opinions, seems to have been the view and practice of the Treasury Department. In the first of these opinions Mr. Harmon, after reasoning from a comparison of the phrase used in Article II that the fact of unavoidable detention shall be certified by the proper Chinese consul in this country, uses the following language: "The only other possible construction is that the phrase 'Chinese consul at the port of departure' was intended to designate our consuls at Chinese ports, but such construction would require an entire change of the language used. When that meaning was intended, Article III shows that the makers of the treaty knew how to express it. * * * While the language of the section you submit is not explicit, and the question presented can not therefore be answered with entire freedom from doubt, my opinion is that the officer to whom the facts of sickness or disability are to be reported is the consul who represents the Chinese Government at the place whence the laborer left the United States." It will be observed that there is no reference in these opinions to the act of 1888 as operative in this field. This leads me to another reason for concurring in the conclusions reached by Acting Attorney-General Conrad, and those indicated with some hesitation by Mr. Harmon. The act of September 13, 1888, was passed with reference to a treaty between the United States and China then pending, which was never ratified. It has always been doubtful whether any part of this act took effect. Section 1 made it unlawful after the ratification of that treaty for any Chinese person to enter the United States "except as hereinafter provided." That would seem to make the entire act dependent upon the treaty. Section 15 obviously was never operative, because it expressly imposes the condition of ratification. The Federal courts in various districts have, for the most part, held that sections 2 to 4 and section 15 have no field of operation, but that other parts of the act, especially sections 12 and 13, are in force; and it must be conceded that hitherto the right of appeal of Chinamen from judgments of deportation under section 13 has been recognized by the courts and not resisted by the Government. Notes to the Treasury Digest of the Chinese exclusion laws, 1899, page 15, note 1, and to 2 Supp. Rev. Stat., page 141, note 1, state the uncertainty on the subject and cite the decisions. The latter note shows that the formal attitude of the Treasury Department has been that the act of September 13, 1888, was "dependent upon the ratification of the then pending treaty with China, which treaty was not ratified." The Supreme Court, in the case of Wong Wing v. United States (163 U. S., 228), mentioned a section of the act of 1888 without discussing or passing upon the validity of that act as dependent upon the treaty. In the case of Li Sing v. United States (180 U. S., 486, 488, 490), the court say: "But the act of September 13, 1888, was passed to take effect upon the ratification of a treaty then pending between the United States and the Emperor of China, and it is conceded that such treaty never was ratified. Without finding it necessary to say that there are no provisions in the act of September 13, 1888, which from their nature are binding on the courts as existing statements of the legis lative will, we are ready to hold that section 12 of that act can not be so regarded." %% * * I do not undertake now to say that there are no portions of the act which are not in force, but the current doubt whether it is at all operative has an important bearing upon the present inquiry. For the language of section 7 of the act of 1888 is followed so substantially in Article II of the treaty of 1894, and yet with such express variation as to the feature before us, that we are impelled to conclude that Congress deliberated upon the very point and clearly determined it by establishing that variation instead of the rule of the act. I therefore hold that Article II of the treaty has thus far replaced and abrogated section 7 of the act, and I so answer your question. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. P. C. KNOX. NAVAL COURT-MARTIAL-ATTESTATION OF SENTENCE. The death of one of the members of a general court-martial after sentence had been imposed, but before he had appended his signature to the sentence, as required by article 52 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy (sec. 1624, Rev. Stat.), does not render the sentence void. It is sufficiently authenticated if attested by the other members of the court. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, October 11, 1901. SIR: I have received your request for an opinion upon the question whether the judgment of a general court-martial sentencing Edward Farrell, landsman, United States Navy, on July 5 last, to confinement for one year for desertion, is or is not sufficiently authenticated. The question arises from the fact that after the sentence was imposed one of the members of the court was taken sick and died without having appended his signature to the sentence. It appears that the Department returned the record to have the signature appended, and the president of the court indorsed the following: "Since the record in the case of Edward Farrell, landsman, was ready for signature, Lieutenant-Commander Cresap has been off duty because of illness, with small possibility of speedy recovery." It further appears that a second effort