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ment, the different kinds of liens, of which there are a great number, will next be taken up. They differ from each other chiefly in respect to the persons entitled to obtain them, the charges for which they may be had, the property which may be. subjected to them, and the method of their acquisition. These matters will be considered in Chapters II to IV. In Chapter V the rights of the parties, i. e., the person over whose property the lien is acquired and the person holding the lien subsequent to the time of acquisition, will be taken up. While there are certain differences as to such rights, particularly in the method of enforcement, yet with respect to them, liens of all kinds may be advantageously treated together with such groupings as may be conducive to fixing the differences in mind.

9. Classification.-Liens may be divided into those which may be acquired in personal property, those which may cover either real or personal property or both, and those which can bind only real property. Those which may attach to personal property can be separated into two classes, those based on possession and those not so dependent. Again liens are classified according to their origin. Those developed by the courts of common law are called common law liens; those which arise in the courts of chancery, equitable liens; those created by statute, statutory liens; and those which are enforced in the courts of admiralty, maritime liens. As each of these four groups has certain characteristics peculiar to itself, it is useful to preserve the classification. If one uses both of the above prin

ciples as our primary basis of division, we have the following headings which will be treated in the order given: (1) common law liens, including pledges, and statutory liens on personal property based on possession and modeled upon common law liens; (2) statutory liens on personal property which are not dependent on possession, and maritime liens; (3) equitable liens which may exist on either real or personal property or on both; and (4) statutory liens on land. The two latter, on account of the brief treatment accorded them, are considered in the same chapter.

Specific and general liens. Another classification is into general and special or specific. A general lien is one which gives a right to hold certain property for all claims of a certain class. For instance, a lawyer is permitted to hold all papers of his client in his possession until he is paid for all the professional services rendered to such client. A specific lien, on the other hand, gives the holder security only for the specific services performed upon such property. A common carrier has a specific lien for his charges. Suppose he transports one article for a person and gives it up without exacting his charges. Later another piece of property is given to him for transportation by the same person. He cannot hold such property for his charges for the first article, but only for the charges due with reference to the one then in his possession. This basis of classification is made use of, where applicable, for grouping the different liens within the main headings.

CHAPTER II,

COMMON LAW LIENS AND STATUTORY LIENS BASED ON POSSESSION.

10. Chief characteristics.-Common law liens are based on possession, i. e., without possession of the property on the part of the person claiming the lien or by some one in his behalf there can be no common law lien, and a lien of this class after being acquired is lost by a loss of possession. In other words, a common law lien is a right to detain property until certain claims are paid. Such liens can exist only on personal property. Equitable and statutory liens, on the other hand, are not necessarily based on possession and may exist upon real as well as upon personal property.

Statutory liens on personal property which are based on possession are similar to common law liens and are modeled after that class. For the most part they merely extend common law liens to include certain persons and transactions closely related to those protected by common law liens. Again in some states liens of common law origin have been made statutory, perhaps with some modifications of the common law. It is desirable to treat such statutory liens with common law liens.

The liens considered in this chapter are generally implied, though they may be expressly stipulated for. On the other hand, it may be agreed that no

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lien shall attach and an understanding to that effect may be implied from the terms of the contract. For instance, in the case of Morrill v. Morrill, a physician rendered services to one member of a firm in consideration of the firm's agreement to repair his sleigh and to charge the expense to the partner. It was held that the firm could not retain the sleigh for the repair charges.

11. Classes of common law liens.-There are three groups usually made of liens of common law origin, classified according to the reasons which caused their recognition. They are: liens based upon a public calling; liens given for improvement by skill and labor; and liens based upon mercantile custom. For convenience a fourth heading is made-liens acquired as a result of legal proceedings. They are of both common law and statutory origin, but may be advantageously treated here. A fifth heading considers vendor's liens on personal property. They are certainly of common law origin, but commonly are taken up in connection with the law of sales. They are covered briefly here for the sake of completeness. Pledges, though they are commonly looked upon as transactions of a nature distinct from other liens, will be considered as the sixth class of common law liens.

12. Liens based on public callings.-Persons engaged in public callings, such as common carriers, are placed by law under certain heavy burdens. For instance, a common carrier is obliged to serve the public without unreasonable discrimination and is 264 N. H. 71, 6 Atl. 602.

practically an insurer of goods transported. In compensation for such obligations the party performing the public service is given certain rights, namely, liens on property in his possession as security for the charges for services performed. All of the liens in this class are special, not general. For the distinction, see §9.

Common carriers. A common carrier is one who holds himself out to the public as willing to transport goods. He differs from a private carrier in that the latter does not contemplate serving the public generally. A common carrier is engaged in a public calling and the law attaches certain rights and obligations to such calling. Among his rights is the one to retain possession of property entrusted to him for transportation until his charges for such services are paid. The carrier's lien has been long recognized by the common law. An old English case so holding is Rushforth v. Hadfield. There are numerous American cases to the same effect. The carrier's lien is special, that is, goods can only be retained for the charges upon them, and not for charges on other goods, possession of which has been parted with. It is generally held that a carrier has no lien on goods given to him without authority of the owner. For a further discussion of this point, see § 27.

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Warehouseman's liens. A warehouseman also has a common law lien on the goods in his custody. The

36 East 519 (Eng.), LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

4 Galena & Chicago Union Railroad v. Rae, 18 Ill. 488, 68 Am. Dec. 574. Hartshorne v. Johnson, 7 N. J. Law (2 Halst.) 108.

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