ted using it, but denied that Holt & Company were the owners, alleging that one Rider was a former member of that firm and entitled to use the brand, and that under him defendants had sold their flour branded "La Favorita, S. O. Rider." There was, however, no question but that defendants adopted the brand knowing it to be already in use by others. In the Saxlehner cases, the facts were peculiar, and need not be rehearsed; injunctions were allowed to restrain the sale of certain waters in bottles and under labels in which those of complainant were intentionally imitated. In all four cases the distinguishing features of the present case were absent.

Here the essential facts are so closely parallel to those that furnished the basis of decision in the Allen & Wheeler case, reported sub nom. Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, (C. D., 1916, 265; 224 O. G., 1407, 240 U. S., 403), as to render further discussion unnecessary. Mrs. Regis and her firm, having during a long period of years confined their use of the "Rex" mark to a limited territory wholly remote from that in controversy, must be held to have taken the risk that some innocent party might in the meantime hit upon the same mark, apply it to goods of similar character, and expend money and effort in building up a trade under it; and since it appears that Rectanus in good faith, and without notice of any prior use by others, selected and used the "Rex" mark, and by the expenditure of money and effort succeeded in building up a local but valuable trade under it in Louisville and vicinity before petitioner entered that field, so that "Rex" had come to be recognized there as the "trade signature" of Rectanus and of respondent as his successor, petitioner is estopped to set up their continued use of the mark in that territory as an infringement of the Regis trade-mark. Whatever confusion may have arisen from conflicting use of the mark is attributable to petitioner's entry into the field with notice of the situation; and petitioner cannot complain of this. As already stated, respondent is not complaining of it.

Decree affirmed.

DIGEST OF DECISIONS.

[Opinions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior are indicated by a degree mark (°); decisions of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia by the letter a; of the United States District Courts by the letter b; of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia by one star (*); of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals by the letter; of the Supreme Court of the United States by two stars (**).]

ABANDONED EXPERIMENTS. See Priority of Invention, 17.
ABANDONMENT. See Amendment of Applications, 4.

ABANDONMENT OF APPLICATIONS. See Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia, 4.

1. APPLICATIONS-FORFEITED-RENEWAL

REBUTS PRESUMPTION OF.-The granting of a renewal application by the Commissioner of Patents rebuts any presumption of abandonment. *Murphy v. Thompson, 130.

Schram

2. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-VALIDITY.-The failure of an applicant for a patent to prosecute his application within two years after it was filed does not invalidate a patent afterward granted thereon, such allowance being within the jurisdiction given the Commissioner by Revised Statutes, section 4894. (Comp. St., 1916, sec. 9438.) Glass Mfg. Co. v. Homer Brooke Glass Co., 269. ABANDONMENT OF INVENTION. See Particular Patents, 13; Trade-Secrets, 2. POLICY OF PATENT LAW.-The policy of the patent law is to secure to the public the full benefit of inventions after expiration of the fixed term deemed sufficient to reasonably stimulate invention, and any action of an inventor which would defeat such policy by withholding his invention from the public for an indefinite time for his own profit will operate as an abandonment of his right to a patent, which in every sense material to the patent laws is tantamount to an "abandonment" to the public of the invention itself. MacbethEvans Glass Co. v. General Electric Co., 239.

ABANDONMENT OF TRADE-MARK REGISTRATIONS. See Foreign Regis

trant.

TRADE-MARK INTERFERENCE-TITLE.-The appellant claims its title by assignment in 1914 from one D., who is supposed to have succeeded to it upon the dissolution of a partnership between him and one S., which partnership had used the mark in 1904; but since D. did not continue the business of the firm or the use of the mark after 1905 he had abandoned it, and in 1914 his assignment of it was a nullity. * RiceStix Dry Goods Company v. The Schwarzenbach, Huber Company, 150.

ABBREVIATIONS. See Name of Applicant.

ACQUIESCENCE. See Claims, 9.

ADAPTATION. See Invention, 1; Suits Under Section 4915, Revised Statutes, 1. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER. See Mandamus, 6.

ADOPTION AND USE. See Priority of Adoption and Use; Trade-Mark Rights.

ADVERSE DECISION IN INTERFERENCE. See Cancelation of Trade-Mark Registrations; Interference, 9; Jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Patents; Mandamus, 3.

