Strategic Defense Initiative: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-ninth Congress, First Session, October 30; November 6, 21; December 3, 5, 1985U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986 - 425 lappuses |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 91.
3. lappuse
... offensive buildup in nuclear systems when in fact we have seen a dramatic buildup on the Soviet side and indeed somewhat of a buildup on our own . But recently , in the last couple of weeks , we have seen a new in- terpretation being ...
... offensive buildup in nuclear systems when in fact we have seen a dramatic buildup on the Soviet side and indeed somewhat of a buildup on our own . But recently , in the last couple of weeks , we have seen a new in- terpretation being ...
7. lappuse
... offensive nuclear arms . But we must also keep in mind that the decision to introduce ballistic missile defenses and its timing is not up to us alone . Judg- ing from past trends , it is not implausible that the Soviet Union will move ...
... offensive nuclear arms . But we must also keep in mind that the decision to introduce ballistic missile defenses and its timing is not up to us alone . Judg- ing from past trends , it is not implausible that the Soviet Union will move ...
12. lappuse
... offensive nuclear weapons ; and certainly to coordinate the SDI with our other defense programs and to support other stra- tegic defense missions . I would like to stress that there are many technologies and some specific programs that ...
... offensive nuclear weapons ; and certainly to coordinate the SDI with our other defense programs and to support other stra- tegic defense missions . I would like to stress that there are many technologies and some specific programs that ...
15. lappuse
... offense - defense relationship and stability in the defense and space talks under way in Geneva to lay the foundation to ... offensive nuclear forces and the pros- pect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deter- rence ...
... offense - defense relationship and stability in the defense and space talks under way in Geneva to lay the foundation to ... offensive nuclear forces and the pros- pect of nuclear retaliation will remain the key element of deter- rence ...
17. lappuse
... offensive ballistic missiles , then phasing in defenses , that eventually these defenses can become totally effective . If , however , say sometime in the next century , the Soviet Union would continue to oppose such a cooperative ...
... offensive ballistic missiles , then phasing in defenses , that eventually these defenses can become totally effective . If , however , say sometime in the next century , the Soviet Union would continue to oppose such a cooperative ...
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Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
ABM systems ABM Treaty ABRAHAMSON administration Agreed Statement agreement allies Ambassador Smith areas arms control Article II(1 article III attack ballistic missiles battle management believe BUCHSBAUM capability Chairman committee components based Congress decision defense system delegation deleted deploy deployment deterrence development and testing discussion effective EXON exotic systems fense future systems GOLDWATER hearings ICBMs IKLE interceptor issue Judge SOFAER kind laser launchers limited ment military missile defense mobile NATO negotiating record nuclear weapons offensive Parnas PERLE phase physical principles President problem prohibited question radars reliable restrictive interpretation RHINELANDER SALT II SDI Program SDI research SDIO Secretary Senator COHEN Senator EXON Senator HART Senator LEVIN Senator NUNN Senator QUAYLE Senator WARNER Senator WILSON sensors Soviet Union space-based specific Strategic Defense Initiative subcommittee systems and components systems or components talking targets technical Thank things threat tion understand warheads
Populāri fragmenti
420. lappuse - Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars...
64. lappuse - AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
166. lappuse - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
139. lappuse - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles...
164. lappuse - Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time...
207. lappuse - our research program has been structured and, as the President has reaffirmed, will continue to be conducted in accordance with a restrictive interpretation of the treaty's obligations".
138. lappuse - Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory...
190. lappuse - ... missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems...
413. lappuse - The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blue prints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.
227. lappuse - ... which are space-based, as well as sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based. The US side understands this prohibition not to apply to basic and advanced research and exploratory development of technology which could be associated with such systems, or their components. There are no restrictions on the development of lasers for fixed,, land-based ABM systems. The sides have agreed, however, that deployment of such systems which would be capable of substituting for current ABM components, that...