreign recruiters are hanged without mercy, and with great justice. It is not presumed that their sovereign has ordered them to commit a crime, and, even supposing that they had received such an order, they ought not to have obeyed it, their sovereign having no right to command what is contrary to the law of nature. . If it appear that they acted by order, such a proceeding in a foreign sovereign is justly considered as an injury, and as sufficient cause for declaring war against him, unless he make a suitable reparation.''

$ 15. The next question to be considered is, whether neutrals may assist a belligerent by money, in the shape of a loan or otherwise, without violating the duties or departing from the position of neutrality? It seems to be universally conceded, that if such loan be made for the manifest purpose of enabling the belligerent to carry on the war, it would be a virtual concurrence in the war, and consequently a just cause of complaint by the opposite party. But Vattel contends that the loaning of money to one belligerent, by the subjects of a neutral State, is not such a breach of neutrality as to be either a cause of war or of complaint, provided the loan is made for the purpose of getting good interest, and not for the purpose of enabling one belligerent to attack the other. Phillimore very properly regards this as a manifest frittering away of the important duties of the neutral; and that it is as much a violation of neutral duty to furnish the one as the other of the

two main nerves, iron and gold,'

for the equipage and conduct of the war. The English courts have decided that such loans are in violation of international law, and that they will take no notice of, nor render any assistance in, any transactions growing out of such loans, unless raised with the special licence of the crown.2

1 Wolfius, Jus. Gentium, § 754; Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. iii. ch. ii.

§ 15. Phillimore, On Int. Law, vol. iii. § 151; De Wurtz v. Hendricks, 9 Moore R., p. 586; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. ii. cap. vii. § 3.

It is contrary to the law of nations for persons residing in Great Britain to enter into engagements to raise money, by way of loan, for the purpose of supporting subjects of a foreign State in arms against a Government in alliance with Great Britain.-De Wurtz v. Hendricks, 9 Moore C.P., 586.

In the judgment in this case, Mr. Justice Best observed that the Court

§ 16. Armed cruisers, in neutral ports, are not only bound not to violate the peace while within neutral jurisdiction, but of Chancery had decided, under circumstances of a precisely similar nature, in the same manner. British Courts of Justice will not take notice of, or afford any assistance to, persons who set about raising loans for subjects of a foreign Government, to enable them to prosecute war against that Government. At all events such loans cannot be raised without the licence of the Crown. See also Josephs v. Pebrer, 1 Car., and Pay, N. Pri. C., 341.

The two following opinions of the British law officers relate to the above question :—

'To the Right Hon. George Canning, M.P., &c.

'DOCTORS' COMMONS, June 17, 1823. 'SIR,-We have been honoured with your commands, signified in Mr. Planta's letter of the 12th inst., stating that you were desirous that we should report our opinion upon the following questions :

1. Whether subscriptions for the use of one of two belligerent States by individual subjects of a nation professing and maintaining a strict neutrality between them be contrary to the law of nations, and constitute such an offence as the other belligerent would have a right to consider as an act of hostility on the part of the neutral Government?

2. If such individual voluntary subscriptions in favour of one belligerent would give such just cause of offence to the other, whether loans for the same purpose would give the like cause of offence?

3. And, if not, where is the line to be drawn between a loan at an easy or mere nominal rate of interest, or a loan with a previous understanding that interest would never be exacted, and a gratuitous voluntary subscription?

In obedience to your commands, we beg leave to report that we have taken the same into our consideration, and we are of opinion that subscriptions of the nature above alluded to, for the use and avowedly for the support of one of two belligerent States against the other, entered into by individual subjects of a Government professing and maintaining neutrality, are inconsistent with that neutrality, and contrary to the law of nations; but we conceive that the other belligerent would not have a right to consider such subscriptions as constituting an act of hostility on the part of the Government, although they might afford just ground of complaint, if carried to any considerable extent. With respect to loans, if entered into merely with commercial views, we think, according to the opinions of writers on the law of nations and the practice which has prevailed, they would not be an infringement of neutrality; but if, under colour of a loan, a gratuitous contribution was afforded without interest, or with mere nominal interest, we think such a transaction would fall within the opinion given in answer to the first question. We have the honour to be, &c., CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON (King's Advocate); R. GIFFORD (Attorney-General); J. S. COPLEY (Solicitor-General).

'LINCOLN'S INN, June 21, 1823.

'SIR, We have been honoured with your commands, signified to us by Mr. Planta in his letter dated 18th inst., in which he states, with reference to the queries proposed to His Majesty's law officers in his letter of the 13th inst., he was directed by you further to ask for our opinion whether, having regard to the municipal law of this country, there exists any, and what, means of proceeding legally against individuals and corporations engaged in such subscriptions as were described in those queries.

they cannot use the asylum as a shelter from which to make an attack upon the enemy. Hence, if an armed vessel of one belligerent should depart from a neutral port, no armed vessel, being within the same, and belonging to an adverse belligerent power, can depart until twenty-four hours after the former, without being deemed to have violated the law of nations. And if any attempt at pursuit be made, the neutral is justified in resorting to force, to compel respect to the sanctity of its neutrality.1

17. If a belligerent cruiser, in acting offensively, passes over a portion of water within neutral jurisdiction, that fact is not usually considered such a violation of the territory as to invalidate an ulterior capture made beyond it. Permission to pass over territorial portions of the sea is not usually

'We have accordingly taken the same into consideration, and beg leave to report that, reasoning upon general principles, we should be inclined to say that such subscriptions in favour of one of two belligerent States, being inconsistent with the neutrality declared by the Government of the country and with the law of nations, would be illegal, and subject the parties concerned in them to prosecution for a misdemeanor, on account of their obvious tendency to interrupt the friendship subsisting between this country and the other belligerent, and to involve the State in dispute, and possibly in the calamities of war. It is proper, however, to add that subscriptions of a similar nature have formerly been entered into (particularly the subscription in favour of the people of Poland in 1792 and 1793), without any notice having been taken of them by the public authorities of the country, and without any complaint having, as far as we can learn, been made by the Powers whose interests might be supposed to have been affected by such subscriptions. Neither can we find any instance of a prosecution having been instituted for an offence of this nature, or any hint at such a proceeding in any period of our history. We think, therefore, even if it could be proved that the money had been actually sent in pursuance of the subscription, it is not likely that a prosecution against the individuals concerned in such a measure would be successful.

'But, until the money be actually sent, the only mode of proceeding, as we conceive, would be for counselling or conspiring to assist with money one of the belligerents in the contest with the other, a prosecution attended with still greater difficulty.

'We beg leave further to report that no criminal proceeding can be instituted against a corporation for contributing its funds to such a subscription, but that the individual members who may be proved to have acted in the transaction can alone be made criminally responsible. 'We have the honour to be, &c.

'R. GIFFORD.
'J. S. COPLEY.'

1 Kent, Com. on Am. Law, vol. i. p. 122; Azuni, Droit Maritime, tome ii. ch. v.; Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, tome ii. ch. viii.; Hautefeuille, Des Nations Neutres, tit. vi. ch. i. ; Pistoye et Duverdy, Des Prises Maritimes, tit. i. ch. i. sec. 3.

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