AFFIDAVITS. See Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 2; Name of Applicant.

AGENT.. See Foreign Registrant.

AGGREGATION. See Particular Patents, 14; Patentability, 3.

ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS. See Claims, 6, 7.

AMENDMENT OF APPLICATIONS.

1. VALIDITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE OFFICE.-The rule is that insertions by way of amendment in the description or drawing, or both, of a patent application do not invalidate the patent if they are only in amplification and explanation of what was already reasonably indicated to be within the invention, and this rule applies with special force where the insertion was required by the Patent Office. General Electric Co. v. Cooper Hewitt Electric Co., 261.

d

2. APPLICATION-NEW MATTER.-Where plaintiff's original application disclosed as the preferred form of the invention the combination of a variable-speed engine, a generator driven therefrom through a magnetic clutch adapted to be rendered intermittently operative, a storage battery to be charged by the generator, and a relay in series in the charging-circuit arranged to intermittently energize and deënergize the clutch to hold the charging-current as nearly constant as possible, and where Figure 5 disclosed a continuously-driven generator provided with a rheostatic generator-field regulator adapted to be gradually operated in one direction or the other through relaycontrolled magnetic clutches of the same type as used in the preferred form and the purpose of the arrangement of Fig. 5 was also to "maintain constant" a function of the output, and where the invention resided in the combination, the broad idea of regulating the current in such a system being old, and where there was no word of warning that a particular type of relay was essential, Held that amendments are invalid which substitute a pulsating-current theory of operation based upon the action of a particular type of relay, which mode of operation was not originally mentioned and was impossible with Fig. 5, which was accordingly canceled. ‘H. Ward Leonard, Inc., v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corporation, 317.

3. SAME SAME.-The practice of amending a case by insertion of nebulous claims and cryptic allusions to possible alternative forms, with the purpose of anticipating subsequent developments in the art, where more explicit amendments would have caused the Examiner to raise the question of new matter, condemned. Id.

4. SAME

SAME.-Where certain elements are selected for the combination in an application as orginally filed, applicant cannot abandon elements originally selected as necessary and substitute other elements not originally suggested as essential where a wholly new idea of cooperation results. Id.

AMENDMENT TO PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. See Preliminary State

ment.

ANTICIPATION. See Amendment of Applications, 3; Construction of Specifications and Patents, 1; Particular Patents, 2, 4, 6, 9, 17, 19; Priority of Invention, 16; Suits for Infringement, 2.

ANTICIPATION-Continued.

1. PATENTS-PUBLICATION.-An inventor's own publication of the device for which he seeks a patent more than two years prior to the applition is a disclosure within Revised Statutes, section 4886, (Comp. St., 1916, sec. 9430,) and precludes the patenting of his invention. Wagner v. Meccano Limited, 231.

d

2. RULE 75 CONSTRUED AND APPLIED ANTICIPATION AND PRIOR INVENTION DISTINGUISHED.-A patent which discloses an invention in controversy and was granted after the filing of an application therefor, (or other reduction to practice,) on an application filed earlier, does not establish anticipation of that invention. The bar which it establishes, if any, is that of prior invention, as of the date of filing the application on which it was granted. Ex parte Thomas, 11.

APPEAL. See Construction of Trade-Mark Statutes, 2; Interferences, 8, 9, 10, 11; Patentability, 1; Priority of Invention, 7.

APPEAL TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. See Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; Mandamus, 2.

RIGHT TO MAKE THE CLAIMS OF A DISSOLVED INTERFERENCE IN AN EARLIER APPLICATION.-Where the court dismissed C's appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents dissolving an interference and denying C's motion to amend on the ground that the invention was not disclosed in an earlier application of C relied upon to carry his date back of a reference cited against the application which was involved in the interference, Held that C is not entitled to have the question reviewed on an ex parte appeal from a decision in that earlier application, denying his right to make the claims therein. *In re Creveling, 145.

