On motion of Mr. Alvord, of Mo., the Convention proceeded to elect the Executive Board for the ensuing year, which resulted in the unanimous election of Major B. B. French, of Washington City, Hon. Amos Kendall, of Washington City, Wm. M. Swain, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pa., Hon. J. D. Caton, of Ottawa, Ill., and Gen. J. K. Morehead, of Pittsburg, Pa.

On motion, it was Resolved, That the powers conferred on the General Committee at the last Convention be regarded as permanent rules of authority for the Executive Board, until repealed by the Confederation.

On motion, it was Resolved, That in the opinion of the Convention, the Secretary ought to reside in the City of New-York. No further business appearing, the Convention adjourned B. B. FRENCH, President.

sine die.

TAL. P. SHAFFNER, Secretary.

Editorial.

MORSE US. O'RIELLY.-DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Since the organization of the United States Government, there has not been a case considered by the Supreme Court of the nation of more consequence to the American people than the late one, from the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky, wherein Prof. Samuel F. B. Morse was granted an injunction against Henry O'Rielly, for an infringement of his American Electro-Magnetic Telegraph, for which he was granted a patent June 20th, 1840, and for an improvement thereon April 11th, 1846.

The questions involved in the consideration of the case by the Court were not confined to the particular infringement of the machinery, as that was so palpable as to require but a moment's observation; but embraced also the discoveries of the sciences involved in the art of telegraphing, and to the determining of the true and original inventor of this ART, and his privileges springing from the letters patent granted, awarding and confirming all the rights and immunities guaranteed by the laws of the United States to the worthy and meritorious inventor, whether for an improvement

in the simplest department of mechanics, or for that most brilliant achievement in the known arts-the ELECTRO-MAGNETIC TELEGRAPH !

A few of the points settled by the honorable Court we propose to briefly consider.

And first:

Who was the Inventor of the Telegraph ?—The Court has determined the claims as to priority of invention in favor of Morse, and in a manner to allow of no controversy in future. Morse's claims have been assailed in the most unwarrantable manner. There were those who felt jealous of his pre-eminent renown, and, ambitious for the commendation themselves, were zealous in their efforts to deface that escutcheon upon which the name of Morse was written with golden capitals, as a benefactor of his fellow-men, unrivalled in splendor of inventive genius. Others, again, who sought to gather the golden grain for their own weal, disregarded all principles of honor in assailing the rights of him to whom unceasing gratitude should have been bestowed for their elevation among men.

Morse was the inventor of the Telegraph. The solemn decree of the Supreme Court awards to him that honor. Comparing his system with those of Europe, invented by Steinheil, Cooke, Wheatstone, Davy, and other philosophers, the Court very justly remarks, that no one can examine them "without perceiving at once the substantial and essential difference between them, and the decided superiority of the one invented by Professor Morse." The consideration of the subject is closed in the opinion in Chief, by "regarding Professor Morse as the first and original inventor of the Telegraph." The opinion read by Justice Grier is stronger, but fully sustains the opinion read by the Chief; and we may safely say that it is the united and unanimous opinion of the entire Bench of the Supreme Court. The Justice thus spoke, viz. :-—

"The word 'Telegraph' is derived from the Greek, and signifies 'to write afar off, or at a distance.' It has, therefore, been applied to various contrivances, or devices, to communicate intelligence by means of signals or semaphores, which speak to the eye for a moment; but in its primary and literal signification of writing, or recording at a distance, it never was invented, perfected, or put into practical operation, till it was done by Morse. He preceded Steinheil, Cooke, Wheatstone, and Davy, in the successful application of the mysterious power or element of electro-magnetism to this purpose; and his invention has entirely superseded their inefficient contrivances. It is not only a new and useful art,' if that term means anything, but a most wonderful and astonishing invention, requiring tenfold more ingenuity and patient experiment to perfect it, than the art of printing with types and press, as originally invented."

The honorable Court carefully considered the claims of the respective inventors of the telegraphs of Europe and America, and the evidence sustaining Morse seems to have been unquestionable. He now stands high above the petty assaults of an envious world, and can smile with composure at the weak and unprincipled attacks of a restless ambition for fame, groping through the world, hoping to attain distinction by assailing the just and pure in heart.

We have said that the Court has decided "that Morse was the first and original inventor of the Telegraph." The word means, to write at a distance. Morse was the first to accomplish that desideratum, and therefore he is justly the inventor of the Telegraph; and, as there is a star of the first magnitude that shines from the firmament with more brilliancy than all the combined constellations that beautify and adorn the handiwork of the Creator, so will the Morse Telegraph be, unrivalled in grandeur, without a twin to share the praises of generations in future, which will be conferred upon it, until Time shall be wrapped in the folds of his winding-sheet, and ceases to exist, by the decree of the will Infinite.

Next, and second, viz. :—

Should the Patent date from the French Patent ?-Morse applied for a patent in the United States in 1838. Before it was granted in 1840, he procured a patent from France. The Court decides that the American patent is not void because it does not bear date with the French issue.