was made to obtain the signature, and that the physician attending the member of the court who died decided that he was in no condition, either mentally or physically, to sign any papers at all. Article 52 of the Articles for the Government of the Navy (sec. 1624, Revised Statutes), provides that "The judgment of a court-martial shall be authenticated by the signatures of the president and of every member who may be present when said judgment is pronounced, and also the judge-advocate." This provision concerning authentication is embraced in the British Naval Laws, from which many of ours have been borrowed. The British article is as follows: "If the prisoner be found guilty of a breach of any of the articles of war established by law, the court shall con sider and determine on the punishment proper to be inflicted in conformity therewith. The judge-advocate shall draw up the sentence accordingly, being careful to specify therein the charge, or substance of it; and the same shall be signed by every member of the court, by way of attestation, notwithstanding any difference of opinion there may have been among the members." The purpose of the British and American articles is doubtless the same. They are intended to direct the officers of the court to sign the sentence, notwithstanding they may not have concurred in the decision, in order that the sentence may be known with certainty to have been correctly recorded. The article orders officers under military discipline to sign the sentence. It does not say that the fact that such a sentence has been pronounced must be taken as nonexistent, however clearly it can be proven, if they or some of them are not in a position to sign as directed. I see no reason for believing it to be the intent of the law, that in a case like the present, the trial and sentence should go for naught, and, therefore, answer your question in the affirmative. Respectfully, The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. P. C. KNOX. PORTO RICO-LICENSE TO CONSTRUCT WHARF. The coastal waters, harbors, and other navigable waters of the Island of Porto Rico are waters of the United States within the meaning and intent of section 10 of the river and harbor act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1151), although the ratifications of the treaty whereby that Island was ceded by Spain to the United States were not exchanged until after the passage of that act. The relinquishment of sovereignty over and the cession of domain by Spain to the United States of the island of Porto Rico by the treaty of Paris of April 11, 1899 (30 Stat., 1754), must be regarded as immediate and absolute from the date of its signature, subject only to the possibility of a failure of ratification. While as respects performance of conditions of a grant by a private grantee, the date of a treaty is the date of its final ratification, so far as it affects the relations of the sovereigns concerned, it operates, when ratified, from the date of its signature. Prior to the passage of the Porto Rican act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat., 77), the Secretary of War had authority, under section 10 of the river and harbor act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stat., 1151), to issue a license for the building and maintenance of a wharf in the harbor of San Juan, P. R., and the rules imposed by section 3 of the resolution of May 1, 1900 (31 Stat., 715), upon the grant of franchises by the Executive Council of that Island do not extend to an antecedent license granted by him. The power to revoke the license so granted is vested in the Secretary of War, and so long as it is unrevoked, the rebuilding of the wharf, under such license, is subject to his control and supervision, and not to that of the Executive Council. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: Your letter of June 20 refers me to section 10 of the river and harbor act of 1899 (30 Stat., 1151), prohibiting unauthorized obstructions to navigation in any of the waters of the United States and providing for control by the Secretary of War, within certain restrictions, of wharves and similar structures in ports and other waters of the United States. After citing that provision of the Porto Rican act of April 12, 1900 (31 Stat., SO, sec. 14), which, with particular exceptions, extends to Porto Rico the statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, you inform me that the War Department issued a certain license, dated February 28, 1900, in lieu of a former license, to build and maintain a wharf in the harbor of San Juan; that the wharf built in pursuance of this authority has been largely destroyed by fire and that the licensee contemplates rebuilding. You also state that the Executive Council of Porto Rico have granted a franchise, subject to local control, to the licensee, and that the Navy Department protests against the reconstruction of the pier on the present site because of asserted injury to the harbor. The objection of the Navy Department has, however, been considered by the Chief of Engineers of the Army, who concludes that "there would appear to be no necessity for revoking the license or prohibiting any rebuilding which the company may desire to undertake." Thus the inference is apt that the licensee stands on your authority under the law and its claimed rights under the license, and the question appears for my opinion whether section 10 of the act of 1899, |