TRADE-MARK FOR CARRIAGE-CLOTH. Mr. Ernest Hopkinson for the applicant. NEWTON, Commissioner: This is an appeal from the decision of the Examiner of TradeMarks refusing to register" Sealhyde " as a trade-mark for carriagecloth made of textiles treated with waterproofing materials. As understood, carriage-cloth is a material largely used for automobile-tops, etc. The Examiner's objection is that "Sealhyde," a slight misspelling of "seal-hide," would be either descriptive or deceptive, since it would convey the idea that the imitation leather was either the hide of the seal or, if it was not, that it is an imitation closely resembling seal hide or skin and that any one who closely imitates seal-hide would have the right to use this word to describe his goods, or else the word is altogether misleading and deceptive and unregistrable on that account. Applicant contends that there is no such word as "seal-hide;" that only the skins of large animals, as cows or horses are called "hides," the skins of smaller animals being ordinarily denominated skins, and in speaking of the skins of seals it is customary to call them sealskins and not seal-hides. He also contends that inasmuch as its carriage-cloth comes in long rolls of fifty yards or more no person could possibly be deceived into thinking that such material was the hide or skin of the seal, and that while the word therefore may be suggestive it is not descriptive or deceptive, and applicant has carefully distinguished this case from the citations. In John Wood Manufacturing Company (114 MS. Dec., 58) it was held that "Electric Weld" should not be registered for boilers and water-heaters, even though the boilers and heaters were not anywhere welded. It was held to be within the range of probabilities that the parts of boilers would hereafter be welded together and it should be left open to the public to so describe their boilers if there are any electric welds in them. In ex parte Essor Company (122 MS. Dec., 366) it was held that while the word "Golden " did not describe applicant's varnish, which the records showed had a white color, it came within the range of probabilities that others might have a golden varnish, and they should have the right to so denominate it, and registration was refused. In Obannon Corporation (121 MS. Dec., 82) "Moleskin," for a leather substitute, was held descriptive and refused registration, and I cannot draw any sufficient distinction between that case and the instant case. The one pointed out by applicant-that sealskins are not ordinarily called seal-hides-slightly distinguishes from that case; but any one would know what was meant by seal-hides, even though it might be an unusual name for the skin of the seal, and I do not like to rely on such a distinction to carry a case. In the National Syrup Co. v. Coca Cola Co. (215 Fed. Rep., 527) the court of appeals, in upholding "Coca Cola " as a trade-mark for a soft drink, had collated many of the litigated words of this character, and among its citations is the case of American Fibre Chamois Co. v. De Lee et al. (C. D., 1895, 395; 71 O. G., 1458; 67 Fed. Rep., 329), in which "Fibre Chamois" was upheld as a valid mark for a textile. The court said: If "Fibre Chamois' as here combined have any sense, as descriptive of the class of goods in question, it is not so pronounced, obvious, and usual as to make said combined words unfit, inappropriate, or misleading, as a name, sign, or mark of origin for complainant's goods. The Supreme Court in Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad, etc., (C. D., 1911, 530; 165 O. G., 971; 220 U. S., 446) discusses at length the objection to the use of "Ruberoid" for rubber roofing and held that mark invalid. On the whole, the trend of decisions is against the granting of the exclusive use of such words as "Moleskin" or "Sealhyde" as trademarks for imitation-leather material. It is held that the decision of the Examiner of Trade-Marks was correct, and it is affirmed. EX PARTE UNITED STATES RUBBER COMPANY. Decided December 9, 1918. 257 O. G., 408. TRADE-MARKS-GOVERNMENT INSIGNIA. The prohibition against the registering of a mark comprising Government insignia is not avoided because the letters happen to be part of the initials of the name of the applicant, and a mark consisting of the letters "U S," written on a disk with other relatively insignificant wording, is not registrable. ON APPEAL. TRADE-MARK FOR RUBBER, CANVAS, AND LEATHER BOOTS AND SHOES. Mr. Ernest Hopkinson for the applicant. CLAY, Assistant Commissioner: The applicant insists, by appeal, upon its alleged right to register as a trade-mark for shoes the letters "U S," written on a disk with other relatively insignificant wording ranged around the border. It contends that it cannot be debarred from registering the principal initials of its name merely because those initials "happen to be the same as those of the Government; " but this is exactly what the statute does provide for in section 5-i. e., a mark which comprises insignia of the United States or any simulation thereof may not be registered. There is no room for question that this mark does so simulate the most ordinary soldier's brass button or collarmark. It is quite immaterial that on close inspection it can be seen that the medallion shown is not a soldier's button, but refers to a rubber company. Nor could any disclaimers help the applicant's case. The meaning of "U. S." is too clearly established to permit of registry of any mark having that as the most prominent feature. If this Office has heretofore made mistakes by registering such, it should by no means therefore repeat them. Affirmed. OPINION OF THE SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR. 1918. [Opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior.] IN RE OATHS IN ALIEN ENEMY COUNTRIES. 250 O. G., 513. OATHS IN ENEMY COUNTRIES-POWER TO ADMINISTER AND PROVE AUTHORITY. Held that the Spanish diplomatic and consular officers in charge of the interests of the United States in enemy countries are not vested with power to administer oaths or to prove the authority of officials of the enemy countries under section 4892, Revised Statutes. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, Washington, D. C., March 29, 1918. The honorable the Secretary of the Interior. MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have considered the question submitted by the Commissioner of Patents, in his attached letter to you of February 23, 1918, whether an oath of an applicant for patent who is an enemy or ally of an enemy, taken in an enemy country before a Spanish diplomatic or consular officer, or as to which oath the authority of the person before whom it was taken was certified to by such an officer, can be regarded as a sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 4892, Revised Statutes. Said section 4892, Revised Statutes, provides: The applicant shall make oath that he does verily believe himself to be the original and first inventor or discoverer of the art, machine, manufacture, composition, or improvement for which he solicits a patent; that he does not know and does not believe that the same was ever before known or used; and shall state of what country he is a citizen. Such oath may be made before any person within the United States authorized by law to administer oaths, or, when the applicant resides in a foreign country, before any minister, chargé d'affaires, consul, or commercial agent holding commission under the Government of the United States, or before any notary public, judge, or magistrate having an official seal and authorized to administer oaths in the foreign country in which the |