of credit insurance policies, the premiums for which were 25 and 33 percent of the amount financed. Plaintiff originally brought the complaint stating that she and her husband had entered into two successive consumer loan transactions with defendant Associates Financial. In connection with each loan, plaintiff also bought credit life insurance, credit accident health insurance, fire household goods insurance, and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. She complained that the insurance sold to her was not reasonable and did not bear a reasonable and bona fide relation to plaintiff's existing hazards or risk of loss. She also claimed that the accidental death and dismemberment insurance was non-credit-related and thus was prohibited from being sold in a place of business of a consumer loan licensee. Plaintiff specifically alleged violations of the Arizona Consumer Loan Act and Credit Practices Rule, breach of fiduciary duty, and racketeering. After the complaint was filed, and before defendant submitted its answer, the parties reached a settlement. Counsel notes that the settlement was extremely favorable to plaintiff, although she has agreed not to disclose its terms.

Additional Allegations Made Against Financial Institution Allegedly Engaged in Fraudulent Loan Practices

42,407. McCollum v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., No. 87 CH 3771 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, filed June 8, 1987). Plaintiff represented by Daniel Edelman, 20 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago, IL 60604, (312) 427-3459. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010117) 42,407B Stipulation (4pp.); 42,407C Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (3pp.); 42,407D Stipulation (2pp.); 42,407E Order (3pp.); 42,407F Amended ComplaintClass Action (28pp.); 42,407G Plf McCollum's Motion for Class Certification Under Count 1 of the Amended Complaint (9pp.); 42,407H Plf McCollum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count 1 of the Amended Complaint (8pp.). Previously reported at 21 CLEAringhouse Rev. 279 (July 1987).]

42,599. Fidelity Fin. Servs. v. Anderson, No. 86 M1 103839 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, filed July 16, 1987). DefendantsCounterclaimants represented by same as above. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010115) 42,599A Motion to Vacate Default & for Other Relief (4pp.); 42,599B Verified Answer & Counterclaim (25pp.); 42,599C Emergency Motion for Reconsideration (24pp.).]

42,608. Fidelity Fin. Servs. v. Weil, No. 87 CH 1802 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook County, filed July 9, 1987). Defendant represented by Daniel Edelman, Jeffrey Cohen, address same as above. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010116) 42,608A Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage (10pp.); 42,608B Answer & Counterclaim (16pp.); 42,608C Mrs. Weil's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count 1 of Her Counterclaim (5pp.).]

Plaintiff in McCollum v. Fidelity Financial Services has amended her complaint to add additional allegations in this action in which she challenges defendant loan corporation's fraudulent and deceptive practices in making home improvement loans. In her initial class action complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant violates the Illinois consumer fraud act by disbursing funds to home improvement contractors without

first receiving certificates of completion signed by the borrowers and showing that the contractors had performed the work, as is required by state law. She also alleges that defendant provided borrowers with form documents purporting to obligate them to make repayment irrespective of whether the contractor performs or a certificate is received. In her amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant refuses to honor its borrowers' rights under the Federal Trade Commission's "holder in due course rule," which requires that lenders who regularly do business with providers of goods and services to consumers subject themselves to claims and defenses arising out of nonperformance or defective performance by the providers of goods and services. Plaintiff maintains that, instead of investigating and finding financing sources with the best terms available to the borrower, unlicensed mortgage brokers refer borrowers directly to defendant, who, plaintiff believes, compensates these brokers for their services in violation of state law.

Defendants in Fidelity Financial Services v. Anderson are seeking to vacate a default judgment that was entered against them by the same financial institution and have asked the court to consolidate their case with McCollum. In Anderson, defendants executed a second deed of trust to secure a home repair transaction. Although they attempted to exercise their statutory right to cancel both the loan and the home repair contract, the loan company and contractor refused to honor their rights. Defendants allege that the financial institution then subjected them to coercion and overreaching in an effort to force them to accept a loan from the institution that was of no benefit to them and that bore a rate of interest substantially higher than what they could have obtained elsewhere. When the holder of the first mortgage brought foreclosure proceedings against defendants, the loan company made several misrepresentations to defendants regarding the status of their case and their legal rights. In addition to seeking to set aside the default judgment, defendants have filed a counterclaim raising the same issues raised in McCollum.

