Use of Polygraphs as "lie Detectors" by the Federal Government

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room B-300, Rayburn Office Building, Hon. John E. Moss (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives John E. Moss, Porter Hardy, Jr., Henry S. Reuss, John S. Monagan, George Meader, and Robert P. Griffin. Also present: Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher.

Staff members present: Samuel J. Archibald, staff administrator; Jack Mattison, chief investigator; and Benny L. Kass, subcommittee counsel.

Mr. Moss. The subcommittee will be in order.

I regret that the hearings today will not be, at least from a physical standpoint, under the most ideal of conditions, but if everyone will be quiet, I think we can hear the witnesses as the hearings get underway.

Several months ago Chairman William Dawson directed the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information to study the use of polygraphs, commonly referred to as lie detectors, in the Federal Government. The directive was based on the mandate of the Government Operations Committee to study the operations of Government activities at all levels with a view of determining economy and efficiency.

As the first step in the study, a questionnaire was sent to 58 Federal departments and agencies to determine whether they use polygraphs and, if so, the extent and conditions of the use. According to the responses received, 19 agencies used polygraphs during fiscal year 1963.

These 19 agencies owned 512 polygraphs which were acquired at a cost of more than $425,000. Some 639 examiners were hired to operate the instruments, and operating costs, which are rising annually, now approach $42 million.

Detailed answers to the questionnaire and a summary of the replies are contained in the committee print entitled, "Use of Polygraphs by the Federal Government." This preliminary study shows that these

devices are used under widely varying conditions in the Federal Government. The training and qualifications of polygraph examiners differ substantially from agency to agency as do the controls exercised on the use of the instruments.

Serious questions have been raised by responsible persons as to whether the polygraph is, indeed, an instrument which should be used for any purpose. If used, what should be the extent and condition of its use?

The subcommittee has neither condemned nor condoned the use of polygraphs by the Federal Government. The inquiry is designed to develop as much factual information as possible to clarify the problems involved in the use of polygraphs. The hearings will begin today with a panel discussion with nationally recognized experts on the use of polygraphs.

On the following days we will take testimony from representatives of some Federal agencies which use polygraphs. By a careful, objective study of the problems, we hope to point the way to possible solutions.

At this point I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a copy of the letter from Congressman Dawson directing the subcommittee to investigate the use of polygraphs in the Federal Government. Is there any objection? Hearing none, the letter will be included at this point in the record.

(The letter referred to follows:)

Hon. JOHN E. Moss,

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D.C., March 12, 1964.

Chairman, Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: In April 1963 I directed the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee to study and analyze the use of polygraphs within the Federal Government. It is my understanding that the subcommittee has compiled a great deal of information on this subject and now intends to hold hearings.

I am sure the subcommittee will fully explore this area. Please report your findings, with recommendations for action, to the full committee as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM L. DAWSON, Chairman.

Mr. Moss. Our witnesses today are Mr. Fred E. Inbau. Northwestern University School of Law; Mr. Cleve Backster, School of Lie Detection, New York; Mr. John E. Reid, John E. Reid & Associates, Chicago, Ill., and Mr. George Lindberg, John E. Reid & Associates, Chicago, Ill. Mr. Backster will be here very shortly.

Before swearing the witnesses, do any of the subcommittee members wish to make any statements?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moss. We have as a very distinguished Member of Congress, not a member of this subcommittee, Congressman Gallagher. Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wish to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Dawson for forwarding the letter that I sent to him requesting this investigation. I wish to compliment you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the staff and the subcommittee, who made such an excellent preliminary study of the

problem, wherein they justified the need for the hearings that are beginning today.

I am concerned with some of the basic rights which people sought when they came to this new land in the face of great danger and hardship, seeking to be free of the oppressive tyrants who ruled elsewhere at those times. Among the basic rights perhaps the most precious were individual privacy and human dignity.

One of the principal reasons for my requesting this hearing and the investigation that proceeded, was to have this subcommittee consider how far scientific progress and bureaucratic efficiency has intruded upon these basic rights. I am specifically concerned with the fourth amendment of whether a person can take the fourth and not be denied his basic right to employment.