The next and third is,

Ratification of the Seven Claims.-The Court was unanimous in the ratification, in the most unqualified sense, of the Patent of 1840, so far as relates to the seven claims. The Chief said, "We perceive no well-founded objection to the description which is given of the whole invention, and its separate parts, nor to his right to a patent for the first seven inventions set forth in the specification of his claims," consisting of a galvanic battery, or any known generator of galvanism or electricity, a galvanic or electric circuit, composed of any known conductors of electricity, a Port Rule and Signal Lever, or other contrivance for closing and breaking the circuit, all in combination with an Electro-Magnet or device by which the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call Electro-Magnetism, may be developed and applied to give motion to other machinery, for the purpose of marking or imprinting intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distance." This is what the Court has decreed to Morse as his right, and in which he will be protected. The Chief not only unqualifiedly sustains the seven claims, and

the specifications entire, but also in the most positive manner interprets the extent of those claims and specifications, and declares that

"The substitution of marks and signs differing from those invented by Professor Morse" cannot be a defence; and that

"His patent is not for the invention of a new alphabet; but for a combination of powers composed of tangible and intangible elements, described in his specification, by means of which marks or signs may be impressed upon paper at a distance, which can there be read and understood. And if any marks, or signs, or LETTERS are impressed in that manner by means of a process substantially the same with his invention, or with any particular part of it covered by his patent, and those marks or signs can be read, and thus communicate intelligence, it is an infringement of his patent. The variation in the character of the marks would not protect it, if the marks could be read and understood."

It will be perceived that the Court has most fully sustained the Morse patents, to reach all variations; and the use of the Roman letter, or any other, or even a sound, capable of being interpreted, is an infringement of his patents. If any part of Morse's mode, process, or the "substitution of wellknown equivalents," in the language of the Court, "the rights of the patent are infringed." The confirmation of the seven claims with the specifications establishes the Morse patent to its fullest extent. Every material element and material part of the patent of 1840 is ratified in the most positive sense, all that Morse has ever presumed to claim as his rights in those letters patent. With a view of discussing this point further, we shall notice next, and fourthly,

The Eighth Claim too Broad.-This claim the honorable Court declared was too broad. Why? In a few words we shall condense the lengthy argument, and demonstrate that, in declaring this claim too broad, it is not consistent with the ratification of the seven claims and specifications. The eighth claim is merely declaratory, and does not really extend further in substantiality than is attained by the rights guaranteed to Morse in the seven. But the Court says it is too broad! and the reasoning is based upon an entire misconstruction of that claim, extending its force beyond the conception of Morse, or its language. The Court says, that "he claims the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the electric or galvanic current," &c. In this, the Court erred in the interpretation. Morse claims no improvement whatever, unless that improvement is his own, as was that embraced in the patent of 1846. If Morse intended to reach that end, by the claim in question, there would have been no ne

cessity for his procuring the patent of 1846, as an improvement on the invention patented in 1840. Suppose that the improvement embraced in the patent of 1846 had been the invention of Mr. O'Rielly, and not Morse, would not O'Rielly have been entitled to the patent for that improvement? On what would it have been an improvement? Unquestionably, it would have been an improvement on Morse's invention of 1840; but, in order that Mr. O'Rielly might avail himself of that patent, he must first get the right from the patentee of 1840. But Morse was the inventor of the patent of 1846, and the Court says, that "there is nothing in the act that forbids him to take out a new patent for the improvement, if he prefers it. Any other inventor might do so; and there can be no reason, in justice or in policy, for refusing the like privilege to the original inventor"-and that “ he must stand on the same footing with any other inventor of an improvement upon a previous discovery," but, "that he shall not claim as new what is covered by a former invention, whether made by himself or any other person." Under these restrictions of the law, Morse procured his patent of 1846. If the eighth claim had been considered as broad as the honorable Court has seen fit to interpret it, there would have been no necessity for his procuring a patent for the improvement. Buckley obtained a patent for an improvement in the art of telegraphing in connection with Morse's pa tents. Morse did not claim that improvement as being covered by his eighth claim; but, on the contrary, a company, in which Morse is a large stockholder, paid Buckley $10,000 for that improvement. Cornell has a patent for an improvement in connecting a series of circuits. Speed has invented improvements, and so have many others. Morse never claimed those improvements as his property, but he has actually participated in purchasing such to be used with his system. With these facts existing, we unhesitatingly assert, with due respect to the high and august tribunal deciding, that in the interpretation of the eighth claim to mean that Morse "claims the exclusive right to every improvement where the motive power is the electric or galvanic current," the Court defines the claim to extend far beyond the objects and purposes designed by Morse; and his course demonstrates the fact. The single reference to his procuring the patent of 1846, we presume, is sufficient in the premises.

The claim in question is merely declaratory, and his disclaimer will not weaken the full force of his rights as contemplated by him in his eighth claim as it exists, especially taken in connection with the present complete ratification of the seven claims and specifications, which the Court has awarded him as his just and legal property, and in which he is to be protected.