The defendant in Fidelity Financial Services v. Weil has also filed an answer and counterclaim in an action brought to foreclose on a deed of trust, which she signed when she secured a loan from the same loan company. She alleges that the institution engaged in unlawful conduct in inducing her to enter into the note and deed of trust and violated a state law that prohibits usurious charges in connection with certain loans secured by residential real estate. She also asserts that the loan company and the unlicensed broker violated the state's consumer fraud act by having the broker purport to act on her behalf for the purpose of investigating and finding financing for her, and then refering her to defendant loan company. She seeks declaratory relief and damages.

Civil Rights Commission Finds Probable Cause Exists to Believe Denial of Insurance to AFDC Recipient Is Discriminatory

39,669. Carruthers v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 07-85-13292 (Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n Mar. 19, 1987). Complainant represented by James Elliott, Legal Services Corp. of Iowa, 106 N. Market, Ottumwa, IA 52501, (515) 683-3166. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010104) 39,669C Order (10pp.). Previously reported at 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 649 (Oct.

1985).]

The Iowa Civil Rights Commission has made a preliminary finding that probable cause exists to support the allegation that discrimination occurred when the respondent, Prudential Life Insurance Company, refused to sell life insurance to an applicant because she receives AFDC. The complainant applied for life insurance from the respondent. She was notified by the respondent that it would not provide the insurance because her primary source of income was AFDC, and its policy was not to provide insurance to persons whose primary source of income is government assistance. Complainant filed her complaint with the Civil Rights Commission and the Iowa Insurance Commission, maintaining that Prudential's policy of not providing insurance to persons whose primary source of income is government assistance has a disparate impact on women, because most heads of households who receive public welfare are women. Prudential claimed that the Civil Rights Commission did not have jurisdiction because the company is not a "public accommodation." The probable cause finding holds that Prudential is a public accommodation and that its discriminatory policy has a disparate impact on women. The case now proceeds to conciliation. Complainant requests an award of general and specific damages as well as an injunction prohibiting such discriminatory practices. She also requests that the Insurance Commission issue a finding that Prudential's practices violate the Iowa Insurance Trade Practices Act, issue an order that Prudential cease and desist its unfair and deceptive acts, and issue an order to allow her to purchase life insurance.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

State Procedures for Collecting Past-Due Child Support by Intercepting Tax Refunds Held Unconstitutional

42,569. Brown v. Eichler, No. 84-582-CMW (D. Del. June 11, 1987). Plaintiffs represented by John Denney and Sandra Messick, UAW Legal Services Plan, 200 Continental Dr., Suite 212, Newark, DE 19713, (302) 366-0513. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010087) 42,569A Opinion (38pp.).]

The court has entered an order in this action finding that defendant officials' past procedures of collecting child support by intercepting plaintiff parents' tax refunds violates plaintiffs' rights because the procedure fails to inform the obligated spouses of potential defenses. Plaintiffs in the instant action are parents who owe, or owed, child support. Included are nonobligated spouses who are the present spouses of absent parents owing support payments. This action began after plaintiffs had their tax refunds intercepted and used to offset past-due child support obligations. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Delaware Tax Refund Intercept Program unconstitutionally violates their due process rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Plaintiffs' due process claims revolve around three contentions: (1) the notice received is deficient because it fails to describe the defenses available to the absent parent; (2) the hearing procedures are unconstitutional because they fail to guarantee a pre-deprivation review; and (3) the non-obligated spouses are not notified individually until

the time that the IRS has already intercepted the refunds. The court concluded that plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated from 1984 through 1987 because present notice sent to obligated parents is invalid, and past notices were even less protective of plaintiffs' due process rights. However, the court did not find the present program to be clearly unconstitutional, because the hearing procedure and notice given to non-obligated spouses is constitutional. Defendants were not found liable for section 1983 violations because of the eleventh amendment. The court also noted that the state is liable for ongoing violations, and it must send revised notices to obligated parents in the future. Additionally, the court noted that defendants should submit a revised form of notice to the court that includes possible defenses, and, if plaintiffs desire, defendants must hold rehearings for intercepts in tax years 1984-87.