Taking the fifth has become a familiar practice, but we should be mindful that our Founding Fathers considered the fourth amendment to have greater priority than the fifth in the constitutional Bill of Rights. The fourth amendment to the Constitution states, among other provisions, that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable search and seizures, shall not be violated.

Is not the fourth amendment violated if a condition precedent to employment is the subjection to a polygraph test, a test that seeks in some instances, and we seek testimony to this effect today, to determine not only the veracity but to probe the very thought process of an individual?

A preliminary investigation by this subcommittee has revealed widespread use, as Chairman Moss has pointed out, by the various agencies of the Government. It is my hope that the purpose of this hearing is to determine the extent and circumstances of the use of the polygraph in Government and to some degree, perhaps later on, in private agencies.

It is my hope that these hearings will guide us in setting some standards for the use of this instrument and to further establish some basic qualifications for operators. I have had called to my attention abuses that seemed to go far beyond the point of seeking confirmation of veracity through the use of polygraphs. Reports of attempts to determine attitudes, through use of the device, are most disturbing.

I have in mind here, Mr. Chairman, of the many calls that I have gotten and many of the letters I have gotten, such as a 17-year-old girl, just out of high school, who sought employment and was subjected to a lie detector test by the U.S. Government. This girl was asked many, many questions concerning not only her private life but her sex life. She was subjected to questions that were most embarrassing and she suffered a humiliating experience, from which several years later she seems not to have recovered. This was brought to my attention by her mother, a constitutent of mine, and in probing the extent of this type of questioning I find that it is common practice in determining

intent.

I just wonder why a girl applying, at 17 or 18 years of age, for a clerk-typist job in a governmental agency, must be subjected to this type of probing. I am wondering whether or not we are not defeating our purpose.

A typist or a plumber and the various people, for instance, in NSA, who are subjected to this type of polygraph questioning, they

do not make policy. It is sort of paradoxical to me that the people at the top of these agencies are not subjected to this. Yet, we have people right out of high school who must subject themselves to this sort of questioning.

This girl, among other things, was asked-and I have four daughters and I know how outraged I would be if they were subjected to this line of questioning-if she were a homosexual. This type of questioning, this line of probing it seems to me, goes far beyond the need or intent to know whether or not a girl is qualified to take a GS-2 position in the U.S. Government.

This is but one of the many examples that have come to my attention. I think that this is one of the things that this subcommittee is concerned with. When you consider the appalling responsibility that an operator assumes in being judge, jury, and investigator, and interrogator of his fellow men and how he may influence this man's destiny, I think you will agree that the time is at hand to make sure that the operator is at least qualified and measures up to some standards, overall standards, set by the U.S. Government.

Be mindful that there are now no standards other than those set by the agencies using the polygraph, and in some cases, it appears that not even a high school diploma is required. With a very grave responsibility in evaluation that the polygraph operator assumes, this could possibly become part of the permanent record of the individual tested.

The old Christian concept of rehabilitation and starting life anew is no longer probable since a minor or major transgression must be constantly brought up for consideration and is neither forgotten nor forgiven even, no matter how long it may be since it occurred or how straight the path since has been traveled.

I have in mind here an example of this as part of the permanent record. An individual fills out a test for NSA. This should be a very confidential and private matter. It turns out later on that for some indiscretion in his youth he evidently did not get the job.

Yet, it has been brought to my attention that a year later he applies for a job in the Bureau of Census. There is no great security aspect in the Bureau of the Census. Yet this transcript appears for this man as he applies for a nonsensitive position. So no matter what we may say, the fact is that there is a very great probability of this transcript or the evaluation turning up at some later date in another area of our Government.

The investigation has led to the calling of this subcommittee hearing and has revealed some rather significant facts with respect to polygraphs by Government agencies. It shows that there is no Government-wide policy governing the use of the polygraph. There is no established standard for operators. There are no specifications, no overall specifications, for the machines, and no criteria for firms with which the Government may contract for polygraph services. If we are concerned with an increasing tendency to invade the privacy of our homes through wire tap and other types of scientific and electronic instruments, let us be doubly concerned with the widespread use of these techniques that we speak of here today and these instruments that may be used, and perhaps are being used, to invade the privacy of a man's mind, which after all, is the most private of all sanctuaries.

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Use of Polygraphs as "lie Detectors" by the Federal Government: Hearings ...