APPEAL TO THE EXAMINERS-IN-CHIEF. See Cancelation of Claims, 1. APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. SUIT FOR INFRINGEMENT OF TRADE-MARKS-APPEAL AND CERTIORARI.—An appeal to the Supreme Court in a suit to restrain infringement of a trade-mark, allowed by one of the judges of the circuit court of appeals, dismissed under section 128, Judicial Code, as amended by act of January 28, 1915, (38 Stat., 803, ch. 22, sec. 2;) but, pursuant to stipulation, the transcript of the record filed for the purposes of appeal treated as a return to a writ of certiorari allowed by the Supreme Court. ** United Drug Company v. Theodore Rectanus Company, 369.

APPELATE COURT. See Infringement, 5.

APPLICANT AND PATENTEE. See Interference, 6, 7.

ARMY OR NAVY. See Practice Before the Patent Office.

ASSIGNMENT OF TRADE-MARKS. See Abandonment of Trade-Mark Regis.

trations.

ATTORNEYS. See Practice Before the Patent Office.
AUTHORITY OF COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS.

Trade-Mark Statutes, 3.

See Construction of

BAR TO PATENT. See Anticipation, 2; Claims, 5; Priority of Invention, 14,

15, 16.

BASIC PATENT. See Suits Under Section 4915, Revised Statutes, 2.

BROAD CLAIMS. See Construction of Claims, 3, 7; Delay in Applying for Re

issue, 1; Interference, 12.

84150°-19- -27

BURDEN OF PROOF. See Interference, 10; Suits Under Section 4915, Revised

Statutes, 2.

CANCELATION OF CLAIMS.

1. APPEAL-REQUIREMENT.-The recourse from a requirement of cancelation of claims, on the ground that they are to a different invention from that originally presented, is by appeal to the Examiners-in-Chief, not by petition. Ex parte Pearson, 36.

2. REQUIREMENT-REFERABLE TO LAW EXAMINER-RULE 42.-The basis of the requirement of cancelation of claims, on the ground that they are to a different invention from that originally prosecuted, is the same as that of the requirement of division—viz., that the inventions are independent or are of such a nature that they may not be joined in one application. Both requirements should be referred to the Law Examiner for approval, under Rule 42. Id.

CANCELATION OF TRADE-MARK REGISTRATIONS.

See Construction of

Trade-Mark Statutes, 3; Foreign Registrant; Registration of Trade-
Marks, 6.

1. ADVERSE DECISION IN INTERFERENCE.-Record reviewed and Held that in view of a trade-mark interference decision adverse to the registrant, G., it was proper, on motion of B., to cancel G.'s mark. * Great Bear Spring Company v. Bear Lithia Springs Company, 203..

2. INTERFERENCE. The law of February 20, 1905, applies to all registrations, and a registration under the law of 1881 may be canceled as an incident to an interference decision. Hudnut v. Phillips v. Mack, 74. 3. SAME ON DECISION ADVERSE TO A REGISTRANT INTERFERANT HIS REGISTRATION MAY BE CANCELED.-An interference between an applicant and a registrant necessarily involves both the question of right to register and the question of right to remain on the register, or validity of the existing registration, for it is necessary to remove an interfering registration from the register in order to make apparent and effective the award of right of registration to the applicant, and where the final decision in a trade-mark interference necessitates a holding that a registrant was not entitled to his registration and the prevailing interferant in effect moves for cancelation, Held that an order of cancelation will be forthwith entered. Id.

CHANGE IN DEGREE. See Construction of Specifications and Patents, 2.
CITIZENSHIP. See Jurisdiction of the Courts.

CLAIMS. See Amendment of Applications, 3; Cancelation of Claims; Construc

tion of Claims; Construction of Specifications and Patents, 1, 4, 5; Delay in Applying for Reissue, 1, 3; Estoppel; Infringement, 3, 4, 8; Interference, 1, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13; Laches; Particular Patents, 5, 7, 10. 12; Priority of Invention, 2, 7, 14, 15, 19.

1. INTERPRETATION OF SPECIFIC.-When dealing with an improvement in a well-developed art and it is established that one party is the prior inventor of the broad subject-matter of that improvement, the more specific counts should be interpreted in the light of the general disclosure. Count 3 awarded to Burt. * Burt v. Coats and Cameron. Coats and Cameron v. Burt, 131.

2. PATENTABILITY-DISCLOSURE OF APPLICATION.-Record reviewed and Held that the appealed claims cannot be predicated upon the disclosure of this application without forcing upon them a meaning which robs them of their sense. Ex parte Creveling, 5.