Paternity Claim Refiled Under Illinois Parentage Act Barred by Nonjurisdictional Two-Year Limitation Period

41,221. Maller ex rel. Maller v. Cohen, No. 86 M1 9203 (III. Cir. Ct., Cook County, filed July 8, 1987). Plaintiff represented by Aviva Futorian, Helene Snyder, Joan Colen, Women's Law Project, James Latturner, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, 343 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, IL 60604, (312) 341-1070; Cathleen Cohen. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010105) 41,221K Order (2pp.); 41,221L Motion to Reconsider or, in the Alternative, to Certify Questions for an Interlocutory Appeal Under Supreme Court Rule 308 (20pp.); 41,221M Plf's Memo in Opp'n to Def's Motion for Reconsideration or for an Interlocutory Appeal (13pp.); 41,221N Def's Reply Memo in Support of Motion to Reconsider or Certify Pursuant to Rule 308 (16pp.); 41,221-O Court's Letter & Order (2pp.); 41,221P Notice of Appeal (1p.). Previously reported at 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 390 (Aug./Sept. 1987).]

The court has entered an order reinstating its first ruling and granting defendant putative father's motion to dismiss this action in which plaintiff child filed a paternity claim against putative father. Initially, plaintiff's mother filed suit on her child's behalf under the Illinois Paternity Act seeking acknowledgment of paternity and reasonable child support from defendant. The suit was dismissed because it was not filed within the two-year statute of limitations period. Plaintiff child then brought an amended action under the Illinois Parentage Act alleging that defendant has admitted to being her father, that he has visited her, and that he has contributed money to her during the time that he visited her. The court originally granted defendant's motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds, but on reconsideration reversed itself and denied defendant's motion to dismiss because the prior judgment was not a judgment on the merits and therefore was not barred by res judicata. On review of this decision, the court reversed itself again and reinstated its original decision granting defendant's motion to dismiss. In a letter attached to the order, the court notes that it had overlooked its earlier interpretation of Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71 (1976), which by implication held the two-year limitation period to be nonjurisdictional. Plaintiff appeals to the Illinois Appellate Court.

Pennsylvania Court Denies Mother's Petition for Child Support Filed Under New Statute of Limitations

42,627. Young v. Hampton, No. 1195 (Pa. Super. Ct., Philadelphia, filed July 7, 1987). Plaintiff-Appellant represented by Thomas Murray, Daniel Haller, Neighborhood Legal Services, 1312 E. Carson St., Pittsburgh, PA 15203, (412) 431-2810; William Koslasky. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010135) 42,627A Complaint for Support (4pp.); 42,627B Memo Opinion (3pp.); 42,627C Brief for Plf/Appellant Joyce Young (56pp.).]

Relying on the recent decision in Clark v. Jeter, 518 A.2d 276 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), the court has dismissed plaintiff mother's petition for child support, which was filed under Pennsylvania's new 18-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff is the mother of two children born out of wedlock. She and defendant have never been married. Originally, in 1975, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking child support payments from defendant father. She later requested the complaint be dismissed. In 1984, plaintiff again filed a complaint against defendant, which the court dismissed due to the statute of limitations. The instant action was filed under the new 18-year statute. This court upheld the lower court's decision denying plaintiff's petition. The court relied on Clark, holding that the statute of limitations, even if it were to be given retroactive effect, cannot revive a cause of action. The court noted that plaintiff's original petition for support was dismissed with prejudice and a final order was entered denying support because the statute had run three months prior to the effective date of the new statute.

EMPLOYMENT

Settlement Agreement Reached in Suit Alleging Wrongful Discharge and Employment Discrimination

42,567. Sandoval v. T.V.I., Inc., No. SEC 56235 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, filed Jan. 22, 1987). Plaintiff represented by Arturo Morales, Employment Law Office, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, 1636 W. Eighth St., Los Angeles, CA 90017, (213) 389-3581; Cassie De Silvestore. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010076) 42,567A Complaint for Wrongful Discharge & Employment Discrimination (11pp.); 42,567B Notice of Hearing of Demurrer & Demurrer of Defs T.V.I., Inc., Thrift Village, Inc., John Booth & Robert Eugley to the First & Second Causes of Action of the Complaint; Memo of Points & Authorities (8pp.); 42,567B Plf's Memo in Opp'n to Defs' Demurrer to Complaint (19pp.); 42,567C Notice of Ruling on Demurrer & Striking of Complaint (2pp.); 42,567D First Amended Complaint for Wrongful Discharge & Employment Discrimination (10pp.); 42,567E Notice of Motion & Motion of Defs T. V.I., Inc., Thrift Village, Inc., John Booth & Robert Eugley to Strike Portions of Plf's First Amended Complaint (7pp.); 42,567F Plf's Memo in Opp'n to Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint (8pp.); 42,567G Notice of Ruling on

Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation in a Competitive Society

The Secretary of Labor's Task Force on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation has published a report entitled Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation in a Competitive Society, the product of a year-long examination of the serious problems faced by workers when they are forced out of jobs as the result of plant closings and mass layoffs. The report identifies issues that must be addressed and calls for action by both private and public sectors to establish practices, procedures, and programs that will provide a rapid response capability to facilitate adjustment for dislocated workers. As part of this effort, the Task Force recommends initiating a new national public effort, funded initially at $900 million, to replace JTPA Title III and to provide state-administered training and reemployment assistance to displaced workers. The report also includes an evaluation of programs assisting displaced workers in foreign industrialized countries, Census data on changes in employment due to plant openings and closings, and case studies of plant closings.

Copies of the report are available from the Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20210, (202) 523-7316.

CLOSED

Defs' Motion to Strike (2pp.).]

A settlement agreement has been reached in this action in which plaintiff, a 13-year employee of defendant food store chain, brought suit alleging wrongful discharge and employment discrimination. Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a clean-up person. Plaintiff was commended by his supervisors for his excellent work and great dedication, and was twice named employee of the month. Further, plaintiff was informed by defendant that his job was secure as long as his work was satisfactory. Two days after being unable to complete the task of cleaning out a maggot-ridden trash dumpster, defendant terminated plaintiff. Plaintiff was denied any reason or explanation as to his discharge, in contravention of defendant's practice and written policy providing that employees can be terminated only for good cause and based upon adequate documentation. Plaintiff filed suit alleging (1) defendant breached the implied-in-law

covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither defendant nor plaintiff would injure the rights of the other party and that defendant would not act arbitrarily in dealing with plaintiff; (2) defendant breached the implied-in-fact covenant to terminate only for good cause; and (3) employment discrimination based on plaintiff's age (over 40). Plaintiff sought lost wages and fringe benefits, in addition to general and punitive damages in the amount of $500,000. The parties subsequently reached an agreement in which plaintiff received a favorable settlement. However, due to a confidentiality clause contained in the agreement, counsel is prohibited from describing the terms of the settlement.

FOOD PROGRAMS

Welfare Department Will Not Count as Income for Food Stamp Purposes Money Withheld for Welfare Benefit Overpayments

40,047. Griffin v. Coler, No. 85-2413 (C.D. Ill. June 9, 1987). Plaintiffs represented by Diane Sauer, Valerie McWilliams, Richard Chase, Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, 202 W. Hill St., Champaign, IL 61820, (217) 356-1351. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010121) 40,047H Consent Decree (5pp.). Previously reported at 20 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 601 (Aug./Sept. 1986).]

The parties have entered into a consent decree in this class action challenging the Illinois Department of Public Aid's "noncompliance amounts" policy, which required that funds being recouped from welfare benefits be counted as income for food stamp purposes. In a previous order, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but reserved the fashioning of a remedy. The parties then filed a joint motion for entry of a consent decree pursuant to which the Department agreed not to count as income for food stamp purposes moneys withheld from welfare benefits to recover an overpayment unless the recipient has been convicted or adjudicated either in a criminal or civil case of fraudulently obtaining the welfare overpayment. The Department has also agreed that it will provide class members with 10 days' advance written notice of any determination that moneys withheld from welfare benefits for the purpose of recovering an overpayment will be counted as income under the Food Stamp Program and will result in fewer food stamps than the household's actual income would entitle it to receive. The alleged factual basis for this determination must be specified in the notice as well as an individualized calculation as to how many food stamps will be lost if the withheld benefits are treated as income. The recipients will also be informed of their right to appeal any adverse determination with regard to counting the withheld benefits as income. Finally, the Department has agreed to redetermine, for all months subsequent to April 1985, whether moneys withheld from the welfare benefits of plaintiffs and any other persons currently in the administrative appeal process or in judicial review should have been counted as income under the Food Stamp Program. The Department will restore all lost benefits to recipients for whom the redetermination shows that the moneys withheld should not have been counted as income. The Department also agreed to pay plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorney fees in the amount of $45,000.

Court Invalidates Agency's Voluntary Quit Regulations and Awards Retroactive Food Stamp Benefits

42,141. Wilson v. Lyng, No. 87-08-CIV-7 (E.D.N.C. July 24, 1987). Plaintiff represented by Mason Hogan, Richard Klein, Legal Services of the Lower Cape Fear, 16 S. Front St., P.O. Box 814, Wilmington, NC 28402-0814, (919) 763-6207; John Saxon. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010127) 42,141E Federal Defs Memo in Support of His Motion to Dismiss (62pp.); 42,141F Plf's Memo in Support of Her Motion for Class Cert. (19pp.); 42,141G Plf's Memo in Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment & in Opp'n to the Federal Def's Motion to Dismiss (27pp.); 42,141H Federal Def's Reply Memo to Plf's Memo in Opp'n to Def's Motion to Dismiss & in Support of Plf's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (51pp.); 42,141-I Plfs' Memo in Opp'n to the State Def's Motion to Dismiss (22pp.); 42,141J Plf's Reply Memo in Support of Her Motion for Summary Judgment (10pp.); 42, 141K Federal Def's Response to Plf's Motion for Class Cert. (5pp.); 42,141L Plf's Reply Memo in Support of Her Motion for Class Cert. (11pp.); 42,141M Plf's Supp. Memo (6pp.); 42,141N Order (14pp.); 42,141-O Plf's Response to June 12 Order (3pp.); 42,141P Plfs' Memo in Support of Motion for Attorney Fees (16pp.); 42,141Q Plfs' Memorandum in Opp'n to Motion to Amend Judgment (8pp.); 42,141R A Revised Proposal-Notice Procedures (7pp.); 42,141S Order (3pp.). Previously reported at 20 CLEARINGHOUSE Rev. 1550 (Apr. 1987).]

A U.S. district court has invalidated the federal food stamp regulations defining head of household (for voluntary quit purposes) as the household's primary wage earner or principal wage earner, because it found them to be inconsistent with the Food Stamp Act. Under the voluntary quit provision of the Act, "if the head of the household voluntarily quits any job without good cause (the household will not be eligible to participate in the food stamp program for). . . ninety days." The court stated that the regulation effectively removes the burden that Congress intended to place on persons responsible for their households' well-being and instead places it on other household members. Under the Secretary's interpretation, a child or a person living with a family can become the head of the family's household. The court has granted plaintiff's motions for class certification and summary judgment, and ordered notice and payment of retroactive food stamp benefits to members of the class. The class consists of all otherwise eligible Food Stamp Program applicants and participants residing in North Carolina who were denied benefits on or after October 24, 1985, pursuant to the Secretary of Agriculture's voluntary quit regulations.

Summary Judgment Granted to Plaintiff Class in Challenge to Food Stamp Regulations on Foster Care Payments

37,205. Foster v. Celani, No. 85-320 (D. Vt. July 1, 1987). Plaintiffs represented by Steven Norman, Vermont Legal Aid, P.O. Box 1367, 12 North St., Burlington, VT 05402, (802) 863-5620. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010106) 37,205E Opinion & Order (19pp.). Previously reported at 20 CLEARING

HOUSE REV. 1550 (Apr. 1987).]

The district court has granted plaintiff class summary judgment and invalidated state and federal regulations requiring Vermont foster care maintenance payments to be counted as unearned income for food stamp eligibility purposes. Plaintiffs are foster parents who had their food stamp benefits reduced, terminated, or denied because foster care maintenance payments were included as income for eligibility purposes. Defendants are the heads of the state and federal agencies that administer the Food Stamp Program. This action began when named plaintiffs had their benefits reduced, and they subsequently requested a fair hearing, wherein defendants upheld the regulation. In their suit challenging the regulation, plaintiffs asserted that foster children should be eligible for the same status as adult "boarders," who may be excluded from a food stamp household at the household's option. A magistrate recommended that summary judgment be awarded to plaintiffs, finding that the foster care maintenance payments fall within the statutory exclusion from household income as "reimbursements which do not exceed expenses actually incurred and which do not represent a gain or benefit to the household." Upon review, the district court has agreed with the magistrate's recommendation for summary judgment, but on grounds different from those stated in the magistrate's report. The district court concludes that foster children are eligible under the appropriate statute and its legislative history to receive "boarder" status, and therefore foster care maintenance payments do not have to be included in household income. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon a recent decision in Minnesota, Murray v. Lyng, Civ. No. 4-85-611 (D. Minn. May 15, 1987), which considered the identical issue and concluded that foster children should be treated as boarders. In the second step of analysis, however, this district court declined to adopt the Minnesota court's determination that foster care payments are excludable from household income because they are payments for third-party beneficiaries. This court reasons that Congress may only have intended this exclusion to apply to money received for persons living outside the home. In addition, this court notes that defendants' "parental control" regulation, 7 C.FR. § 273.1 (a)(3)(ii), must be limited in its application so that it does not prevent children from receiving "boarder" status. Defendants are enjoined within the District of Vermont from enforcing the challenged regulations.

Preliminary Injunction Requires Issuance of Food Stamps Beyond Certification Period when Timely Appeal Filed

42,582. Jackson v. Lukhard, No. 87-0029-B (W.D. Va. filed June 15, 1987). Plaintiff represented by Martin Wegbreit, Client Centered Legal Services of Southwest Virginia, P.O. Box 147, Castlewood, VA 24224, (703) 762-5501. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010099) 42,582A Complaint (4pp.); 42,582B Memo in Support of Motion for a TRO (3pp.); 42,582C TRO (3pp.); 42,582D Memo in Support of Motion for a Prelim. Inj. (14pp.); 42,582E Prelim. Inj. Order (3pp.); 42,582F Answer (3pp.); 42,582G Memo in Support of Plf's Second Motion for a Prelim. Inj. (16pp.); 42,582H Amended Complaint (19pp.); 42,582-I Motion to Join an Additional Def & Memo in Support (5pp.); 42,582J Order Granting Leave to File Amended Com

plaint (2pp.); 42,582K Order (2pp.); 42,582L Order Joining Additional Def (2pp.); 42,582M Answer (3pp.).]

Plaintiff food stamp recipient filed this amended complaint against defendants, Secretary of the USDA and state Department of Social Services (DSS), for denial of recertification of benefits based upon a determination that her family was over the resource limit. Plaintiff and her three children's last food stamp certification period expired at the end of February 1986. Although a timely recertification interview was held, DSS did not issue a notice to the family until March, and denied further food stamps because property owned by one of the children exceeded the resource limit. The negative decision was appealed in a timely manner, and continuation of food stamps was requested. The fair hearing was granted, but the request for benefits pending the appeal was denied because the family's certification period had ended. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The court granted a TRO requiring payment of food stamps pending the appeal and later granted preliminary injunctive relief. The case involves a number of issues, including (1) the right to a timely decision on a timely application for recertification; (2) the right to benefits pending an appeal of a negative recertification decision; and (3) whether real property owned by minors is a countable resource in the Food Stamp Program. Plaintiff will proceed in the district court if the pending administrative decision is not favorable.

HANDICAPPED PERSONS

Amicus Brief Supports Schoolchildren's Action Challenging Expulsion During Pendency of Review Proceedings

42,583. Honig v. Doe, No. 86-728 (U.S. Sup. Ct. filed June 22, 1987). Amicus represented by Lenore Gittis, The Legal Aid Society, 15 Park Row, 21st Floor, New York, NY 10038, (212) 619-3890. [Here reported: (Accession No. 1010093) 42,583A Amicus Curiae Brief for The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York, Juvenile Rights Division, in Support of Respondents (65pp.).]

Amicus curiae, the Juvenile Rights Division of The Legal Aid Society, has filed a brief in the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of plaintiff handicapped children who were expelled or indefinitely suspended from school during the pendency of review proceedings conducted pursuant to the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA). This action began after named plaintiffs had been excluded from school because of their in-class conduct. The brief argues that the expulsion or indefinite suspension of a handicapped child during the pendency of review proceedings conducted pursuant to the EHA constitutes a change in educational placement. Additionally, amicus argues that Congress intended the stay-put provision of section 1415(e)(3) to prevent school officials from indefinitely excluding a handicapped child from his or her current education placement during the pendency of review proceedings. Finally, the brief argues that long-term suspension often results in educational, psychological, emotional, or social developmental harm to the handi